ALGERIA POISED FOR POSITIVE REFERENDUM VOTE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001973

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA POISED FOR POSITIVE REFERENDUM VOTE ON
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

REF: A. ALGIERS 1810


B. ALGIERS 1702

C. ALGIERS 1661

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman-reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In the leadup to the September 29 referendum on
President Bouteflika's proposed Charter for Peace and
National Reconciliation, the GOA has pulled out all the stops
to assure a sizable turnout and overwhelming "yes" vote.
From Bouteflika on down, the entire senior leadership has
barnstormed the country, presenting the Charter as the sine
qua non of stability and economic development and, not
coincidentally, announcing large public works projects at
almost every stop. While there is some dissension within the
official ranks, public opposition from some press and urban
political elites, and some concern about abstention rates,
non-Berber parties across the political spectrum have all
endorsed the national reconciliation project and there is a
wall-to-wall expectation that the referendum will pass with a
comfortable majority. We recommend the Department issue a
measured public statement, once the results are officially
announced, that registers some concerns while avoiding
counterproductive direct criticism, and that focuses on
shaping the key next steps implementing the national
reconciliation process. See para 8 for proposed guidance.
(End Summary)

THE PRO-CHARTER JUGGERNAUT ROLLS ON
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2. (C) In the leadup to the September 29 referendum on
President Bouteflika's Charter on Peace and National
Reconciliation (reftels),the GOA has pulled out all the
stops to mobilize a sizable turnout and overwhelming "yes"
vote. Bouteflika and his ministers have continued to scour
the countryside with pro-Charter campaign messages,
announcing new government projects at each stop and
portraying the Charter as key to definitively turning the
page on terror and opening a new era of rapid economic
development. Portraying the charter as a logical progression
from the "rahma" (clemency) and Civil Concord policies of the
late 1990s, the leadership has presented the Charter as a
broad political mandate for up to twenty implementing laws,
as the maximum the current balance of internal forces will
sustain, and as a uniquely Algerian solution to an Algerian
problem. With a notable lack of specificity, the leadership
has also maintained that "peace and national reconciliation"
does not mean impunity from justice. Finally, having fought
its war of liberation alone and then been shunned as it
successfully defeated terrorism at home without outside help,
Bouteflika and others in the leadership have pointedly argued
that Algeria does not need outside advice or models on how to
pursue national reconciliation.

BROAD POLITICAL ENDORSEMENTS
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3. (C) State television and radio have meanwhile kept up a
drumbeat of pro-Charter messages, carefully keeping
dissenting opinion out of the public media. The official
military magazine "Djeich" has urged military personnel to
vote for the Charter (which, though little discussed, would
provide broad immunity for security personnel linked to
disappearances). The presidential coalition parties (FLN,
Democratic National Rally, and moderate Islamic Movement for
a Society of Peace),a smattering of smaller non-Berber based
parties, including the Trotskyist Worker's Party and the more
hard core Islamic Islah, have all called for a positive vote
on the Charter, as have the major national labor federation
and an array of pro-Bouteflika social and civic
organizations. Even some leaders of the banned Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS),contacted by Minister of State
Belkhadem in London, have endorsed the Charter, despite
Bouteflika's and the Charter's clear position that the FIS
would continued to be banned from political activity.
(Except of course, endorsing the Charter!)

ALONG WITH SOME INTERNAL DISCORD
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4. (C) While the government has been mostly on-message, there
have been some signs of internal discord over the referendum
as well as dissenting voices in public. Prime Minister
Ouyahia, traditionally known as an "eradicationist"
hard-liner against terrorists, and Belkhadem, who has barely
disguised his desire to replace Ouyahia as Prime Minister,
have publicly disagreed over whether the charter would be a
final step or an interim step toward a full general amnesty.
There has also been contradictory rhetoric about whether
reconciliation entails forgiveness or essentially forgetting
and moving on. Beyond these discordant notes, Bouteflika has
also publicly railed against unnamed municipal officials,
"functionaries", and others even in the "heart of the
administration" who have opposed the Charter. In this
regard, one minister and the wife of another privately
confided to the Ambassador that the Charter was "a gamble."
AND CRITICAL VOICES AMONG PRESS AND POLITICAL ELITES
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5. (C) Several widely read dailies -- especially El-Watan,
Liberte, and Quotidien d' Oran -- have raised searching
questions about aspects of the Charter in their commentaries.
They have also increasingly featured thoughtful criticisms
from prominent personalities, including former PM Reda Malek,
Ait Ahmed (the self-exiled head of the Berber-based Socialist
Forces Front party),Said Saadi (leader of the small,
Berber-based RCD party),well-known human rights activists,
academics, and former senior officials. Significant elements
of the political class have also become increasingly if still
privately negative about the referendum, expressing concern
over the lack of real debate in the public media, cynicism
over the possibility of voting manipulation should the
results fall short of the desired "yes" mandate, and unease
that the real goal of the national reconciliation project is
to consolidate Bouteflika's political position and pave the
wave for constitutional amendments permitting a third
presidential term.

