Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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05ALGIERS2289 | 2005-11-14 13:27:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Algiers |
1. (C) Over a one-on-one lunch November 6, Ambassador and departing presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir discussed the latter's November 9 departure to Rabat as Algeria' new ambassador, the challenges that awaited, and the personal factors that made him well-suited for the difficult task of building better communication and trust between Morocco and Algeria. Belkheir emphatically argued that Algeria had no territorial claims on the Western Sahara, that Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan was a missed opportunity, and that Algeria's goal was not an independence outcome but respect for the principle of self-determination. Underscoring the need for both realism and flexibility from all sides, Ambassador encouraged Belkheir and Algeria to focus on autonomy for the Western Sahara -- the only area where there was some common ground on this contentious issue -- and how it could be achieved in a way that honored the principle of self-determination. Belkheir was strongly critical of Iranian President Ahmadinejad's call for "wiping Israel off the map" and said there should be full Syrian cooperation with the Mehlis investigation of the Hariri assassination, even if the trail led to close family members of Bashar Asad. On bilateral issues, Belkheir expressed satisfaction with the continuing expansion of U.S.-Algerian cooperation and noted that he had discussed the Blue Lantern problem (since resolved in principle) directly with President Bouteflika following his last conversation with the Ambassador. 2. (C) With Belkheir's departure, Embassy Algiers has lost a major interlocutor. The latter has provided an immediately accessible, discreet channel to President Bouteflika; collaborated with us on sensitive issues ranging from military cooperation to the POW release (where the President did not want the MFA involved); and served as a channel for very frank discussion of problematic Algerian behavior on certain issues. Given Belkheir's unique attributes (his role in inviting Bouteflika to return to Algeria in 1999 to run for the presidency, his reputation as one of the top power brokers in the country, and his connections across the bureaucracy and military), it is expected that the next presidential chief of staff will be a far less influential figure. (End Summary and Comment) CURRENT BILATERAL CLIMATE WITH MOROCCO IS "VERY DIFFICULT" -------------------------- 3. (C) Belkheir said he was departing for Rabat November 9 to take up his new duties as ambassador to Morocco. He said the Moroccan Deputy Interior Minister al-Himma had called him the previous day to finalize arrangements for his arrival and brief him on the King's speech commemorating the Green March. Noting the current bilateral climate was "very difficult," he said somewhat wistfully that he had hesitated a great deal before accepting President Bouteflika's request but had accepted out of a sense of duty and in response to Bouteflika's strong urging. Ambassador said Belkheir had an important task before him: creating better communication, building confidence between the two governments, and creating a regional climate more conducive to resolution of the Western Sahara issue. The current impasse and tensions served no one's interest and only diverted attention and energies away from cooperation on issues of common concern -- terrorism, drug networks, clandestine immigration, and greater regional economic cooperation. If anyone could improve communication between the two countries, Ambassador commented, it was he (Belkheir). His personal connections to the royal family, his long involvement in Moroccan-Algerian relations, and his longstanding personal commitment to improved ties suited him well for the task before him. "UNCLE" BELKHEIR'S PERSONAL TIES TO MOHAMMED VI MAY BE A POSITIVE FACTOR -------------------------- 4. (C) Belkheir repeated that the situation was very difficult. The Moroccan press was stirring things up. The King's last-minute cancellation of PM Ouyahia's visit was seen as a very grave insult by Bouteflika and others in the leadership, and would be difficult to overcome. The absence of any positive response to the Polisario's release of the remaining Moroccan POWS was also disappointing. Nonetheless, he readily agreed, recalling his and Ambassador's collaboration in crafting and realizing this humanitarian initiative, facilitating the release had been the right thing to do and had lifted a burden for Algeria. Ambassador commented that while we still hoped both sides could find a way to engage in a cycle of reciprocal positive steps, one could never go wrong in taking a humanitarian step that reduced human suffering. Despite these negatives, in seeking to promote better communication and trust, Belkheir remained hopeful that his good personal relations with Hassan II and Mohammed VI would be a positive factor. In this regard, he recalled that during one of their many meetings, Hassan II had called the future Mohammed VI into the room and introduced Belkheir as "your friend and your uncle." SELF-DETERMINATION IS ALGERIA'S OBJECTIVE, NOT WESTERN SAHARA INDEPENDENCE -------------------------- 5. (C) Ambassador said one of Belkheir's challenges would be to convince the Moroccan leadership that Algeria, whatever might have been the case in the past, now genuinely saw the stability of Morocco and the throne as a vital Algerian interest. This was important because some senior Moroccans even today feared Algeria's real goal in the Western Sahara was setting up an ostensibly independent Polisario state dependent on Algeria. Belkheir emphatically stated that Algeria's objective was not independence, but ensuring respect for the Sahrawis' right to self-determination. As in the