STATUS OF TERRORISM ONE MONTH AFTER PASSAGE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 002222

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER AG
SUBJECT: STATUS OF TERRORISM ONE MONTH AFTER PASSAGE OF
CHARTER ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4(c) and (d).

SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT
--------------


1. (C) One month after the favorable September 29 referendum
on the Charter for National Peace and National Reconciliation
-- which offered a broad but partial amnesty for those
involved in the violence of the 1990s -- monthly civilian
deaths, military deaths and causalities, and terrorist
surrenders have all increased. Reported terrorist deaths in
October reached 53, considerably higher than the monthly
average of 24 over the past six months and 10 over the past
twelve months. Based on press reporting, September and
October, when the focus was on the referendum vote,
respectively saw 10 and 13 civilian deaths, more than double
the monthly average for the year. With the exception of
April, when there were 26 civilian deaths (most of them in
one grim attack),eight out of the last twelve months saw
only zero to five civilian deaths. In terms of
military/security force deaths, September saw 28 (the highest
number of such deaths over the previous twelve months) and
October saw 25 (higher than the monthly average). We
conclude from these trends that: 1) hard-core terrorists have
stepped up attacks presumably to demonstrate they will not be
cowed or coopted by the partial amnesty offer; 2) the
military and security forces continue to press the campaign
against terrorist remnants with some success and to sustain
substantially more terrorist-related casualties than
civilians; and 3) the partial amnesty offer is having a
positive effect on terrorist surrenders but apparently little
effect on the terrorist hard-core, at least for now. (End
summary and comment)

HISTORY OF TERRORISM
--------------


2. (C) Algeria's "dark decade" began in 1991 after the
constitution was amended allowing the formation and
legalization of political parties, other than the ruling
National Liberation Front (FLN). The militant Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS),whose program included the creation of
an Iranian-styled theocratic state was formed and won a solid
majority of the vote in the first stage of the national
legislative elections in December 1991. Most observers
believe the vote was mainly a protest vote against the ruling
political and military elite rather than a sign of broad
support for creating an Islamic state. In early 1992, the
government responded to the perceived Islamic militant threat
posed by the FIS by dissolving the National People's
Assembly, canceling the second round of elections, outlawing
the FIS, and declaring a state of emergency. These actions
set off a ten-year cycle of turmoil and violence which saw
the assassination of the Algerian President, increasingly
random acts of violence committed against police, military
and civilians, and ever increasingly lethal responses from
Algerian security forces trying to quell the unrest.


3) (C) In a 2002 speech to the International Conference on
Terrorism held in Algiers, General Major A. Maiza, First
Regional Military Commander, said that at the high point of
terrorist violence in 1994, there were over 27,000 terrorists
active in Algeria. During the late 1990's and continuing to
today, the Algerian security services and military have
inflicted serious damage to Algerian terrorist groups, nearly
dismantling the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and significantly
reducing the operational effectiveness of the GIA splinter
group and now primary terror group threat, the Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). President Bouteflika's 1999
Civil Concord plan was a key step toward uniting the country,
and an estimated 6,000 terrorists laid down their arms in
response. After last month's successful vote on the Charter
for Peace and National Reconciliation, Interior Minister
Yazid Zerhouni officially estimated that approximately 1,000
active terrorists still operated in the country - 840 GSPC,
100 Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia (DHDS),and 40 GIA.

IMPROVING SITUATION
--------------


4. (C) Though Algerians still live under a state of emergency
evidenced by the ubiquitous security presence throughout the
country, the overall security situation has vastly improved.
Analysts at the African Union Counter-Terrorism Center (AUCT)
informed the Embassy that Algeria no longer views terrorist
violence as a threat to national security. However, it
remains a serious domestic issue and an ongoing threat to
public safety. Most of the larger Algerian cities, such as
Algiers, Oran and Constantine, have not experienced
significant terrorist attacks for over a year. Terrorism
still is a limited problem in the more rugged and rural
regions, where small scale terrorist attacks and military
action against the GSPC remain somewhat commonplace.

TERRORIST FIGURES
--------------


5. (C) Since October 2004, 251 terrorists, 99 civilians and
186 military and security forces have been killed in
terrorist related violence. Over this same time frame, 263
terrorists have been captured. October 2005 was a
particularly deadly month with 53 terrorists, 19 civilians
and 25 military and security forces killed. This upswing in
violence, also seen in August and September, is most likely
the negative response by GSPC and other elements to
Bouteflika's national reconciliation. In order to show that
the GSPC is more resolute than ever in continuing its
struggle, the GSPC in particular has increased the lethality
of its operations due to a shift from classic ambush tactics
to increased use of road-side improvised explosive devices
(IED). Since the announcement of the national
reconciliation, around 25 terrorists have laid down their
arms. After the introduction of the laws implementing the
national reconciliation later this year, many more terrorists
are expected to do the same. We expect the figure of 1,000
terrorists cited by Zerhouni to decrease. However, those
remaining will be the most hardened and dangerous terrorists
and the least likely to give up without a fight. It is a
paradox that as Algeria makes progress on the security front,
spikes in violence occur because fewer and fewer "moderate"
elements who might lay down their arms remain in the fight.


6. (C) The following figures represent the monthly totals of
killed terrorists, civilians and military/security forces
from October 2004 to present:

MONTH Terrorists Civilians Mil/Security

OCT 16 17 8
NOV 7 4 12
DEC 17 4 3
JAN 16 5 18
FEB 20 0 13
MAR 11 0 4
APR 9 26 13
MAY 25 2 19
JUN 8 3 25
JUL 33 2 12
AUG 27 7 6
SEP 9 10 28
OCT 53 19 25

ERDMAN