Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALGIERS2059
2005-10-05 15:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BASTAGLI'S MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL PBTS PHUM PTER AG MO WI UN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002059 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PTER AG MO WI UN
SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BASTAGLI'S MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR ON WESTERN SAHARA ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002059

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PTER AG MO WI UN
SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BASTAGLI'S MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR ON WESTERN SAHARA ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) UN Special Representative to the Secretary General
for the Western Sahara Francesco Bastagli briefed Ambassador
October 1 on his meetings in the region since taking up his
new duties. He expressed appreciation for the U.S.
contribution to resolving Western Sahara issues; spoke of the
need to bolster Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between
the parties; said the Moroccan Minister of Interior had
offered to work out an arrangement for visits to Sahrawi
prisoners; thought Algeria could be more helpful on CBMs,
though Morocco remained the "main obstacle" to progress;
advocated the need for practical steps forward; and indicated
he was prepared to interpret his mandate broadly. Bastagli
said he worried that there was potential for unrest if the
dispute remained unresolved and warned that the status quo
could not last. (End Summary.)

BASTAGLI IN REGION TO LISTEN AND LEARN
--------------


2. (C) In an October 1 courtesy call, UN Special
Representative to the Secretary General for the Western
Sahara Francesco Bastagli briefed Ambassador, accompanied by
DCM and PolEc Chief, on his meetings with the key players in
the region. MINURSO Political Officer Carmen Johns and
Tindouf Liaison Office Head Ingunde Suchlau accompanied
Bastagli. Bastagli said he had been in Tindouf the previous
day (September 30) and in Rabat earlier in the week. His
next stop would be Mauritania before returning to Laayoune.
He began his mission by having consultations at the UN in New
York and came to the region to "listen and learn." He
commented that the Algerian MFA had its own "political
archeology" on the Western Sahara, which he discovered in the
course of his conversations with that Ministry. Having come
from the Balkans, where he served for three years in Pristina
on Kosovo issues, Bastagli professed to understanding the
importance of memory. He also expressed his appreciation
for the U.S. contribution to resolving Western Sahara issues,

including the August release of Moroccan prisoners as an
outcome of Senator Lugar's presidential mission.

MOROCCO MAIN OBSTACLE, BUT ALGERIA COULD DO MORE
-------------- ---


3. (C) Addressing the climate within the UN on the Western
Sahara, Bastagli said the UNSC wanted to be informed on the
monitoring of the cease-fire and was re-deploying military
observers to facilitate this. Confidence Building Measures
(CBM) between Morocco and the Polisario needed to be
implemented. Bastagli said there were positive signs in
Rabat based on his meetings there. He wanted to pursue every
opportunity for progress with Morocco, Algeria, and the
Polisario. Asked by Ambassador for examples of positive
signs, Bastagli cited his meeting with the Moroccan Interior
Minister, whom he had asked to resume family visits to the
Sahrawi prisoners on humanitarian grounds. Absent progress
on CBMs, Bastagli reminded his Moroccan interlocutor, the
next Secretary General's report to the UNSC would cast
Morocco as the party blocking progress. That could alienate
donors, argued Bastagli in Rabat. A positive signal from
Morocco was especially needed following the Polisario's
release of all the remaining Moroccan prisoners. Bastagli
said his Moroccan interlocutor took the point and gave him a
"small present," offering to work out a visitation
arrangement. In contrast to the Moroccan Interior Ministry,
continued Bastagli, the MFA in Rabat was more guarded.
Bastagli was also conferring with UNHCR, since it was
important that all parties agreed to the formula. Turning to
Algeria, Bastagli said Algeria as the host country for a
large portion of the refugee community could be of more help
in bolstering CBMs, even though Morocco was the main obstacle
to progress. Algeria, observed Bastagli, saw the dispute as
one between Morocco and the Polisario to which Algeria was
not a party.

NEED TO FOCUS ON PRACTICAL STEPS
--------------


4. (C) On the Algerian side, reported Bastagli, the GOA was
upset that MINURSO was not denouncing the abuses of Sahrawi
prisoners by Morocco, even though the GOA knew full well that
was not part of MINURSO's mandate. Ambassador commented that
each party wanted MINURSO to exceed its mandate only when it
suited its purposes. MINURSO raised human rights concerns
informally, responded Bastagli. This was the most practical
way forward. Although Algeria wanted Morocco to implement
the Baker Plan, Morocco clearly had other ideas. MINURSO had
a very limited mandate and could not carry out its main
function, which was the organization of the referendum.
Bastagli said there had been no discussion of this, since
Morocco vehemently opposed a referendum. Bastagli saw his
role as implementing any referendum, not deciding the
politics of holding one. His primary focus was to focus on
the practical steps that could be taken now, such as CBMs.
There was a sense of urgency, since the passage of time was
an active ingredient in the conflict. Perhaps, Bastagli
wondered aloud, the time factor would convince the U.S. to
become more actively engaged. The possibility for unrest was
always present. He said a Polisario official had told him
because the Sahrawis were Muslims and did not engage in
terrorist activity, no one worked actively to resolve their
dispute with Morocco.

HOW MANY REFUGEES ARE THERE?
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the camps in Tindouf and noting that
Morocco publicly spoke about Moroccan Sahrawi prisoners being
held by the Polisario, Ambassador asked if the refugees could
leave the camps freely. Suchlau said she personally did not
see how it was possible to contain them. There was much
traffic between the camps and Tindouf and between the camps
and Mauritania. The desert was wide open for anyone wanting
to leave the camps. Nonetheless, added Bastagli, there were
evident economic and practical constraints to leaving the
camps. Suchlau noted that it was not difficult to obtain a
residency permit for Mauritania; there was a large Sahrawi
community in that country. Bastagli then commented that the
number of refugees, according to the Moroccans, had been
falling. It was not just the Sahrawis resident in the camps
who required a political resolution; the situation affected
others as well. DCM asked how the World Food Program derived
its reduced estimate of residents in the camps. Suchlau said
the figures came basically from the UNHCR, but since there
had been no formal census, it was hard to establish a valid
estimate of the population.

STATUS QUO CANNOT LAST
--------------


6. (C) Bastagli, who (unlike his predecessor) was received
in Algiers by both the Algerian Foreign Minister and the MFA
Secretary General, said he encouraged the GOA to assume its

SIPDIS
responsibilities as a nation hosting refugees. While
Algerians naturally were interested in the situation, both
officials had agreed the dispute was between the Polisario
and Morocco. Bastagli said although it was hard to convince
key member states to engage again on this issue at a high
level, it was a mistake to think that the status quo could
last. It was sad, he said, that it sometimes took violence
to generate action by the international community. Morocco,
he continued, had invested much in the economic development
of the Western Sahara under its control, but it clumsily
handled the local Sahrawi population. Citing his visit to
the port of Dakhla, Bastagli said Moroccan authorities often
chopped in half the boats of local fishermen operating
without licenses.


7. (C) Bastagli said that despite their presence in
Laayoune, MINURSO staff were in fact effectively cut off from
the local population and unable to talk directly to Sahrawis.
The Moroccan police presence in Laayoune was pervasive and
the all-Morocco composition of MINURSO's local staff further
limited unfiltered contact. Overall, Bastagli commented, the
extent of Moroccan Government control exceeded what Bastagli
had seen elsewhere. MINURSO staffer Johns added that
demonstrations such as those in May and June always seemed to
take place at times when she was on leave or on a mission,
again limiting her ability to form an independent judgment of
the situation. A joint civilian-military cell to monitor the
situation was being established, even though that was outside
MINURSO's formal mandate, Johns added.

ERDMAN