ABSTENTIONS A CONCERN BUT MANAGEABLE
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6. (C) While few doubt the outcome of the referendum,
government officials like Belkhadem have publicly expressed
concerned about voter turnout -- in part because of
widespread perceptions that the outcome is a foregone
conclusion and voting will thus not make much difference.
One disturbing reflection of this concern has been reported
instances of police detentions of anti-referendum activists
distributing leaflets calling for boycotting the referendum.
While views differ over expected voter turnout, most contacts
agree it will be lower in urban centers like Algiers and in
the restive Kabylie, the only place during his nation-wide
pro-Charter campaign where Bouteflika encountered significant
public dissent concerning the Charter. Belkhadem has
publicly spoken about an 80 per cent turnout. Some National
Assembly deputies have privately commented to us that the
referendum would pass by a large margin but with an
abstention rate of 35 per cent. An abstention rate over 40
per cent would be a setback for Bouteflika, these deputies
said. And a senator from a presidential coalition party
claimed the inner circle feared the abstention rate could
reach 50 per cent.

MANY AVERAGE ALGERIANS GENUINELY READY TO PARDON
-------------- ---


7. (C) All this said, the GOA has the means -- and certainly
the political will -- to mobilize a fairly high turnout,
particularly outside the major urban centers. In addition,
many average Algerians, including many of our non-GOA Embassy
contacts who have lost friends and family to terrorism, are
simply weary from over a decade of terrorism. Acting out of
a sense of patriotism and a genuine willingness to forgive
despite all that has happened, they are willing to hope the
Charter will deliver as promised and to give Bouteflika, who
can claim a solid record of accomplishment and improved
security and economic growth since coming to office in 1999,
the benefit of the doubt in charting the best course ahead.

SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE
--------------


8. (C). In reacting to the September 29 referendum results,
we recommend we aim for a measured response that avoids a
rush to judgment, that registers some concerns while avoiding
counterproductive, direct criticism, and that is
forward-looking and focused on shaping the key next steps
implementing the reconciliation process. Just as in our
approach to democratization in the Muslim world, we believe
we should not insist on a one-size-fits-all approach to
reconciliation, but allow some room for an approach that
reflects the uniquely Algerian aspects of this painful
national tragedy, Algeria's Islamic traditions, and the fact
that this is the first major case of a Muslim-Muslim national
reconciliation process.


9. (SBU) We suggest the Department issue a press statement
along the following lines, once the results of the referendum
have been officially announced:

--We have closely followed the referendum debate in Algeria
concerning President Bouteflika's proposed Charter for Peace
and National Reconciliation, just as we have followed the
efforts of other countries which have sought to turn the page
on painful episodes in their history through a process of
reconciliation.

-- While a full airing of views on this vital issue in the
public media would have been welcome, the Algerian people
have freely voted to support the Charter by a solid majority.

-- We respect their decision and wish the Algerian people
and the Algerian government well, as they seek to move
forward within a framework of justice and rule of law to
achieve genuine peace and national reconciliation.

-- In this regard, we note that in presenting the Charter
to the Algerian public, Algerian leaders have assured on
various occasions that the Charter does not involve impunity
from justice.

-- We look forward to the implementing legislation that
will enshrine this important principle, which other countries
have found essential to the success of their reconciliation
efforts.


ERDMAN