Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN5728
2005-07-19 06:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:
SENATOR LEVIN MEETS JORDAN'S KING ABDULLAH
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005728
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV OREP JO
SUBJECT: SENATOR LEVIN MEETS JORDAN'S KING ABDULLAH
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale according to Section 1.4 (b
and d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005728
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV OREP JO
SUBJECT: SENATOR LEVIN MEETS JORDAN'S KING ABDULLAH
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale according to Section 1.4 (b
and d)
1. (C) Summary: Senator Levin met King Abdullah on July 7 to
discuss key issues in the region, most notably the Iraq
reconstruction process. The King commented on the ongoing
insurgency, and identified steps to end it, including a more
inclusive political process and poverty alleviation. The King
also spoke about U.S. efforts to encourage reform in Syria,
expressing some doubt that any real progress had been made.
Also attending the meeting were Charge d'Affaires David Hale,
U.S. Senate staff memebers Richard Debobes and Daniel Cox,
Jordanian Foreign Minister Farouq Qasrawi, and Royal Court
Policy Coordination Director Abdullah Wraikat. End Summary.
--------------
IRAQ TOPS THE AGENDA
--------------
2. (C) The King was frank when asked for his assessment of
the insurgency in Iraq. He said that he saw no sign of a
respite from the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. The King
estimated that they numbered in the "hundreds" not
"thousands", which in his mind is sufficient to provide an
ample reserve of suicide bombers. Additionally, the King
feared that Iraqis were now taking a larger role in the
insurgency, replacing the foreigners. The King noted
indigenous extremist forces would be much more difficult to
defeat than foreign fighters.
3. (C) When asked, the King offered his recommendations to
Senator Levin on how best to defeat the insurgency. Foremost
among these was political inclusion. Positive progress in
drafting a constitution with the participation of credible
Sunni representatives was critical, according to the King. If
Sunni leadership was brought into the political process, it
would have an incentive and a responsibility to fight against
the insurgency. If the December 2005 elections are inclusive,
he noted, Iraq will have turned a new page. If they are not,
and the Sunnis continue to feel isolated, they will be pushed
toward the extreme.
4. (C) The King said that not enough was being done to
address poverty in Iraq. At this point, he said, you could
get an Iraqi to "do anything" for a few hundred dollars.
Alleviating this suffering would help pull some of the
disenfranchised elements of society back into the mainstream.
On other fronts, the King was more positive. He stated that
continued Sunni outreach was a necessary step. He stressed
the importance of adequately equipping and training Iraqi
police and security elements, and he assessed that military
training had proven more successful than police training,
noting that it was a difficult task to balance quality
training with the need for quick turnover. When asked, the
King said that he could only venture a guess of 50/50 odds
that the insurgency would end in the foreseeable future. He
agreed with Senator Levin that there needs to be an effort to
convince skeptics that the U.S. will stand down once Iraqi
security forces are able to stand up on their own. Again when
asked, he agreed that an Iraqi National Assembly endorsement
of the U.S. presence in Iraq might be helpful, but only if
embraced by all factions. He also agreed that additional
international involvement with coalition forces would be
desirable, but cautioned that not all nationalities would be
welcome. Specifically with regard to the involvement of
Muslim states, the King said that participants, possibly as
part of a UN action, would have to be drawn from regions
distant from Iraq, such as Indonesia or Morocco, to avoid the
perception that Iraq's Muslim neighbors were participating
solely to advance their own agendas.
--------------
KING: SYRIAN BEHAVIOR LARGELY UNCHANGED
--------------
5. (C) Asked by the Senator for his thoughts on developments
in Syria, the King remarked that Syrian behavior on key
issues, such as their support for Hizballah and the
exfiltration of terrorists across their borders, had not
changed significantly. They Syrian strategy has been to offer
just enough concessions to appease the international
community and obtain relief from U.S. pressure, but not to
make any real strategic policy changes.
6. (U) Senator Levin did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.
HALE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV OREP JO
SUBJECT: SENATOR LEVIN MEETS JORDAN'S KING ABDULLAH
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale according to Section 1.4 (b
and d)
1. (C) Summary: Senator Levin met King Abdullah on July 7 to
discuss key issues in the region, most notably the Iraq
reconstruction process. The King commented on the ongoing
insurgency, and identified steps to end it, including a more
inclusive political process and poverty alleviation. The King
also spoke about U.S. efforts to encourage reform in Syria,
expressing some doubt that any real progress had been made.
Also attending the meeting were Charge d'Affaires David Hale,
U.S. Senate staff memebers Richard Debobes and Daniel Cox,
Jordanian Foreign Minister Farouq Qasrawi, and Royal Court
Policy Coordination Director Abdullah Wraikat. End Summary.
--------------
IRAQ TOPS THE AGENDA
--------------
2. (C) The King was frank when asked for his assessment of
the insurgency in Iraq. He said that he saw no sign of a
respite from the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. The King
estimated that they numbered in the "hundreds" not
"thousands", which in his mind is sufficient to provide an
ample reserve of suicide bombers. Additionally, the King
feared that Iraqis were now taking a larger role in the
insurgency, replacing the foreigners. The King noted
indigenous extremist forces would be much more difficult to
defeat than foreign fighters.
3. (C) When asked, the King offered his recommendations to
Senator Levin on how best to defeat the insurgency. Foremost
among these was political inclusion. Positive progress in
drafting a constitution with the participation of credible
Sunni representatives was critical, according to the King. If
Sunni leadership was brought into the political process, it
would have an incentive and a responsibility to fight against
the insurgency. If the December 2005 elections are inclusive,
he noted, Iraq will have turned a new page. If they are not,
and the Sunnis continue to feel isolated, they will be pushed
toward the extreme.
4. (C) The King said that not enough was being done to
address poverty in Iraq. At this point, he said, you could
get an Iraqi to "do anything" for a few hundred dollars.
Alleviating this suffering would help pull some of the
disenfranchised elements of society back into the mainstream.
On other fronts, the King was more positive. He stated that
continued Sunni outreach was a necessary step. He stressed
the importance of adequately equipping and training Iraqi
police and security elements, and he assessed that military
training had proven more successful than police training,
noting that it was a difficult task to balance quality
training with the need for quick turnover. When asked, the
King said that he could only venture a guess of 50/50 odds
that the insurgency would end in the foreseeable future. He
agreed with Senator Levin that there needs to be an effort to
convince skeptics that the U.S. will stand down once Iraqi
security forces are able to stand up on their own. Again when
asked, he agreed that an Iraqi National Assembly endorsement
of the U.S. presence in Iraq might be helpful, but only if
embraced by all factions. He also agreed that additional
international involvement with coalition forces would be
desirable, but cautioned that not all nationalities would be
welcome. Specifically with regard to the involvement of
Muslim states, the King said that participants, possibly as
part of a UN action, would have to be drawn from regions
distant from Iraq, such as Indonesia or Morocco, to avoid the
perception that Iraq's Muslim neighbors were participating
solely to advance their own agendas.
--------------
KING: SYRIAN BEHAVIOR LARGELY UNCHANGED
--------------
5. (C) Asked by the Senator for his thoughts on developments
in Syria, the King remarked that Syrian behavior on key
issues, such as their support for Hizballah and the
exfiltration of terrorists across their borders, had not
changed significantly. They Syrian strategy has been to offer
just enough concessions to appease the international
community and obtain relief from U.S. pressure, but not to
make any real strategic policy changes.
6. (U) Senator Levin did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.
HALE