KAZAKHSTAN: EUR DAS KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 000537

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE),DRL/PHD (PDAVIES)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KZ POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: EUR DAS KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH
OPPOSITION PARTIES

REF: A. 04 ALMATY 4811


B. ALMATY 377

C. ALMATY 166 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: In a February 5 roundtable with Kazakhstani
opposition politicians, DAS Kennedy discussed the current
political environment following flawed parliamentary
elections and the opposition's attempts to develop a unified
campaign platform and a single presidential candidate.
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan representatives described the
legal challenges facing the party and called on the USG to
demonstrate its support. Representatives of the more
centrist Ak Zhol party echoed DCK's call for U.S. action, and
repeatedly raised the specter of growing Islamization of the
Kazakhstani population. All participants confirmed the
opposition's decision to boycott the GOK's
recently-established National Commission on Democratization
and Civil Society. One DCK representative indicated a
willingness to consider participation if Galymzham Zhakiyanov
were freed, however. Several participants expressed concern
about the image of the U.S. in Kazakhstan, claiming that the
public saw high-level contacts with the GOK as support for a
corrupt regime. End summary.


2. (SBU) EUR DAS Laura Kennedy held a roundtable with
opposition party representatives on February 5 at the
Ambassador's residence in Almaty. Participants included
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, chairman of the Opposition Coordination
Council; Ak Zhol co-chairman Bulat Abilov, Oraz Zhandosov,
and Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly; Communist Party head Serikbolsyn
Abdildin; and Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK)
representatives Assylbek Kozhakhmetov and Tolen Tokhtasynov.

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Political Overview
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2. (C) Tuyakbay, clearly now recognized as leader of the
opposition following his election as chairman of the
Opposition Coordination Council (OCC, ref A),kicked off the
conversation with an introduction of the political parties
present and an overview of the flawed parliamentary elections
in September-October 2004. He informed DAS Kennedy of his
own resignation as speaker of the Mazhilis and deputy
chairman of President Nazarbayev's Otan party following
Nazarbayev's refusal to rectify the many problems with the
elections. He commented bitterly that Nazarbayev's only
action had been to present former PA head Imangali
Tasmagambetov (ref B) with an award and make him mayor of
Almaty. Tuyakbay outlined the OCC's priorities of seeking
reform, including the adoption of a new Constitution, and the
peaceful transfer of power.


3. (C) Abdildin, at 67 the dean of the opposition movement,
claimed that the opposition is stronger now than ever. He
praised Tuyakbay, Zhandosov, and Sarsenbaiuly for their
knowledge of government operations, and noted that the rest
were successful businessmen who understood the market
economy. Abdildin echoed Tuyakbay's criticism of the
parliamentary elections, noting that in its history as an
independent country Kazakhstan had never had an election that
was transparent and free of falsifications. He stressed that
the situation would never change as long as Nazarbayev was in
power, as he treats the country "as his own property."
Abdildin criticized the OSCE for not coming right out in its
report and saying that the elections were not legitimate. He
also called on the U.S. to speak out "at the highest levels."


4. (C) Sarsenbaiuly explained that Ak Zhol was made up of
people who had been in government and taken part in the
economic reforms of the early to mid-1990s. They believed
that democratic reform would follow, but eventually left
government when it became clear that would not happen.
Sarsenbaiuly claimed that since 2001, the country had been
moving backward on the political front. Right now it ranks
somewhere between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but soon it
would slip to between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan due to
limits on the press and political parties and the existence
of political prisoners. The OCC had been formed to try to
move the country back in the right direction and counteract
the move toward authoritarianism and closure of the country.

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Unified Presidential Candidate?
--------------


5. (C) In response to DAS Kennedy's question about prospects
for a single opposition presidential candidate, Zhandosov
confirmed that it was the OCC's primary goal. Abdildin added


that the opposition was developing a coordinated campaign
platform, the centerpiece of which was a new Constitution.
Tuyakbay indicated that reforms would focus on the protection
of individual rights and freedoms, including the right to
political participation and the creation of the necessary
conditions. He stressed the need for a system of true checks
and balances between the three branches of power, outlining a
presidential-parliamentary system with a stronger prime
minister than the status quo and a single-term limit for the
president. He also called for the parliament to be formed
exclusively through single-member district voting, rather
than by party lists and presidential appointment.


6. (C) Abilov stated that the last elections had revealed
both a crisis of ideas and of trust in the authorities. He
claimed that many people did not vote because they have lost
confidence in the current leaders and want an alternative.
Abilov claimed that the country is held "hostage" to
Kazakhgate (i.e. the Giffen trial) and the corruption of
President Nazarbayev. He stressed that the opposition is
realistic and does not expect "a miracle tomorrow;" they are
focused on unifying in order to achieve a just Kazakhstan.
(Note: On February 1, Abilov was elected chair of an OCC
working group dedicated to the formation of a mass national
movement of parties, NGOs, and private individuals to be
called "For a Just Kazakhstan.")

