Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN2043
2005-03-10 17:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON POLITICAL REFORM IN JORDAN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KMPI JO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002043 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KMPI JO
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON POLITICAL REFORM IN JORDAN

Classified By: Charge David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002043

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KMPI JO
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON POLITICAL REFORM IN JORDAN

Classified By: Charge David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) After a hopeful start, a well-publicized push for
political reform announced by King Abdullah in late 2003 lost
momentum as the GOJ struggled internally with unresolved
questions on both the pace and extent of change. Heightened
security concerns have given a louder voice to officials wary
of greater public freedoms, and contributed to a crackdown on
Islamist political activity. Eager to keep Jordan at the
forefront of regional reform in Western eyes, the King is
relying on two recent royal commissions to advance the reform
agenda and to fulfill his stated desire to promote grassroots
political participation. Many Jordanians will remain
skeptical of the King's controlled, top-down approach to
reform, and he will need to make some tough decisions when
the time comes to transfer real power to democratic
institutions. End Summary.

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ALL ABOARD THE REFORM TRAIN!
--------------


2. (U) After achieving significant progress in reforming the
Jordanian economy, King Abdullah turned his eye toward
political reform in late 2003. In a public letter to
incoming Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez in October 2003, the
King laid out his vision for the new government and declared
that political development should be "at the top" of its
priorities. He called for greater "political openness" and
"active and real participation" of all segments of society in
Jordanian political life, while highlighting the need for a
new political parties law and a "more democratic" elections
law. The King reinforced his message of deep-rooted
political reform in his address at the opening of Parliament
on December 1, 2003. Declaring that it was the duty of all
Jordanians to create "a radical, positive transformation in
our democratization process," he further noted that political
parties established by "the grassroots" with comprehensive
platforms were "vital and necessary" for the country.


3. (C) Such statements by the King and other GOJ officials
initially encouraged public and private debate on policy

issues. Criticism of the government increased as Jordanians
cautiously reacted to the apparent relaxation of some of the
unwritten limits on public expression. Meanwhile, the newly
created Ministry of Political Development -- despite limited
resources and a lackluster minister -- moved forward on an
ambitious series of meetings between senior GOJ officials
(including PM Fayez) and a variety of different groups to
discuss elements of political reform. The ministry also
produced in May 2004 a draft strategy and plan of action for
political development that was forthright in assessing the
obstacles to the creation of a democratic culture in Jordan
and that contained specific objectives including the adoption
of new legislation on elections, political parties, and
women's rights. A large public opinion poll and a "national
gathering" were planned to gauge popular expectations
regarding the plan.

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LOSING STEAM
--------------


4. (C) While USAID-supported programs aimed at promoting
educational and judicial reform continued to move forward,
the GOJ push for democratization and political reform lost
momentum as 2004 progressed. The action plan created by the
Ministry of Political Development, which had been developed
without any parliamentary input, virtually disappeared from
the public arena. The pace of public meetings on political
reform topics slackened. A number of contacts increasingly
told us that the government's emphasis on political
development had "amounted to nothing." Polling data
indicated that Jordanians were at least as afraid to voice
freely their opinions in public as they had been prior to the
political reform campaign. Government statements on reform
shifted gears and put the need for administrative and public
sector reform at center stage.


5. (C) Various factors contributed to the slow-down in
movement on political reform. Probably the most important
reason is that the GOJ had never agreed internally on the
pace, scope and mechanics of democratization. After laying
some groundwork for political reform as described above, the
government simply did not know how to proceed further.
Contacts painted a picture of a cabinet divided on this
issue, with reform-minded ministers wanting to move forward
while conservative, old-guard ministers (backed by the
ever-cautious security establishment) were just as happy for
political reform to inch along, if not cease altogether. The
reshuffling of the cabinet in October 2004 did little to
alleviate this stalemate. The Prime Minister's heart was
with the conservatives, who also dominate parliament.


6. (C) The go-slow camp was strengthened by the disruption
of a major terrorist plot in April 2004 aimed at GOJ targets
and the U.S. Embassy. This event, along with other security
threats and the danger posed by the Zarqawi terrorist
network, emboldened those who argued that too much openness
and change could endanger national security. Heightened
security concerns and fear of extremism also contributed to
government moves to reign in Islamist political activity.
There followed a round-up of unlicensed mosque preachers, the
brief detention of Islamic Action Front (IAF) members for
giving "political speeches" after Friday prayers, the seizure
of the Muslim Brotherhood's charitable fund-raising boxes,
and a campaign to stymie Islamists' use of professional
associations through vote-rigging and diversion of union
dues.

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THE KING STEPS IN
--------------


7. (C) Stalled progress on political development did not go
unnoticed by the palace. Stymied by his cabinet's lack of
action, and conscious that Jordan's image as a regional
reform leader was being eroded by developments in neighboring
states, King Abdullah went around his ministers and
parliament in December by appointing two royal commissions to
push forward his reform agenda. The first, mostly comprised
of old-guard elements, will study the establishment of
regional assemblies with devolved powers designed to move
decision-making closer to ordinary citizens. The second,
which has a much more diverse membership, will bring together
a wide range of civil society representatives and government
figures to establish a broad-based "national agenda" to
include political reform. Palace officials also state that
new legislation on elections and political parties will be
unveiled with the release of the commissions'
recommendations, probably around the end of the year. (NOTE:
PM Fayez told the press March 7 that the government had
already "outlined" a new elections law, but would "slow down"
moves to reform the electoral system pending the work of the
royal commissions. END NOTE.)

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COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Our reformist contacts outside government almost
without exception express skepticism concerning the latest
royal commissions, particularly the one focused on
decentralization, as its members lack reform credentials and
will reportedly conduct most of their work behind closed
doors. The King is insistent, however, that these
commissions constitute "irreversible" steps toward
democratization and that their final recommendations will be
implemented. Even if he is sincere in his desire to open the
political system, the King's use of palace-appointed
commissions indicates that he wants reform on his terms.
This, in turn, prompts many to wonder -- how much
democratization will the King and his advisors accept? A
vigorous political party system attracting a broad swathe of
Jordanians, combined with a truly representative parliament
with real decision-making powers and an engaged civil
society, could eventually threaten the position of the
regime's traditional backers. The powerful security services
are loathe to permit full freedom of expression and assembly,
fearing it could imperil stability. Many in the old-guard
East Bank establishment, which dominates top levels of
government and the security services, still suspect the true
loyalties of the majority Palestinian-Jordanian population
and can be expected to resist their political empowerment.
How the King handles these anti-reform pressures, and his
willingness to transfer at least some of his power to the
people (who are more conservative and more opposed to U.S.
foreign policy than the GOJ would like to acknowledge),will
determine the future of political reform in Jordan.


9. (C) With dramatic political change and opening underway
all around Jordan, leaders here are well aware that they need
to do more or risk losing their reputation for being in the
vanguard of Arab reformers. A word of encouragement from
senior U.S. officials to the King during his March 15-22
visit to Washington can help strengthen his awareness that
the time to move further on political development is overdue.


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