Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALGIERS2155
2005-10-23 05:33:00
SECRET
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

MEETINGS IN ALGIERS ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

Tags:  PTER KAWC PINR PREL AG 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002155 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PTER KAWC PINR PREL AG
SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN ALGIERS ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b)(d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002155

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PTER KAWC PINR PREL AG
SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN ALGIERS ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b)(d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (S) Ron Miller, Senior Adviser to the Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues, held meetings with officials from the
MFA, Ministry of Justice, and Presidency officials October 18
on issues related to the detention and repatriation of
detainees held at Guantanamo who claim to be Algerian.
Miller said there were 25 such detainees. Out of these,
three were approved for repatriation, albeit with the need
for assurances from the GOA on managing the threat posed by
two of the three. Once a mechanism for repatriating
Algerians was established, the same procedures would be
followed for future repatriations, which were bound to occur
since the U.S. was pursuing a policy of aggressive
repatriations. Miller expressed regret that a scheduled
visit to Guantanamo for Algerian officials two years ago had
not gone forward as planned, but he extended an invitation
for MFA, law enforcement, and intelligence officials to visit
Guantanamo, help establish the nationality of the presumed
Algerians, and provide any other information relevant to the
repatriation process. Miller provided a sample diplomatic
note containing the assurances sought by the U.S. before
repatriations could begin, furnished intelligence on the
presumed Algerian detainees, and provided all the
biographical data the U.S. possessed on them.


2. (S) Algerian officials welcomed Miller's visit but
expressed regret that the U.S. had not worked more
cooperatively earlier in addressing issues surrounding the
Guantanamo detainees. They stressed that the detainees'
rights, dignity, and choices should be respected. They
wondered why the Algerians, whose Government cooperated
closely with the U.S. in the war on terror, were not at the
front of the line for repatriation. They also asked for more
details on what the detainees had done that led to their
detention. Ministry of Justice officials said it was
possible that some Algerian detainees would be subject to
prosecution in Algeria for their activities abroad. Finally,
GOA officials in all meetings underscored Algeria's interest

in negotiating and ratifying a bilateral extradition treaty
with the United States. In the meeting at the Presidency, the
GOA pledged to study the materials provided by Miller and
respond to the U.S. proposals as soon as possible.


3. (S) In our view, Miller's visit was helpful and
well-received. Much of its value was in making available to
non-intelligence actors in the GOA information that the
Algerian security services received in late 2002 but did not
share with civilian ministries. In this sense, Miller
provided information that the GOA, save the security
services, had long sought. Post looks forward to working
with Miller and S/WCI to resolve favorably the outstanding
issues. (End Summary and Comment.)

MEETINGS AT MFA, JUSTICE, AND PRESIDENCY
--------------


4. (S) In separate October 18 meetings with the MFA,
Ministry of Justice, and Presidency, Senior Adviser to the
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Ron Miller
presented an overview of Guantanamo detainee issues, focusing
on the U.S. request for immediate repatriation of three
Algerian detainees. Miller, accompanied by DCM and PolEc
Chief, also responded to questions from GOA officials.
Director General of Consular Affairs Hacene Rebehi led the
Algerian delegation at the MFA. At Justice, Miller met with
Mohamed Amara, Director of Human Rights. Presidential
Counselor on Counter-Terrorism Mohamed Kamel Rezag Bara,
flanked by representatives of MFA and the Presidency, hosted
Miller at the Presidency.

OVERVIEW OF DETAINEES PRESUMED TO BE ALGERIAN
--------------


5. (S) Miller, who thanked the GOA officials for their warm
welcome and expressed appreciation for their willingness to
receive him during Ramadan, explained in his meetings that
the U.S. was holding 25 individuals who claimed Algerian
citizenship, three of whom were approved for transfer or
release. While the U.S. was not certain in each and every
case that the claims of citizenship were valid, we were
convinced that the three individuals identified for transfer
or release were Algerian citizens. Miller noted the U.S. had
already repatriated 251 detainees from Guantanamo, including
five Moroccans, an Egyptian, a Tunisian, and a Libyan. Two
more Moroccans would soon be repatriated.


6. (S) The Algerian ready for release, Boucetta Fethi, did
not meet the criteria as an enemy combatant. The other two
were ready for repatriation provided that the GOA provided
the U.S. with certain guarantees. Miller described the
processes in place at Guantanamo to assess violations of law
by detainees as well as their value to intelligence efforts.
Stressing that the U.S. did not want to hold the detainees
longer than necessary and that we were obliged under the
Geneva Convention to return the detainees to their country of
citizenship if they no longer posed a significant threat, the
U.S. sought to repatriate detainees once it was established
that legal proceedings against the detainee could not be
pursued, the individual could provide no further exploitable
intelligence, and the detainee's threat to the U.S. and the
international community was manageable. While the U.S.
pursued a policy of aggressive repatriation, such
repatriations had to occur in a safe, organized manner so
that the receiving states could manage the risk posed by
these individuals.

