Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALMATY1774
2005-05-06 09:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM: STATE OF PLAY

Tags:  EPET KZ ECONOMIC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 001774 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EB/ESC (JONES),EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN (MUDGE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2007
TAGS: EPET KZ ECONOMIC
SUBJECT: CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM: STATE OF PLAY
KAZAKHSTAN


Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CDA MARK ASQUINO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D)


C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 001774

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EB/ESC (JONES),EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN (MUDGE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2007
TAGS: EPET KZ ECONOMIC
SUBJECT: CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM: STATE OF PLAY
KAZAKHSTAN


Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CDA MARK ASQUINO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D)



1. (C) Summary: The April 26th Caspian Pipeline Consortium
(CPC) shareholders meeting in Almaty ended in an impasse.
Russian intransigence on forming a Russian board of directors
(CPC-R),combined with a demand for a variable tariff on
operating expenses (OPEX),created the logjam. In earlier
meetings with Ambassador Ordway, ChevronTexaco Eurasian
Business Chief Guy Hollingsworth and ExxonMobil Kazakhstan
Country Representative David Willis were vexed over Moscow,s
hard-line. Both were united in opposition to a CPC-R board
of directors. The companies split, however, over an OPEX
variable tariff, with ExxonMobil bitterly opposed and
ChevronTexaco flexible. Corporate shareholders will not,
barring some Russian concession, attend a May 16th meeting
with Russian Energy Minister Khristenko. End Summary.

No Movement at CPC Shareholders Meeting


2. (C) Guests at an April 26th gala dinner for CPC
shareholders were, in the words of one participant, &down in
the mouth.8 Shell Kazakhstan Country Manager Martin Ferstl,
host of the event, told DCM Mark Asquino that the
shareholders came out of the meeting &at sword points8
because the Russians &had taken a hard-line.8


3. (C) The Russians pushed hard on creating a board of
directors for CPC-R and gaining a variable tariff for both
CAPEX and OPEX. Oleg Gordiyev, Deputy Director of Energy,
complained that CPC was in debt $5bn and needed to recoup
this loss. He added that the oil companies &did not
understand this.8 When queried as to a middle ground between
Russia and other consortium members, Gordiyev fell silent.


4. (C) ChevronTexaco Eurasia Business Chief Guy Hollingsworth
vowed that his company &would not give into the charter
(with board of directors).8 Some of the other oilies posited
that if the consortium could not come to terms on a charter
for CPC-R, Nazarbayev and Putin would have to personally
engage. Ferstl of Shell, however, doubted the extent to
which Nazarbayev could push Putin.


5. (C) According Ferstl, Western CPC shareholders
unofficially decided not to attend a May 16th meeting with
Russian Energy Minister Khristenko barring some Russian
concession. GOK Energy Minister Vladimir Shkolnik announced

the May 16th Moscow talks in Astana on May 4.

ExxonMobil: &At the Walk-Away Point8


6. (C) ExxonMobil Kazakhstan Country Chairman David Willis
told Ambassador Ordway in an April 15th meeting that
ExxonMobil was at its &walk-away point8 on CPC expansion.
He added that, &We have offered about all that we can
give.8 Willis said ExxonMobil was amenable to an immediate
tariff increase as well as to a variable tariff to capture
CAPEX cost overruns, but was adamantly opposed to a variable
tariff on OPEX. It would, according to him, create a further
divide between shippers and non-shippers and be liable to
machinations.


7. (C) Russia,s drive to create a board of directors for
CPC-R, however, is the ultimate redline for ExxonMobil.
Willis noted that under the Russian joint stock law, the
composition of a board of directors could be changed by a 51%
vote. Given that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Oman control 50%
already, they, according to Willis, would just need to bribe
one minor shareholder to surpass 51%. They then could create
a docile board of directors and seize control of CPC. Willis
dubbed CPC expansion a &small issue8 compared with the
threat a board of directors poses.


8. (C) Willis also sought a new GOR presidential decree
confirming the non-natural monopoly status of an expanded
CPC. A Yeltsin-era decree affords such protection to the
existing pipeline.

ChevronTexaco: Situation Not Yet Critical


9. (C) Guy Hollingsworth, ChevronTexaco Eurasia Business
Chief, was more upbeat over CPC expansion than his ExxonMobil
partner. In an April 22nd lunch with Ambassador Ordway,


Hollingsworth joked that the Russians would &close at the
last minute8. He added that as long as CPC received project
sanction by the end of 2005, the situation was ?
critical.8


10. (C) While opposed to a board of directors for CPC-R,
Hollingsworth was resigned to a variable tariff on OPEX. He
said that ChevronTexaco &could go for it8 because it would
not be &catastrophic8 and would add only about $1-2 per
barrel cost (Note: When it comes on line in mid-2006,
TengizChevroil,s (TCO) &Second Generation8 project will
add about 250,000 bpd of production. TCO, operated with a
50% stake by ChevronTexaco, will scramble to find export
routes for the added crude until CPC expansion becomes
operational. At minimum, there will be an 18 month lag. End
Note).


11. (C) Hollingsworth hinted that President Nazarbayev, who
calls CPC &my pipeline8, would intervene against Russia.
&The President likes us. We perform.8 (Comment:
ChevronTexaco prides itself on its &special relationship8
with the Kazakhstanis given its status as the first major
Western investor. This relationship extends to presidential
son-in-law and hydrocarbon Richelieu, Timur Kulibayev. End
Comment)


12. (C) Comment: Real issues separate CPC private sector
shareholders. None unites them as much, however, as their
opposition to a Russian-controlled puppet board of directors.
If Russia wants to kill expansion, that demand will be more
than a mere bargaining chip for a variable tariff on OPEX.
The three-year*and counting*CPC expansion process should
serve as wake-up call for both the GOK and private producers
to get serious on other pipeline options. Three million
barrel a day production is not far off*most experts point to

2015. It could ramp up to four to five million barrels a day
by 2020-25 given the right tax regime. According to
Hollingsworth, Kazakhstan will need four additional pipelines
to bring that amount of oil to world markets.
ASQUINO


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