Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN5519
2005-07-12 04:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

STAFFDEL TALWAR AND FM QASRAWI DISCUSS GAZA

Tags:  PREL KPAL ECON JO IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

120456Z Jul 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005519 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2015
TAGS: PREL KPAL ECON JO IZ
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL TALWAR AND FM QASRAWI DISCUSS GAZA
WITHDRAWAL, IRAQ, AND IRAN


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005519

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2015
TAGS: PREL KPAL ECON JO IZ
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL TALWAR AND FM QASRAWI DISCUSS GAZA
WITHDRAWAL, IRAQ, AND IRAN


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 9 meeting, Jordanian Foreign
Minister Farouk Qasrawi shared with Senior Professional Staff
Member Puneet Talwar (SFRC) and Charge his opinions on
regional issues. The upcoming Gaza withdrawal, Qasrawi felt,
should be followed up with further Israeli withdrawals and a
concerted world focus on the economic development of the
Palestinian territories. To confront Hamas, the Palestinian
Authority and Fatah would first have to reform themselves.
The situation in Iraq would be improved by a lowered profile
for U.S. armed forces and more visible and accelerated
reconstruction efforts. Ahmedinejad's election as president
of Iran was bad for the region, and the Iranians
unfortunately would not give up their nuclear program even
with pressure. END SUMMARY.

--------------
GAZA WITHDRAWAL
--------------


2. (C) Minister Qasrawi stated that the Palestinians were
disillusioned with the stagnation in the economy, their lack
of freedom of movement, the continuation of construction of
settlements and the barrier, the lack of basic public order
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the disarray within the
PA. Even so, he said, the Palestinians must now show unity
and ensure that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is allowed
to proceed in a quiet, orderly manner. Otherwise, the
Palestinians would be the "big losers." Unfortunately, said
Qasrawi, there seemed to be a lack of coordination between
Israel and the PA on the withdrawal. (NOTE: In an aside,
Qasrawi mentioned that prior to the meeting, he had been in a
conference call with the Jordanian Embassy in Israel and
Abdul Salam Abbadi, Jordan's Minister of Awqaf, regarding
threat information shared by the government of Israel. This
information, he intimated, concerned the possibility that
Jewish extremist groups might attempt something against the
Islamic sites on the Temple Mount in order to disrupt the
withdrawal from Gaza.)

--------------
NEXT STEPS
--------------


3. (C) In Gaza, economic development needed to happen
quickly, Qasrawi said. He was pleased by the appointment of

James Wolfensohn to spearhead this effort, and said that the
$3 billion that the G8 had promised the Palestinians would
help to change their perceptions of their own potential.
However, he said, Israel needed to continue its phased
withdrawal as laid out in the roadmap, concentrating
particularly on making good on promised withdrawals from West
Bank cities. Qasrawi noted in this context the Jordanian
offer to send the remnants of the Palestinian Liberation Army
(the "Badr Corps") to help with the security of the West
Bank. President Abbas had asked for them, they were
depoliticized, and their lack of strong local ties after so
many years abroad might be an advantage. However, the
Israelis had turned them down. Qasrawi also noted that
Jordan stood ready to train Palestinian troops in Jordan.


4. (C) If there were no further steps to withdraw after Gaza,
there would be further problems. Qasrawi particularly
worried that if Palestinians saw no hope, they would start
trying to emigrate. He noted that just the possibility of
this happening was already the occasion for considerable
domestic concern in Jordan, especially among the Parliament.
Jordanians, both for demographic and economic reasons, saw a
further influx of Palestinians as a threat, and they were
alarmed at both the statements made by the Lebanese about
sending their Palestinian population to Jordan and the
imagined American and Israeli conspiracies to push the West
Bank Palestinians over the river.

--------------
THE PA AND HAMAS
--------------


5. (C) Qasrawi noted that Hamas was already a potentially
more powerful political force than Fatah. Already, they were
claiming credit for the withdrawal from Gaza, and they would
likely win any elections held under Israeli occupation. The
PA had neither the firepower nor the popularity to take Hamas
on; President Abbas was "not another Arafat" and was having a
hard enough time dealing with the legacy of corruption within
the PA and trying to counter disgruntled Fatah cadres who had
lost their meal tickets in the PA. Qasrawi pointed out that
Israeli measures were only one of the factors causing Hamas
to gain popularity; its social welfare network and reputation
for incorruptibility were at least equally important. The
only hope for the PA, then, would be to reform and become
more popular than Hamas. Fatah, too, would have to
democratize, leaving behind its historic role as a one-man
show centering around Arafat. Qasrawi noted that there was
strong rhetorical support for Hamas even in Jordan, though he
did not believe that they had any organization in the refugee
camps of Jordan.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


6. (C) Qasrawi had definite ideas on ways in which he thought
the situation in Iraq might be improved. Most important, he
felt, was the continued transfer of policing duties from the
American soldiers to Iraqis. Yes, Iraqi policemen could be
brutal and had recently been savaged in an article in The
Economist; nonetheless, Iraqis preferred dealing with them to
dealing with the Americans. The more the U.S. army lowered
its profile, the further the demands for a timetable for
withdrawal would recede. The Sunnis were already more
concerned about getting a "more-than-fair" voice on the
constitutional drafting committee than about a timetable.


7. (C) A second measure the U.S. should take, according to
Qasrawi, was an acceleration of its reconstruction program
with a focus on visible projects. Such a measure would
isolate the terrorists in Iraq, of which Qasrawi's Iraqi
counterparts believed 80% were foreign.

--------------
IRAN
--------------


8. (C) Qasrawi stated that while the recent election of
Ahmedinejad as president had been a bad sign, it was not a
completely unexpected occurrence. Nobody had really been
excited about Rafsanjani, and once the suspect first round of
elections had narrowed the field to two candidates, Qasrawi
said, he had predicted a victory for Ahmedinejad. The
Ahmedinejad victory, however, was not good for either Iraq or
the Palestinians. The ill effects of the election on the
latter had been seen recently in Hizbullah-provoked incidents
that could not have happened without the connivance of the
Iranians. Iran, Qasrawi said, did not care about the welfare
of the Palestinians even at the popular level - but this fact
only made them more dangerous, because they could play the
issue in pursuit of purely cynical goals.


9. (C) Qasrawi was equally pessimistic about the prospects
for stopping the Iranian nuclear program. Iran, he said,
wanted to regain its role as the primary regional force,
which it had lost in the Iran-Iraq War. The nuclear program
was one issue that the entire country could agree on; even
liberal Iranians would not criticize it. Therefore, even the
likely European backlash against Iran in the wake of the
election would not be enough to deter the Iranian leadership
from using the program to unite the people behind them.


10. (U) Puneet Talwar cleared this cable.
HALE