past, he argued that Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan had missed an opportunity to secure an outcome that would have met Morocco's needs (i.e., autonomy) while honoring the principle of self-determination. Stressing that Algeria had no territorial claims or ambitions whatsoever in the Western Sahara, he recalled a conversation several years ago in which Hassan II had said Morocco "understood" Algeria's need for access to the Atlantic and thus would be willing to provide a "land corridor" for Algeria. Belkheir said he had responded that Algeria had no territorial claims whatsoever but was only seeking self-determination for the Sahrawis. For Algeria the stability of Morocco and the Moroccan throne were vital to Algerian interests. AMB: NEED FOR REALISM ON WESTERN SAHARA -------------------------- 6. (C) Belkheir asked if Ambassador had seen President Bouteflika's recent letter to President Bush (in which he noted that Algeria had kept its commitment to the President to cooperate fully with Baker and reaffirmed Algeria's strong attachment to implementing the Baker Plan). With evident concern, he also noted that Ambassador Bolton had raised the issue of whether MINURSO's mandate should be renewed, since it was clearly not fulfilling its mandated mission. Regarding the latter, Ambassador said we had, as he knew, voted to extend MINURSO for another six months, and that had been the right decision. That said, reminding all concerned that the status quo should not be taken for granted was useful and appropriate. It was important to avoid another UNFICYP-type situation, where a costly peacekeeping force became a pillar of an unsatisfactory status quo, enabling the parties to avoid their responsibilities for achieving a solution. 7. (C) Regarding the Bouteflika letter, Ambassador said it had presented Algerian views very clearly. At the same time, one had to be realistic. Morocco has rejected the Baker Plan, no one was prepared to impose a solution, and, with the parties stalemated and issues like Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Palestine on Washington's plate, it was unlikely there would be much high-level interest in investing heavily in the issue, especially at a time when there were few signs of flexibility that could make progress possible. One also had to be realistic in recognizing that Morocco was no more willing to accept an independence outcome than the Polisario or Algeria were willing to accept a unilateral fait accompli incorporating the Western Sahara into Morocco. This being the case, anyone who was really serious about a solution needed to be focusing on the one element of the Baker Plan -- autonomy -- where there was some common ground. Noting Belkheir's own arguments that Morocco's rejection of Baker had been a missed opportunity to produce an autonomy outcome that Morocco could live with, Ambassador said the challenge was to find a way, within a UN framework, to bring such a solution about through a process that honored the principle of self-determination. To succeed, imagination, realism, and flexibility would be required from both sides. Belkheir listened carefully, neither agreeing nor disagreeing. IRAN, SYRIA -------------------------- 8. (C) Belkheir introduced the issue of Iran, expressing astonishment and concern over Iranian President Ahmadinejad's "irresponsible" call for "wiping Israel off the map." Ambassador said we agreed such remarks by a head of state were unprecedented and dangerous, and expressed disappointment that Algeria and other Arab states had not spoken out more clearly and forcefully in public in response to such unacceptable statements. These statements underscored our concerns over Iranian efforts to seek a nuclear weapons capability under the guise of a peaceful nuclear energy program. The development of such a capability by Iran would be extremely destabilizing for the region. It was essential to maintain a firm international consensus in order to convince Iran to change course. On Syria and the Mehlis Report, Belkheir volunteered that it was important for the Syrian leadership to cooperate with the investigation, even if the trail led to individuals such as Military Intelligence Chief Shawkat or Bashar Asad's brother Maher. BILATERAL ISSUES/BLUE LANTERN -------------------------- 9. (C) Ambassador briefed Belkheir on recent progress in our bilateral relations, including last week's signing of a $4 million landmark MEPI grant to strengthen English teaching in Algerian public schools, the planned December signing of an S&T Cooperation Framework Agreement, important progress in narrowing the remaining issues in the Open Skies negotiation, upcoming high level visits, and the joint military exercise now under way. Ambassador said an important exception to these positive developments was the continuing lack of cooperation on the Blue Lantern issue. Ambassador reviewed familiar arguments, stressed Algeria's interest in cooperating with what was a minor, technical, non-obtrusive request, expressed concern over MOD Minister-Delegate Guenaizia's apparent reluctance to meet with the Ambassador to discuss the issue, and noted the very concrete implications of non-cooperation, which were neither in our nor Algeria's interest. 10. (C) Belkheir expressed satisfaction with the overall growth and direction of U.S.-Algerian relations, agreed we needed to resolve the Blue Lantern issue, and said that following Ambassador's expression of concern in their last conversation, he had briefed President Bouteflika. The latter, he reported, had replied, "I am the Minister of Defense." (Comment: The day after this luncheon conversation, the Defense Attache received a formal note from the MOD indicating that following "a study," the MOD had decided to cooperate with our Blue Lantern request. This suggests the President in his capacity as Minister of Defense may have directly intervened to resolve the problem.) ERDMAN |