Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN1826
2005-03-06 14:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

MDA ISSUE: EMBLEM WORKING GROUP'S NEXT STEPS

Tags:  KPAL PREL PREF IS JO ICRC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001826 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA
GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015
TAGS: KPAL PREL PREF IS JO ICRC
SUBJECT: MDA ISSUE: EMBLEM WORKING GROUP'S NEXT STEPS

REF: A. STATE 34521 (NOTAL)

B. SANTOS-GREENE EMAIL 2/25/05

C. AMMAN 1199

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001826

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA
GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2015
TAGS: KPAL PREL PREF IS JO ICRC
SUBJECT: MDA ISSUE: EMBLEM WORKING GROUP'S NEXT STEPS

REF: A. STATE 34521 (NOTAL)

B. SANTOS-GREENE EMAIL 2/25/05

C. AMMAN 1199

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Based on recent consultations with regional
members of the Emblem Working Group, the Chair of the
International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement's Standing
Commission is confident the majority of Arab National
Societies can be persuaded to actively support the
reconvening of the aborted October 2000 conference that would
have resolved the issue of Israeli membership by adopting an
additional Third Protocol to the Geneva Convention. Dr. Al
Hadid intends to ask Arab Societies to start lobbying their
respective governments at an Arab Red Crescent Society
Meeting in Riyadh March 20-21. Dismissing Palestinian
support as "important but not a must," Al Hadid argued that
visible Swiss support would be key to any regional diplomatic
approaches. He urged the USG to join him in lobbying the
Swiss FM to appoint a high-level official to signal
international support for the conference, and also suggested
specific steps the USG could take vis-a-vis the Egyptians and
Israelis in a March 5 meeting. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) As instructed ref A, Amman-based refcoord called on
Dr. Mohammed Al Hadid, President of the Jordanian Red
Crescent Society and the current Chair of the Red Cross/Red
Crescent Movement's Standing Commission (SC),March 5 to ask
for his assessment of potential regional opposition to the
idea of reconvening the aborted 2000 conference that would
have paved the way for Israeli National Society membership by
establishing a third emblem. Al Hadid confirmed that he
broached the idea of using the upcoming March 21-21 Arab Red
Crescent Assembly meeting in Riyadh to advance the notion of
the conference during his talks with SC Emblem Working Group
Chair Ambassador Philippe Cuvellier and Egyptian Red Crescent
SecGen Dr. Mamdouh Gabr in Amman February 21. Al Hadid said
he also used the margins of a recently-concluded
International Humanitarian Law Conference in Cairo to sound
out Syrian RC President Abdul Rahman Attar, when Attar failed

to join their meeting in Amman.

POTENTIAL OPPOSITION
--------------


3. (C) Al Hadid said that he was confident, following those
meetings, that he could successfully press Arab National
Societies to start lobbying their respective governments for
the conference. Al Hadid explained that the critical
countries to bring on board, in his view, are those
"surrounding Israel." The one wildcard -- Syria -- now
appeared containable because Attar had told him in Cairo that
he believed the SAR would not/not oppose the conference.
According to Al Hadid, Attar believed the SAR would view
opposition as "a waste of time with no political gains."
Although Al Hadid acknowledged that the Syrian National
Society "cannot move on an issue without informing its
Government" he trusted Attar's preliminary judgment. Asked
about potential opponents in the larger region, Al Hadid said
that the key countries to target would be Lebanon, because of
its proximity to Israel, and Iran. He explained that he had
revised his earlier assessment that Iran would not be an
opponent (ref C) after meeting the Iranian National Society
President in Amman March 4 at a training seminar on natural
disasters. Al Hadid noted that Iran's position was "clearly
no where near as tough as it had been in the 1990s," but
cautioned that the Iranians might be inclined to politicize
the issue simply to oppose the U.S. Contrary to some
third-hand accounts, Al Hadid said that he did not/not think
we needed to focus on Sudan.


4. (C) Asked about Palestinian influence, Al Hadid
acknowledged that Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS)
President Younis Al Khatib had become more critical of the
MDA in recent years because of the PRCS's opposition to MDA
operating in the West Bank. While he acknowledged that the
Palestinians would have political influence in the region, Al
Hadid argued that their support is "not a must." He added
that MDA-PRCS outreach would be helpful if it was conducted
in a manner that did not appear to the Palestinians as if
they were being "bribed." Al Hadid noted that the Jordanian
Red Crescent was in the process of seeking EU funds to
support an MDA training program, and might be well positioned
to offer trilateral Jordanian Red Crescent-MDA-PRCS training
opportunities, provided if it could secure external funding.
Al Hadid added that he was "more hopeful" that the incoming
MDA Chair would focus on strengthening MDA's relations with
regional societies, noting that Avi Zohar had turned down
several opportunities to visit Jordan during his tenure.

AL HADID'S REGIONAL STRATEGY
--------------


5. (C) Turing to his regional strategy, Al Hadid explained
that his next step would be to raise the conference issue at
the Arab Assembly Executive Committee meeting March 20 in
Riyadh. Because prior commitments will make it impossible
for him to remain in Riyadh to address the full Assembly
March 21-22, he planned to ask Dr. Gabr to convey a two part
message on his behalf: 1) The SC Chair believes the time is
right to reconvene the 2000 conference and 2) that he was
counting on Arab National Societies to lobby their
governments, especially government officials appointed since

2000. Al Hadid predicted that there would be "little
opposition" in Riyadh as the issue was ultimately a decision
for governments. Continuing, he intimated that lining up
Swiss support would be key to securing the support of Arab
governments. He argued that it was critical, in his view, to
convince the Swiss to appoint a Commissioner or
Ambassador-at-Large responsible for the conference, as they
had done in 2000, as this would pave the way for any
diplomatic overtures by sending a clear signal of the level
of international support. Al Hadid said that Ambassador
Cuvellier would be seeking a meeting with the Swiss FM in the
coming month, and that he would also attempt to raise the
issue with the Swiss MFA during his March 7-13 visit to
Switzerland.


AL HADID ON US INFLUENCE
--------------


6. (C) Al Hadid thought the USG should also start making
diplomatic overtures in the region. He strongly suggested
approaching Egypt first, given its standing in the region on
the Arab-Israeli issue. Al Hadid argued that FM Aboul Ghaith
would be a more effective ally than the Egyptian Government
spokesman identified by Ambassador Cuvellier in Ref. B to
generate regional support, but recommended that the American
RC ask the Egyptian RC to lay the groundwork with the FM
first in case the issue is unfamiliar. With regard to other
bilateral USG approaches, Al Hadid noted that it is important
to argue that the third emblem would assist countries other
than Israel, such as Eritrea. He also appealed to the USG to
join him in underscoring the importance of statute compliance
with the Israelis. Commenting that "we have to get Israel to
pull its act together," Al Hadid said meetings he has had
with visiting MDA officials over the last month have left him
increasingly concerned that they do not fully realize that
adoption of the third protocol alone will not guarantee
membership.

HALE