Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALMATY3454
2005-10-04 14:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA

Tags:  PREL CW KNNP KZ PARM POLITICAL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 003454 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, NP/PTR ROLIVER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015
TAGS: PREL CW KNNP KZ PARM POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

REF: A. STATE 40787

B. STATE 166864

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 003454

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, NP/PTR ROLIVER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015
TAGS: PREL CW KNNP KZ PARM POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

REF: A. STATE 40787

B. STATE 166864

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Ordway met with Minister of
Energy and Mineral Resources Vladimir Shkolnik on September
27 in Astana. Shkolnik assured the Ambassador that there
will not/not be a signing ceremony for the proposed Central
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty in the near
term, and certainly not coincident with the visits of T and
Codel Issa to Ust-Kamenogorsk on October 8. In a
wide-ranging discussion, the Ambassador also raised the
issues of CWC compliance and the nuclear energy component of
the U.S. - India partnership. End Summary.

--------------
CANWFZ Not Ready For Signature
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador conveyed U.S. concern over reports that
the five Central Asian states might sign the CANWFZ in
Semipalatinsk at the same time that NTI was organizing a
large international event October 8 in nearby
Ust-Kamenogorsk, which will be attended by U/S Joseph and
other senior U.S. officials. The Ambassador told Shkolnik
that the U.s., in agreement with the UK and France, objects
to the CANWFZ because it leaves open the possibility of
outside countries' nuclear weapons being stationed on the
soil of the ostensibly denuclearized zone. The Ambassador
stressed that if a signing ceremony took place in association
with the U.S.-attended event, the Embassy would be required
to issue public statements distancing the U.S. from the
treaty.


3. (C) Shkolnik assured the Ambassador that the treaty is not
close to being signed and noted that he had not even seen the
draft. He added that what he knew of the treaty is that it
was being pushed by Tashkent, and further stated that he
personally found it to be a misguided idea. In a separate
meeting with Foreign Minister Tokayev, he said that there was
still a dispute among the parties about the level at which it
would be signed, with Kazakhstan insisting on Foreign
Ministers, and Uzbekistan on Presidents. Moreover,
Kazakhstan wanted to have consultations with the P-3 as they
had requested on Article 12. He urged that Ambassador Bolton
personally and quickly address the C-5 ambassadors in New
York on this issue.

--------------
CWC Compliance
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador also inquired about the CWC compliance
issues that were put to Kazakhstan in a March 14 demarche
(Ref A). Shkolnik responded by saying that the OPCW was
putting Kazakhstan in an untenable position. He said that
during his trip to The Hague earlier this month, he told the
OPCW that it would be impossible for Kazakhstan to fill out
the questionnaire that OPCW required. Kazakhstan has no
specialists familiar with the chemical weapons, and no one
who was associated with the production previously done at the
Pavlodar facility. In order answer OPCW's questions, he
would have to send specialists to Russia to obtain the
information. Shkolnik said that to do so would amount to
proliferation of knowledge about how to produce chemical
weapons to Kazakhstan, which did now currently have that
knowledge.

--------------
Nuclear Suppliers' Group and India
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador also delivered Ref B points on cooperation
with India's civil nuclear industry in light of that
country's commitment to certain nonproliferation safeguards.
Shkolnik's immediate response was one of doubt. Shkolnik
questioned how providing nuclear fuel to India for civilian
use would serve any nonproliferation goals. Any external
fuel supplied for civilian purposes would free up an
equivalent amount of domestically produced fuel for military
purposes, thus undermining our nonproliferation goals. He
noted that Kazakhstan has in the past refused to sell India
uranium for that exact reason. Shkolnik said that he would
ask the head of Kazakhstan's nuclear regulatory agency, Timur
Zhantikin, to discuss this issue with U.S. experts at the
IAEA in October.
ORDWAY


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