KAZAKHSTAN: SAAKASHVILI AND NAZARBAYEV MEET IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 001391

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/SNEC, INR/REA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KZ GG POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SAAKASHVILI AND NAZARBAYEV MEET IN
ASTANA


Classified By: POEC Chief Deborah Mennuti, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili made
a state visit to Astana March 30-April 1. Presidents
Nazarbayev and Saakashvili met at Nazarbayev's new residence
in Astana, conducted a joint press conference and talked
alone for two unscheduled hours following the state dinner
for Saakashvili on March 30. Although the situation in
Kyrgyzstan consumed a significant part of the leaders'
conversation at their official meeting (and Saakashvili
issued a joint statement on the subject with Ukrainian
President Yushchenko during the visit),the tangible results
of the talks were confined to new understandings on
investments and economic cooperation. While to all outward
appearances the visit went off without a hitch, the GOK
viewed Saakashvili's visit with some trepidation from the
time it was announced, and their consternation seemed to
increase as events in Kyrgyzstan unfolded. The GOK took care
to keep Saakashvili out of any venues where he might make
statements that the Kazakhstani opposition cou
ld seize on as signs of support. End summary.

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A Calm, Cordial Visit...
--------------


2. (C) The DCM of the Georgian Embassy in Astana (who was
present at all of the official events) provided a detailed
readout of the visit to Emboff after Saakashvili's departure.
The outward results of the visit were positive, if modest.
Four protocols were signed - establishing a partnership
between Astana and Tbilisi, another between the port
authorities of Aktau and Poti, a memorandum of understanding
on trade relations and an additional protocol to their mutual
legal assistance treaty. In their official meeting, which
the DCM described as lengthy and productive, the two
presidents also discussed the possibility of increasing the
amount of Kazakhstani oil that transits the Baku-Sup'sa
pipeline, in addition to BTC. Both sides expressed general
interest in Kazakhstani export of natural gas to Georgia.

3. (C) The DCM confirmed that Kyrgyzstan was discussed, and
reported that Nazarbayev repeated the appraisal of the
situation that he made publicly: that the Kyrgyz revolution
was carried out by criminals and hooligans, and that the
country's low standard of living was to blame. It does not
appear that Saakashvili made any proposals to Nazarbayev on
the situation (Akayev had not resigned yet),although the
Georgian Foreign Minister dropped out of the President's
delegation to go to Bishkek and remained there throughout
Saakashvili's Astana visit.


4. (SBU) The two Presidents held a joint press conference,
where they emphasized the growing commercial relationship
between Kazakhstan and Georgia (trade turnover in 2004 only
approached $40 million, but has quadrupled in the past three
years). Saakashvili was effusive in his praise for
Kazakhstan's market reforms and even its political evolution
and made a point of praising Nazarbayev by name several times.


5. (C) Nazarbayev hosted a dinner for Saakashvili in the new
Presidential residence "Ak Orda." After the dinner,
Nazarbayev invited Saakashvili for an impromptu tour of
Astana. According to the DCM, the two Presidents toured the
city without aides for two hours, making stops at the
"Baiterek" monument and the "Duman" saltwater aquarium.

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But It Didn't Start Out That Way
--------------


5. (C) Although in the end the visit went smoothly, the DCM
told Emboff that it was obvious from the start that the GOK
viewed Saakashvili's visit with trepidation, which was
clearly compounded by the situation in Bishkek. The GOK's
discomfort was most evident in its undiplomatic handling of
Saakashvili's itinerary, which MFA officials privately said
was out of the Ministry's control.


6. (C) The Georgian DCM reported that the Ministry refused to
draft a schedule for the visit, only grudgingly providing one
when the Georgians insisted it was Kazakhstan's
responsibility. The MFA also suddenly, after preparations
were well underway, insisted on changing the character of the
visit from an official to a state visit. The DCM believed
that the GOK felt that doing so would impose a more
ceremonial, rehearsed structure on the visit.


7. (C) The most contentious arguments took place over
Saakashvili's speaking engagements. The Georgian side
requested time for Saakashvili to address both the Parliament
and the students and faculty of Gumilev Eurasian University.


While the address to Parliament appears to have been a
non-starter, MFA's first draft of the schedule included the
address to the students. State Protocol quickly reneged on
that proposal, explaining that the University was "too busy"
that day.


8. (C) MFA working-level officials told the DCM that this was
not MFA's call, and Volkov himself told the DCM that he had
been "reprimanded" for including the university address in
the first schedule. Volkov indicated that there were
"differences in approach" to the visit in various quarters of
the GOK. In the end, Saakashvili gave a private talk to
selected students and faculty from the Diplomatic Academy.


9. (C) The DCM told Emboff that these and other indications
of GOK hostility to the visit spurred the Georgian side to
file a last-minute flight plan requesting departure on March
30 (i.e. the same day as Saakashvili's arrival) in the event
of a major snub to their President. He suggested that
Nazarbayev personally decided whether Saakashvili would make
the speeches the Georgians had requested.

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Comment
--------------


10. (C) For all of the wrangling that preceded the
Nazarbayev-Saakashvili meeting, it turned out to be
businesslike and uneventful. Each leader seems to have
gotten what he wanted: Saakashvili appears to have piqued
Kazakhstani interest in increasing trade with and investment
in Georgia, and Nazarbayev got through the visit without
providing the opposition access to Saakashvili or a statement
from the Georgian President they might seize as an indication
of support. Clearly, very senior figures in the GOK feared
that unscripted appearances by Saakashvili before Parliament
or the University risked providing the opposition with a
political boost. Those fears were almost certainly amplified
by the unanticipated events in Bishkek, which unfolded in the
week leading up to the visit. Given concern in the upper
echelons of the GOK about the collapses of other post-Soviet
governments, preparations for the late April visit of
President Yushchenko of Ukraine will likely proceed in a
similarly confrontational manner. End comment.
ORDWAY


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