Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALMATY4076
2005-11-16 05:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: TAZHIN ON ZHAKIYANOV, ELECTIONS

Tags:  KZ PGOV PHUM PREL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 004076 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN J. MUDGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015
TAGS: KZ PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TAZHIN ON ZHAKIYANOV, ELECTIONS

REF: A. ALMATY 3924

B. ALMATY 4029

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 004076

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN J. MUDGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015
TAGS: KZ PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TAZHIN ON ZHAKIYANOV, ELECTIONS

REF: A. ALMATY 3924

B. ALMATY 4029

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: President Nazarbayev's chief political
strategist told the Ambassador on November 4 that he was
confident of Nazarbayev's convincing lead in the presidential
race, and even somewhat surprised that the opposition had not
made a stronger showing to date. Deputy Presidential
Administration Head Marat Tazhin said that Nazarbayev has
enjoyed consistent ratings of 69-75% since July. In
contrast, For a Just Kazakhstan candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay
and Ak Zhol candidate Alikhan Baymenov were polling at the
most 12% and 6% respectively nationwide. Tazhin indicated
that certain regional leaders had been reprimanded for
interfering in opposition campaign events, but maintained
that overall Tuyakbay and Baymenov have been able to campaign
freely and get their message out in the press. He indicated
that the implementation of democratic reforms after the
election would depend in large part on which camp within the
government came out on top. Tazhin hinted that Nazarbayev's
October 24 statement regarding his willingness to work with
the opposition after the elections had created the basis for
cooperation with opposition leaders. Tazhin also reported
that the decision had been made to free jailed opposition
leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administration Marat Tazhin in Astana on
November 4 to discuss the political environment in the run-up
to December 4 presidential elections.

--------------
Zhakiyanov to Be Freed
--------------


3. (C) Tazhin opened the conversation by informing the
Ambassador that opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov would
be freed. Tazhin explained that the judicial process would
take another three to four weeks, but the fundamental
decision to free him had been made. He commented that U.S.
interventions had had an impact on the GOK's decision, which
he contrasted with the handling of the Khodorkovskiy case in
Russia and described as an example of Kazakhstan's capacity
for modernization. (Note: On November 2, the administration

of the "settlement colony" in Shiderty where Zhakiyanov is
being held formally recommended him for release. A court
must now act on the recommendation. Zhakiyanov's wife
Karlygash told POEC chief on November 2 that she is confident
that the court will ratify the colony administration's
recommendation. End note.)

--------------
Presidential Campaign "Boring"
--------------


4. (C) When asked by the Ambassador how the campaign was
progressing, Tazhin exclaimed that it was "boring." He had
expected more changes in the popularity ratings of the
candidates after the campaign began. Instead, Nazarbayev's
rating had remained stable; Tazhin attributed this to the
positive economic situation, the effect of Nazarbayev's
February 1 address to the nation, the impact of unrest in
Kyrgyzstan and Andijon, and the increase in Nazarbayev's
domestic and international activity. Tazhin added that
Nazarbayev's October 24 statement regarding his willingness
to work with the opposition after the election if they behave
responsibly during the campaign had also had the desired
positive effect.


5. (C) Tazhin commented that the opposition candidates have
been able to campaign nationwide and get their message out to
the public. Newspapers that support FJK candidate Zharmakhan
Tuyakbay have a weekly print run of 700,000-940,000 copies.
The Ambassador noted that there have been many problems with
seizures and interference with the delivery of opposition
papers. Tazhin minimized the issue, claiming that delivery
problems resulted from the opposition papers' use of
unreliable distributors. He said that these papers were now
negotiating an agreement with KazPost that would improve
distribution. (Note: Opposition representatives have told
us in the past that papers sent via KazPost often do not
reach their destination. End note.) Tazhin questioned the
wisdom of the opposition's strategy of holding meetings with
300-400 people at a time in cities around the country, rather
than doing larger events that would reach a wider audience.
He also commented that Tuyakbay and Baymenov were not
purchasing many television ads.

--------------

Tuyakbay Polling 10-12%
--------------


6. (C) Turning back to Tuyakbay, Tazhin noted that he has
significant financial resources. He claimed that opposition
media frequently violates electoral law by running
"propaganda" in support of Tuyakbay that is not paid for by
the campaign. Tazhin noted with irritation that the same
people then criticize the official media for reporting on
Nazarbayev. Polls commissioned by the Presidential
Administration show that Tuyakbay's nationwide rating has
increased from 5% to 10-12%. In Almaty, Tuyakbay is polling
about 15%. Tazhin predicted that Tuyakbay could reach 17-20%
if he campaigns well. He is hindered by his relative lack of
charisma and "overly serious" demeanor.