NEED FOR ALGERIAN ASSURANCES BEFORE REPATRIATION
-------------- ---


7. (S) Miller underscored that if the GOA consented to the
repatriation of Fethi, he could be released very quickly. The
U.S., though, would require assurances from Algeria for the
other two Algerians ready for repatriation, as had been
requested of and granted by numerous countries, including
North African and Middle Eastern countries. The U.S. sought
assurances via diplomatic note that the receiving government
would take responsibility for managing the threat posed by
the repatriated individual, treat the subject humanely, and
provide some form of access if the need for further
questioning for intelligence purposes arose in the future.
The U.S. deferred to the receiving country on issues of
surveilling, holding in custody, or pursuing judicial
proceedings against the repatriated person. Once a mechanism
of providing assurances was in place bilaterally with
Algeria, future repatriations from Guantanamo would be
handled in the same manner. Miller stressed that as the
Administrative Review Boards completed their assessments of
all detainees, the current timeline for which was late 2005,
it was probable that more presumed Algerians would be
approved for repatriation.

INVITATION EXTENDED FOR DELEGATION TO VISIT GUANTANAMO
-------------- --------------


8. (S) It would be useful to both the U.S. and Algeria, said
Miller, if Algerian law enforcement, intelligence and MFA
officials could interview the presumed Algerians at
Guantanamo and establish their nationality and provide any
other information relevant to the repatriation process.
Miller noted that an invitation extended to the GOA a couple
of years ago did not result in a visit due to some
misunderstandings. Miller expressed regret for any
misunderstandings and offered to expedite a visit to
Guantanamo for Algerian officials as soon as the GOA was
ready. Miller said an Algerian visit to Guantanamo, like
visits from delegations of other countries, was of value for
purposes of ascertaining the nationality of detainees,
establishing the threat that the detainee posed to the
international community, as well as examining bases for
criminal investigations and proceedings.


9. (S) In the meeting with MFA, Miller provided intelligence
information releasable to the GOA on the Algerian detainees,
and in all his meetings he provided the biographical
information that presumed Algerian detainees had furnished to
Guantanamo staff. In his meeting at the Presidency, Miller
provided a sample diplomatic note outlining the assurances
sought by the U.S. prior to the repatriation of detainees.
Miller referred to all the above documents in every meeting
and stressed with his interlocutors that he and the U.S. were
being completely transparent in sharing information with the
GOA.

GOA REACTION: WE DESERVED BETTER TREATMENT
--------------


10. (S) Algerian officials in all meetings with Miller
universally expressed regret that they had not received
months earlier the information Miller provided and that the
U.S. had not worked more cooperatively earlier in addressing
these issues. They also expressed that Algeria took
seriously its responsibilities for its citizens detained
anywhere in the world. In cases where Algerians held more
than one nationality, GOA officials said the choice of the
individual to choose the country of repatriation should be
respected. Asked about the six Algerians who hold dual
nationality with Bosnia, Miller said those detainees were not
yet approved for repatriation, but since all of them had
expressed a preference to return to families in Bosnia, and
Bosnia agreed to receive them, if they were approved for
release they would be returned to Bosnia absent an objection
from the GOA. Rezag Bara said Algeria did not object to their
return to Bosnia provided the decision was made of the
detainees' free will. Algerian officials would need to
verify their wishes in any visit to Guantanamo. With regard
to visiting Guantanamo, the Algerians indicated interest but
were non-committal, leaving the impression this would be
decided at a higher level.

ALGERIA DESIRES BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY WITH U.S.
-------------- --------------


11. (S) GOA officials all stressed that the detainees'
rights, dignity, and choices should be respected. They also
asked for more details on what the detainees had done that
led to their detention, noting that Algeria was in the
process of drafting implementing legislation on Bouteflika's
National Reconciliation Plan, approved by the voters
September 29, and that some of the detainees might benefit
from provisions aimed at terrorists who agreed to lay down
their arms. Ministry of Justice officials said it was
possible that Algerian detainees, once returned, would be
subject to prosecution in Algeria for their activities
abroad. Finally, GOA officials in all meetings underscored
Algeria's interest in negotiating and ratifying a bilateral
extradition treaty with the United States.

ISSUES UNDER STUDY WITH GOAL OF SPEEDY RESPONSE
-------------- --


12. (S) In the MFA meeting, Rebehi said the GOA had the
feeling the Algerians were in the back of the line when it
came to release, and he wondered why the Algerians, whose
Government he noted cooperated closely with the United States
in the war on terror and who knew first hand the savagery of
terrorism, were not at the front of the line. In response,
Miller said the lack of cooperation from the detainees
presumed to be Algerian was a major contributing factor to
the delay. It was hard for investigators at Guantanamo to
make an assessment of nationality in cases where the
detainees refused to talk. Miller emphasized again the
utility of a visit by an Algerian delegation, since it was
our experience that detainees conversed more readily with
investigators from their own country. In the meeting at the
Presidency, Rezag Bara said the GOA would study the materials
provided by Miller and respond to the U.S. proposals as soon
as possible.


13. (U) S/WCI Senior Adviser Miller did not clear this
message.

ERDMAN