Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN4477
2005-06-06 11:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

ICRC BAGHDAD TO PUSH A "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING"

Tags:  MOPS PHUM PINS XF IZ ICRC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004477 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS XF IZ ICRC
SUBJECT: ICRC BAGHDAD TO PUSH A "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING"
AGENDA AT ITS MID-TERM REVIEW

REF: BAGHDAD 2068

Classified By: Acting DCM Christopher Henzel for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004477

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS XF IZ ICRC
SUBJECT: ICRC BAGHDAD TO PUSH A "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING"
AGENDA AT ITS MID-TERM REVIEW

REF: BAGHDAD 2068

Classified By: Acting DCM Christopher Henzel for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
).


1. (C) On the margins of the UNRWA Major Donors and Host
Nations conference (septel),PRM PDAS Greene met with ICRC
Head of Delegation (HOD) Chistoph Beney to express USG
concerns that ICRC actions in Baghdad were causing a
deterioration in the overall USG-ICRC relationship. Greene
asked that Beney implement a series of discrete steps to
start restoring USG confidence in ICRC's detention monitoring
activities in Baghdad. In the process of departing Amman to
participate in ICRC's ongoing mid-term review of its
worldwide operations, Beney told Greene that he intends to
propose that ICRC's Mid-East Zone reviewers adopt the
confidence-building measures outlined below. Beney admitted
that ICRC's institutional tendency to "view tensions in
detention work to be normal," combined with his mission's
on-the-ground absence from Iraq, had "de-sensitized" him to
the rift growing between his mission and Coalition Forces
(ref A). Beney assured Greene that the aftermath of the Camp
Bucca visit had "enlightened" him to the extent relations in
the field are strained, and expressed a desire to lay
groundwork ahead of his scheduled July departure to "turn the
situation around."

ASHRAF PLAN: ICRC REQUESTS MEK DEFECTOR LIST
--------------


2. (C) Raising the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) as a possible
vehicle to improve cooperation, Beney said he would use the
ongoing ICRC mid-term review to press ICRC to clarify its
objectives for the Ashraf Camp population "over the next six
months," starting with a developing a concrete plan to
facilitate the return of the 400-plus MEK "defectors" who are
interested in returning to Iran as soon as possible. Beney
noted that ICRC Baghdad is ready to start cross-checking the
Ashfraf residents who want to repatriate against its 1992 POW
list, but requires formal notification to start the process.
Beney added that ICRC Baghdad had approached MNF-I for the
Ashraf returnee list earlier this month. (NOTE: Beney
assured Greene that ICRC does not believe POWs have any fears

that would prevent their return to Iran. END NOTE.) Beney
predicted that ICRC would propose facilitating repatriation
through a border operation, similiar to the symbolic
repatriation carried out earlier this year. However, if the
numbers prepared to return turned out to be small, Beney
thought ICRC would consider using its aircraft to facilitate
returns directly from airports inside Iraq.


3. (C) Beney expressed hope that progress on the MEK
defectors would create sufficient momentum to enable ICRC to
make a commitment to conduct private interviews for the
remaining 3,000 Ashraf residents over the next six months.
He also proposed that ICRC help raise interest in
repatriation to Iran by improving telephone access for those
who have already returned. However, he stressed that ICRC
Geneva is struggling to see the value of interviewing the
remaining 3,000 Camp Ashraf population who "remain under MEK
control," and is concerned that the USG expects ICRC to "work
miracles" by identifying a new population who want to return
to Iran or finding a third-country destination for
resettlement.

ACKNOWLEDGE IMPROVEMENTS IN DETENTION CONDITIONS
-------------- ---


4. (C) Turning to ICRC inspections of MNF-I detention
facilities, Beney acknowledged that inmate conditions have
improved over the past year and that "ICRC should have been
more appreciative of the improvements, and should have
recognized the efforts that have been made." But he
expressed concern about persistent reports that suggest ICRC
Baghdad is "fixated on the provision of toothbrushes," when
ICRC has communicated its serious outstanding concerns
regarding undisclosed transfers to visiting USG delegations.
Beney thought that ICRC could improve the lines of
communication by working to meet MNF-I in Baghdad on a
monthly basis, adding that he would visit Baghdad with his
yet-to-be-named successor in July to kick-start the process.
On ICRC Baghdad's efforts to engage MNF-I on its IHL
concerns, Beney acknowledged that their efforts were
"mis-timed," and stressed that ICRC has no interest in
extending legal recognition to the insurgents. He also
assured Greene that ICRC Baghdad has "nothing to gain in
talking to the press," and would work to ensure that any
statements were coordinated with Washington through its
Headquarters in Geneva in the future.

5. (C) PRM PDAS GREENE COMMENT: Beney clearly feels the
heat of intense USG dissatisfaction with aspects of ICRC's
performance in Iraq. Clearly, Beney also feels significant
pressure from ICRC headquarters to improve the relationship
with the USG. While responsive to USG criticism, Beney is
transiting to another assignment and will not be a factor in
moving the relationship forward. To get the relationship
back on track, we will continue to strongly encourage a
senior-level visit from ICRC Geneva to press ICRC to make
tangible commitments regarding the Ashraf population, and
urge it to focus on making tangible improvements to their
press and communications strategy in Iraq. END COMMENT.


6. (U) This message was cleared by PRM PDAS Richard Greene.


















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