--------------
Baymenov at 6%
--------------


7. (C) Baymenov is polling around 6% nationwide, according to
Tazhin, and about 8% in Almaty. He has the benefit of a
nationwide, albeit weak, party structure and an experienced
campaign team. The PA had done a psychological focus group
on Baymenov, which revealed that he is also helped by his
youth, his mastery of the Kazakh language, his openness to
change, and his warmth and genuine enjoyment of contact with
the public. Baymenov is hindered, according to Tazhin, by
his lack of financial resources and newspapers. Tazhin
predicted that Baymenov could raise his rating with a good
campaign and strong showing in the televised debate the CEC
is organizing November 17.

--------------
Nazarbayev Steady Since July
--------------


8. (C) Returning to Nazarbayev's own polling data, Tazhin
reported that the president had been polling in the 69-75%
range nationwide since July. His rating in Almaty, which
Tazhin described as "the most politicized" area of the
country, was 56-58%. Russians and other Slavs strongly
support Nazarbayev, according to Tazhin, because they were
scared by the March events in Kyrgyzstan and see Nazarbayev
as a guarantor of stability. Tazhin predicted that undecided
voters would break predominantly toward Nazarbayev. One
expert group he convened told him that he was underestimating
to what degree external stress could impact voters'
decision-making, for example the likelihood that instability
in other countries could make voters shy away from change.
Tazhin pointed out that Nazarbayev received 79% in the last
presidential election in 1999, which was a time of economic
crisis. (Comment: It was also not a contested election.
End comment.) Tazhin expressed bewilderment as to why the
opposition "insisted" on elections this year, with the
economy strong and Nazarbayev in excellent health.

--------------
Role of the Akims
--------------


9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about the
role of the akims in the upcoming election, Tazhin remarked
that regional leaders are actually offended because Astana
has sent such strong signals about the need for accurate
voter lists, the prohibition of the use of administrative
resources to influence results or procedures, and the
requirement to send voting results to Astana quickly. Tazhin
affirmed that the procedural situation will be "different
this time" compared to the 2004 parliamentary elections.

--------------
Problems with the Campaign
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador informed Tazhin that the Embassy had
received many reports of problems with opposition campaign
events in the regions, primarily with agitators occupying
space reserved for campaign events or attempting to disrupt
them in other ways. This had happened in a long list of
cities around the country. Tazhin minimized the problem,
acknowledging that there had been "anecdotal events" in a few
places like Semipalatinsk in northeast Kazakhstan. He
conceded that some akims were believed to have been involved
in the incidents, and said that the PA had called them
afterwards to chastise them. Tazhin noted that it was a
positive thing that none of the candidates had encountered
physical violence. (Note: Likely a reference to the attacks
on Tuyakbay in Ust-Kamenogorsk and Shymkent in the spring.
End note.)


11. (C) The Ambassador asked about the two seizures of
opposition newspaper Svoboda Slova (Ref A). Tazhin claimed
that the seizures had been order by the city procurator
because the paper ran articles insulting the honor and
dignity of President Nazarbayev. Tazhin said that such
articles were having a significant negative public impact,
and he agreed fully with the seizure orders. He asserted
that Kazakhstani authorities would do the same if any other
candidate were similarly insulted. Tazhin once again
contrasted the GOK's approach to that of the opposition,
remarking that authorities "had not attacked the opposition
despite the fact that several of them have been involved in
criminal affairs." Tazhin said that former Nazarbayev
ally-turned-outspoken opposition activist Zamanbek Nurkadilov
had broken the law by alleging that Nazarbayev was behind the
murder of Turgut Ozal. He claimed that Tuyakbay's son lives
in Boston in a house purchased with bribes from James Giffen.
Tazhin added that Baymenov has "problems" with his
relatives as well, but did not offer any details. He alleged
that while akim of Pavlodar oblast, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov had
stolen several businesses, even going so far as to order that
medical care be withheld from a heart attack victim until he
signed over his company.

--------------
After the Elections
--------------


12. (C) Tazhin observed that the real question was not who
would win the presidential elections, given Nazarbayev's
consistently high ratings, but which camp within the current
government would come out on top -- the conservatives or the
modernizers. The Ambassador commented that the program of
democratic reforms that Tazhin had outlined during his
meeting with USOSCE Ambassador Finley (Ref B) was impressive.
Tazhin agreed that a real plan existed, but cautioned that
it would be necessary to see how it was implemented. In his
view, it was already "a bit late" for such reforms. He
informed the Ambassador that local akims, even those known to
be conservative, were generally in favor of direct elections.
Tazhin pointed out that without giving local leaders more
control over the budget, however, it would be pointless to
implement direct elections. Of the 28 local akims elected in
the recent experimental elections, he noted, many had already
resigned because they were not able to govern effectively
without such authority.


13. (C) Summing up the conversation, Tazhin told the
Ambassador that he was "calm" about the elections. If the
voting was conducted in a procedurally clean way and the
opposition received the expected amount of votes, there would
be a basis for future work.
ORDWAY


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