BELKHEIR ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001914

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER AG
SUBJECT: BELKHEIR ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

REF: A. ALGIERS 1661


B. ALGIERS 1702

C. ALGIERS 1878

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD W. ERDMAN; REASONS 1.4 (B) (D)


1. (C) Ambassador took advantage of a September 10 meeting
with Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir on other issues to
ask about the September 29 referendum on national peace and
reconciliation. Without detectable enthusiasm, Belkheir said
the goal of the referendum was to move beyond the divisons
caused by over a decade of terrorism, isolate and weaken
those terrorists in the "maquis," and give the leadership
authority and latitude to move forward on national
reconciliation as the situation and attitudes evolved.
Bouteflika, he added, was not simply asking for a straight
"yes" or "no" on whether the public supported national
reconciliation. He was asking them to vote on the provisions
of the Charter, which would provide the government broad
parameters and political support for subsequent measures
aimed at promoting national reconciliation.


2. (C) Expressing confidence the referendum would pass by a
substantial margin, Belkheir noted that many people had the
mistaken impression that major steps would be taken right
away. In fact, the Charter, if approved, would provide the
leadership the flexibility it needed to decide the pace and
way forward, depending on how events, public attitudes, and
circumstances evolved. The leadership understood how
sensitive and difficult the process of national
reconciliation was. It would not be easy for many in the
public to simply forgive and move on. Nonetheless, most
Algerians were prepared to do this in the interest of turning
the page on the decade of terrorism, including 80% of the
families of the "disparus".


3. (C) Ambassador noted that some Algerians, including in the
government, saw the referendum as a "gamble" whose impact
(assuming it were approved) was not forordained. Belkheir
said the leadership did not expect approval of the charter
would completely bring an end to the residual terrorism of
those who remained in the maquis. However, it would weaken
the terrorists' support network while convincing many to turn
themselves in. It would also make it possible for former FIS
supporters who left the country but who did not themselves
commit terrorist acts to return to Algeria, provided they did
not engage in politics.


4. (C) Ambassador commented that other countries that had had
to face similar national tragedies involving "disappeared"
had found it necessary to incorporate elements of
truth-telling and justice into their approach. Historical
experience suggested that without these elements, real
national reconciliation could not take place. It was not
clear from the Charter how these necessary elements would be
provided for. Belkheir repeated that the process would unfold
gradually and in response to evolving events and attitudes,
as the situation required. There would not be impunity, he
insisted. The referendum was not about a general amnesty but
about a pardon in certain circumstances for certain
categories of those who had been involved in aspects of
terrorism. For example, those who had committed mass
murders, rapes, and bomb attacks in public places would be
excluded. And those included in this process would not be
pardoned automatically but would pass through some kind of
judicial mechanism that would be set up.


ERDMAN