KAZAKHSTAN: AMB. MINIKES' MEETING WITH OPPOSITION

UNCLAS ALMATY 001721

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE),EUR/RPM, DRL/PHD (PDAVIS)

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM KZ POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: AMB. MINIKES' MEETING WITH OPPOSITION
PARTIES



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In an April 25 roundtable in Almaty, Amb.
Minikes heard the views of opposition politicians on
Kazakhstan's bid to become the chair of the OSCE in 2009 and
the current state of play with regard to respect for human
rights and democratic principles in Kazakhstan.
Participants did not think that Kazakhstan deserved to be
selected as CiO; some argued that the decision should not be
made until after presidential elections in December 2005, as
the opposition would bring the country into compliance with
OSCE standards. All thought that the GOK was pursuing the
OSCE chairmanship as a way to advance its own interests
rather than from a desire to improve its respect for OSCE
principles. They told Amb. Minikes that the GOK's record on
human rights and democracy issues was worsening. One
opposition representative asked for the OSCE's help in
establishing dialogue with President Nazarbayev. Summing up
the conversation, For a Just Kazakhstan presidential
candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay called on the U.S. and the EU
to act to encourage the GOK to conduct fair presidential
elections. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) During a visit to Kazakhstan to discuss the GOK's
bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship, Ambassador Stephan
Minikes held a roundtable discussion on April 25 with
Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, For a Just Kazakhstan's presidential
candidate; Bulat Abilov and Oraz Zhandosov, co-chairs of
True Ak Zhol; Alikhan Baimenov, chairman of Ak Zhol; Asylbek
Kozhakhmetov, head of Alga DCK ("Ahead, Democratic Choice of
Kazakhstan"); Petr Svoik of recently-dissolved Democratic
Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK); and Serikbolsyn Abdildin, head
of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK). All
participants except Baimenov are members of the For a Just
Kazakhstan (FJK) electoral bloc and support Tuyakbay's
candidacy. The Ambassador and POEC chief (notetaker) also
participated.

--------------
Kazakhstan's OSCE Bid
--------------


3. (SBU) In response to Amb. Minikes question of why the GOK
was seeking the chairmanship of the OSCE, Tuyakbay indicated
that the main motivation was to escape criticism. He
claimed that for the past four or five years, the
Kazakhstani government had been waging a propaganda campaign
within European institutions to give the impression of
progress on democracy. The GOK sees what Tuyakbay called
"constant criticism" from the OSCE and the U.S. as a
potential threat to its economic and political status. It
thinks that if it becomes CiO, it can deflect such
criticism. Amb. Minikes noted that the CiO is held to an
even higher standard that other members and could therefore
expect to face greater, not less, scrutiny.


4. (SBU) Tuyakbay asserted that the GOK's propaganda
campaign had already produced results; despite the worsening
human rights situation, "OSCE criticism has declined." He
described ODIHR's assessment of the 2004 parliamentary
elections as relatively mild. Acknowledging the strong U.S.
PC intervention on April 14 regarding amendments to the
Kazakhstani election law, Tuyakbay claimed that President
Nazarbayev signed the legislation the following day as a
signal that input from the international community was
unwelcome.


5. (SBU) Amb. Minikes explained that the U.S. believes that
it would be beneficial for Kazakhstan to succeed in its bid
for the CiO, but not under conditions that would make a
mockery of OSCE criteria. He also noted that as the OSCE
does not have a strong secretariat, the country holding the
chairmanship plays a crucial role in the organization's
success or failure. To be an effective chairman, a country
must have a large, well-trained corps of diplomats; it must
be willing to spend _12 to _15 million; and the Foreign
Minister must be prepared to devote over half his time to
OSCE issues. Amb. Minikes also pointed out that
Kazakhstan's CiO candidacy could come under uncomfortable
scrutiny during possible Helsinki Commission hearings on the
Hill.


6. (SBU) Zhandosov noted that Nazarbayev son-in-law Rakhat
Aliyev, Kazakhstan's ambassador to the OSCE, was the primary
advocate of the CiO bid. Although Nazarbayev and Aliyev are
not personally close, they are political allies. Baimenov


claimed that the CiO bid is a GOK tactic to gain time, by
arguing to the West that they will take steps to reach OSCE
standards after the presidential elections; in reality, he
claimed, the GOK had no desire to confirm to OSCE standards.


7. (SBU) Abilov added that he fully supported Kazakhstan's
bid for the CiO, because he was certain that Tuyakbay would
win in upcoming presidential elections and implement the
reforms needed to make Kazakhstan a worthy chairman. He
added that if the presidential elections, which he expected
to take place in December 2005 rather than December 2006,
were as flawed as the 2004 parliamentary elections, the
opposition would have to "restrain people from going to the
streets." Zhandosov and Baimenov echoed Abilov's assertion
that the elections would take place in 2005. Zhandosov
urged that the CiO issue not be decided until after those
elections; if Tuyakbay wins, "this will be a different
country. If Nazarbayev resorts to falsification, the result
will be mass protests and violence."


8. (SBU) Abdildin said that although he would like to see
Kazakhstan succeed in both its CiO bid and its quest to join
the UNSC in 2010, the state did not yet meet "the demands of
the people or OSCE standards" and was therefore not yet
worthy of either goal. Svoik attributed the GOK's question
for the OSCE chairmanship to a desire to fool the OSCE and
the Kazakhstani people into believing the country was
actually democratic. He called on the U.S. to push the GOK
for serious political reforms this year.

