Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALMATY3075
2005-08-23 04:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

PETROKAZAKHSTAN SOLD TO CHINESE CNPC SUBSIDIARY

Tags:  EPET IN KZ CA CH ECONOMIC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 003075 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EB/ESC
EUR/SNEC (MANN)
EUR/CACEN (MUDGE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2015
TAGS: EPET IN KZ CA CH ECONOMIC
SUBJECT: PETROKAZAKHSTAN SOLD TO CHINESE CNPC SUBSIDIARY

REF: ALMATY 1433

Classified By: POEC CHIEF DEBORAH MENNUTI, REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 003075

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EB/ESC
EUR/SNEC (MANN)
EUR/CACEN (MUDGE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2015
TAGS: EPET IN KZ CA CH ECONOMIC
SUBJECT: PETROKAZAKHSTAN SOLD TO CHINESE CNPC SUBSIDIARY

REF: ALMATY 1433

Classified By: POEC CHIEF DEBORAH MENNUTI, REASONS 1.4(B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan (PK)
announced its sale to PetroChina, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC),on August 22,
for $4.18 billion. Thomas Dvorak, president of one of two
principal Kazakhstan-based PK operating companies, was
optimistic that PK shareholders would approve the sale, while
noting that a successful deal hinged on the yet-unknown
Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) reaction. A successful sale
could bring relief to PK's troubles in the Kazakhstani
courts, which include both anti-monopoly charges against the
company and criminal charges against Dvorak and other senior
executives. End Summary.

Chinese to Pay a 24% Premium
--------------


2. (U) PK provided details of the sale in an August 22 news
release, noting that the $4.18 billion offer constituted a
bid of $55 per share, or a 24.4% premium over recent PK stock
prices. The transaction will be subject to the approval of
two-thirds of PK's shareholders, and is expected to close in
October 2005.

Company President Upbeat About Sale
--------------


3. (C) Thomas Dvorak, president of Kumkol Resources, one of
two principal PK operating companies, told Econoff that he
was guardedly optimistic about the sale. He anticipated that
PK shareholders would approve the deal, noting that the
"premium" to be paid by the Chinese was somewhat exaggerated
due to the recent fall in PK share prices over recent PK
legal troubles with the GOK. Dvorak resisted suggesting that
the Chinese had overpaid for PK, noting that CNPC was
acquiring an intact company, rather than pieces of one.
Furthermore, PK's oil field in the Turgai basin was of
particular value to the Chinese, as a source of oil for
Atasu-Alashankou pipeline (reftel).


4. (C) Less clear to Dvorak was whether the GOK supported the
sale -- something which would be known from the GOK's public
statements in the coming days. Nor did Dvorak exclude the
possibility that the company would be split up, with the
Turgai assets going to Lukoil, PK's refinery to KMG, and
Kumkol remaining with the Chinese. (Note: Respected trade
journal Argus Energy Consultants reported such a deal two
weeks ago, and one PK employee thought it likely. End Note.)



5. (C) Dvorak added that a successful sale might cause his
legal problems to abate. GOK opposition, on the other hand,
could make his problems worse. (Note: in 2003 the
Kazakhstani Agency for Regulation of Monopolies charged seven
PK distribution companies with colluding to raise oil product
prices, and in April 2004 criminal charges were brought
against Dvorak and PK VP and CFO Clayton Clift for alleged
violations of the antimonopoly law. In June 2005, another
executive, Daniel Herrmann, was criminally charged with
"illegal entrepreneurship" for allegedly violating the terms
of a PK drilling permit. Details on Herrman's trial septel.
PK has also been hard-hit by GOK enforcement of anti-flaring
regulations, suffering a recent drop in production of nearly
20 percent. End Note.)


6. (C) If the GOK does not approve of the deal, it might
invoke the December 2004 preemption law to block the sale.
While PK's lawyers -- and many others -- believe the
preemption law would not apply, MEMR and KMG have stated
privately that it does and could be enacted in any deal
wherein a controlling interest is purchased on the open
market in a third country.


7. (C) Comment: The sale of PK to the Chinese makes sense on
a number of levels. First, the GOK wants to keep China
happy, but also wants to keep them from offshore blocks, like
Kashagan. A KMG source told us that the Chinese had demanded
an offshore bloc in return for supporting a GOK scheme to
build a natural gas pipeline across Kazakhstan from West to
East. While not offshore, PK may just be enough to keep the

Chinese happy and secure support for the gas pipeline.
Second, as Dvorak noted, PK's Kumkol fields are ideally
located to supply the Chinese pipeline. The wild-card here
is Russia. The GOK has supported Lukoil in the Russian
company's dirty fight with PK over the Turgai joint-venture.
If the PK-CNPC deal was done without the GOK's blessing and
turns out to harm Lukoil's interests, expect PK's travails to
continue. If, on the other hand, the GOK worked out a deal
with the Chinese ahead of time, this deal should stick.
ASQUINO


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