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DCK is the Canary in the Coal Mine
--------------


7. (C) Kozhakhmetov gave a lengthy overview of the legal
challenges facing DCK (ref C),stressing that the
government's legal move against his party was a result of the
fact that it could not defeat the opposition on the basis of
ideology alone. He noted that DCK had always highly valued
the support of the USG and international organizations, but
did not sense that support was as strong now as before.
(Note: This was undoubtedly a reference to the fact that we
have not issued a public statement, as Kozhakhmetov had
requested, on the liquidation case.) Kozhakhmetov noted that
President Bush had referred to support for political
dissidents in his inauguration speech, and asked what the
impact would be on U.S. foreign policy. He declared that
regardless of the outcome of the next appeal hearing,
scheduled for February 9, the government would not be able to
get rid of DCK's supporters and their beliefs.

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The "Islamist Threat"
--------------


8. (C) Zhandosov explained that the OCC was developing a
unified electoral campaign based largely on the concept of
fighting corruption. When in government themselves, the
members of the OCC had worked to increase transparency and
the openness of relations between the government and the
people. They themselves had all avoided the temptation of
corruption. Zhandosov noted that the investment climate in
Kazakhstan had worsened because the government did not have a
sense of accountability. The situation was bearable for
large firms, such as Western energy companies, but very
difficult for small firms. He stressed that the opposition's
approach to improving the investment climate meshed well with
U.S. interests and policy goals. Shifting to the political
environment, Zhandosov warned that if the situation does not
change, in ten years the opposition in Kazakhstan will be
Islamist and anti-foreign. The presidential elections will
be crucial. Echoing Kozhakhmetov's comments about the
President's inaugural address, Zhandosov called for concrete
action to follow. He proposed that the U.S. work with Ak
Zhol to identify judges who had issued biased rulings after
the parliamentary elections in order to exclude them from any
U.S.-funded training. He also suggested unspecified action
against media outlets that spread disinformation during the
campaign.


9. (C) Tuyakbay quickly jumped in to clarify that the
opposition was seeking the USG's "moral support" as it
confronted the corrupt authorities running the country. They
were not asking the U.S. to bring about the transfer of
power; rather, the opposition simply wanted the U.S. to speak
out when things are wrong.

-------------- --------------
National Commission on Democratization and Civil Society
-------------- --------------


10. (C) DAS Kennedy asked the roundtable participants
whether the OCC's decision to boycott the new National
Commission on Democratization and Civil Society, which goes


by the unfortunate Russian acronym NKVD, still stood.
Tokhtasynov specified that opposition parties would
participate if Galymzhan Zhakiyanov were freed; the
parliamentary elections were declared invalid and re-run; and
there was direct dialogue with Nazarbayev. He later offered
that freeing Zhakiyanov would be a good first step.
Sarsenbaiuly stated that the NKVD had been created as cover
for the bad elections and was only a PR move. He stressed
that the opposition could not responsibly take part when
nothing had been done to address election violations, when
political prisoners were still being held, and when the
government was attacking opposition parties and newspapers.
Sarsenbaiuly then added that the USG's decision to receive a
Kazakhstani official who had been involved in the sale of
arms to North Korea (note: current MOD Altynbayev) at high
levels cast doubt on the intentions and priorities of the
U.S.

--------------
U.S. Assistance to Kazakhstan, Image
--------------


11. (C) Tokhtasynov commented that television coverage of DAS
Kennedy's February 4 press conference in Astana had been
slanted, mistranslated, and had presented her comments on
U.S. assistance for democratic development as an apology or
justification of U.S. policy. DAS Kennedy assured the group
that we stand firmly behind our policy of support for the
development of a democratic process and are very open in our
discussions with the GOK. However, both DAS Kennedy and the
Ambassador stressed that the U.S. has made it clear it was
not advocating a Rose or ORANGE Revolution in Kazakhstan.
The task of bringing about political change rested with the
opposition and the people of Kazakhstan, not the USG.
Sarsenbaiuly commented that the opposition understood that
the U.S. government's primary goal in the region was
stability, and that the U.S. saw democratization as a
necessary condition for stability. He stressed that the
Nazarbayev regime could not provide long-term stability: it
faced increasing Islamization, the export of narcotics, a
worsening investment climate, growing corruption, and the
lack of development/infrastructure. Sarsenbaiuly claimed
that high-level U.S. contacts are perceived by the public as
support for a corrupt regime, and called for the USG to treat
the GOK as it treats the government of Belarus. Zhandosov
echoed Sarsenbaiuly's comments, noting that the U.S. was seen
in Kazakhstan as the friend of power rather than the friend
of the people.


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