--------------
Kazakhstan's OSCE Commitments
--------------


9. (SBU) Amb. Minikes asked participants how they assessed
the GOK's record on adhering to its OSCE commitments.
Kozhakhmetov painted a bleak picture, noting that DCK
founder Galymzhan Zhakiyanov remains in custody; the
Parliament is taking steps to limit freedom of speech,
assembly, and political association; the GOK is attempting
to close several newspapers, including Respublika, Soz, and
Zash Alash; and the GOK had requested the arrest of
Respublika editor Irina Petroshova in Moscow. He echoed
Tuyakbay's comment that Nazarbayev's signature of the
election law amendments one day after the PC intervention
was a signal, and added that Nazarbayev had similarly signed
the extremism law two days after international organizations
criticized it. Kozhakhmetov criticized the OSCE for failing
to speak out on the liquidation of DCK.


10. (SBU) Zhandosov echoed Kozhakhmetov's assessment, noting
that since the fall the GOK had increased the pressure on
the opposition, independent media, and NGOs. He predicted
that the trend will intensify, as Nazarbayev realizes that
he cannot win reelection without disabling the opposition
and resorting to falsification. Zhandosov criticized the
OSCE Center in Almaty for failing to speak out on the
election law amendments. He stressed that the OSCE should
use the July Parliamentary Assembly in Washington as an
opportunity to give a "correct assessment" of the situation
in Kazakhstan and push the GOK in the "right direction."
Kozhakhmetov noted that all the Kazakhstani delegates will
be from pro-presidential parties and will therefore give a
distorted view of the situation.


11. (SBU) Zhandosov added that For a Just Kazakhstan had
attempted unsuccessfully to establish a dialogue with the
GOK; in a March 29 announcement, they had proposed a series
of steps to prevent a repeat of events in Kyrgyzstan:
adoption of a new election law that meets OSCE standards;
the appointment of new members of the Central Election
Commission and all subordinate local commissions; the
release of Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and all others charged for
political reasons; an end to repression of the mass media;
and review of the results of the fall Mazhilis elections.
Zhandosov noted that President Nazarbayev had not responded,
and asked if the OSCE could play a role in facilitating
dialogue.


12. (SBU) Baimenov claimed that Nazarbayev and his
associates are betting on the fact that in their bilateral
relations with Kazakhstan, OSCE members place greater
emphasis on energy and counterterrorism cooperation than on
human rights issues. Amb. Minikes replied that while at


times strategic interests prevail, President Bush had spoken
out clearly in his inauguration speech when he said that our
"national interests and our beliefs are now one." Baimenov
said that he plans to visit Brussels in May or June to
highlight the real situation in Kazakhstan and to ask EU
members which OSCE they want to see in 2009: one controlled
by Kazakhstan, Russia, and the other signers of the Astana
declaration, or one in which the human dimension is as
important as security issues. He stressed that the GOK must
take steps to reform before the next presidential election;
nothing would be done afterward. Baimenov told Amb. Minikes
that he had proposed to ODIHR director Strohal during the
latter's January visit that the OSCE develop a quarterly
roadmap for Kazakhstan on human dimension issues. Amb.
Minikes noted that the OSCE had never worked with a member
state in that way before, but that this was a possible
attractive approach to helping Kazakhstan convince
participating States of its commitment to putting OSCE
principles into practice.


13. (SBU) Abdildin reminded Amb. Minikes that Kazakhstan had
never conducted an election or a referendum that met OSCE
standards. He criticized the OSCE's assessment of the 2004
Mazhilis elections as being too mild. Abdildin predicted
that the upcoming presidential elections would result in
additional serious violations. He called on the U.S. to
tell Nazarbayev, who had celebrated his 15th year in office
the previous day and was seeking a fifth term, that he has
been in power long enough.

--------------
View of Events in Kyrgyzstan
--------------


14. (SBU) Abilov asserted that events in Ukraine, Georgia,
and Kyrgyzstan all reflected the desire of people to live in
a normal, prosperous country with free elections. The
violence in Kyrgyzstan was instigated by Akayev's people and
the mafia in order to provoke instability. Abilov drew a
parallel between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, noting that in
both countries "the state policy is corruption." Baimenov
observed that acting Kyrgyz president Bakiyev had been
forced to establish relations with Nazarbayev out of
economic necessity.

--------------
The Bottom Line
--------------


15. (SBU) Speaking for the group, Tuyakbay said that the
opposition in Kazakhstan asks the U.S. and the EU for only
one thing: their best efforts to convince the GOK of the
need to conduct fair presidential elections. The opposition
is confident of their popularity and their ability to run
the country effectively. They need the help of the West
only to ensure that presidential elections are fair.


16. (SBU) Comment: As always, some of the opposition's
claims were exaggerated. We doubt, for example, that
President Nazarbayev rushed to sign the election law
amendments in response to the U.S. statement in the OSCE PC.
Given Nazarbayev's high popularity ratings it is also
unlikely that the opposition will win upcoming presidential
elections, as Abilov predicted. We also think Zhandosov's
criticism of the OSCE Center regarding the election law
amendments was unfair, given the volume of controversial
legislation currently under consideration; the Center was in
fact in the process of organizing a public discussion of the
election law amendments when they were signed so quickly by
President Nazarbayev. End comment.


17. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered.

ORDWAY


NNNN