POLISARIO AMBASSADOR URGES U.S. "GESTURE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001910

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM WI MO AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO AMBASSADOR URGES U.S. "GESTURE"
FOLLOWING PRISONER RELEASE

REF: ALGIERS 1768

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) Polisario "Ambassador" to Algeria Beissat told DCM
September 6 that there was considerable internal criticism of
Polisario leader Abdelaziz following the Lugar mission due to
the impression that the Polisario had received nothing in
return for releasing the Moroccan prisoners. Beissat urged
the U.S. to "make a gesture" toward the Polisario, at least
by expressing concern at Morocco's continued detention of 37
Sahrawi activists. Turning to the diplomatic impasse over
the Western Sahara, Beissat said Morocco had made clear it
would not accept the Baker Plan, so it was up to the
international community to pressure Morocco. If not,
Polisario might use force to break the logjam. DCM pushed
back, stressing that Senator Lugar's mission had been
humanitarian and Polisario had done the right thing by
releasing the Moroccan prisoners. DCM warned that Polisario
would be completely isolated if it resumed the use of force
and urging them to pursue the UN process. Beissat said
Polisario wanted to be a force for stability in the
Trans-Sahel, and suggested they were interested in engaging
EUCOM in support of the Trans-Sahel counterterrorism
initiative.


2. (C) Since the Lugar mission, the Polisario leadership has
been undertaking an active diplomatic campaign to call
attention to their cause and clarify their views. Abdelaziz
has written to President Bush, the EU, Kofi Annan and Nelson
Mandela, with his letters published in the Algerian press.
Their goal is to generate international sympathy and support
for implementing UNSCR 1495, present themselves as on the
right side of international law, depict the Sahrawi detainees
arrested over the summer by Morocco as political prisoners,
and draw attention to the humanitarian agenda, including
family reunification and accounting for Sahrawi missing.
While their public messages avoid Beissat's bluster about use
of force, they do serve to emphasize their point that they
represent a party to the Western Sahara conflict that, absent
a mutually acceptable settlement, will not quietly disappear.
End Summary and Comment.

ABDELAZIZ CRITICIZED AFTER LUGAR
MISSION, NEED FOR U.S. GESTURE
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3. (C) During a September 6 meeting at his request,
Polisario "Ambassador" to Algeria Mohammed Beissat commented
to DCM that Polisario leader Abdelaziz had been weakened by
the aftermath of the Lugar Mission and release of the last
remaining Moroccan prisoners held by Polisario. The
opposition to Abdelaziz within the Polisario were arguing
that Senator Lugar and his delegation had flown into Tindouf,
taken the Moroccan prisoners back to Morocco, and then the
U.S. had effectively told the Polisario to "go to hell" by
not acknowledging publicly their role in the prisoner release
and by not mentioning Polisario humanitarian concerns,
including the 37 Sahrawis (whom he termed political
prisoners) arrested by Morocco after demonstrations in
Laayoune. Even Moroccan human rights organizations were
demanding the release of these prisoners, Beissat said, so
why had the U.S. not commented? Abdelaziz was fortunate that
the next Polisario "national conference" would not take place
until next year, since he was certain to come under severe
criticism due to the impasse and the sense among the rank and
file that Polisario had received nothing in return for
releasing the Moroccans. He argued that some kind of U.S.
gesture or a statement at the UN recognizing the Sahrawis'
right to self-determination, was needed to restore hope and
fend off pressures to take up arms in order to break the
stalemate.


4. (C) DCM stressed that Lugar's mission had been
humanitarian, and that Polisario had done the right thing by
releasing the prisoners. Sometimes doing the right thing
required going out on a limb politically, but the prisoner
release had resolved a long-standing humanitarian issue and
may create new opportunities for diplomatic progress.
Furthermore, the UNSYG had put together a new team to deal
with the Western Sahara, including his naming of a new
personal representative. In addition, Ambassador Bolton was
very familiar with the Western Sahara issue and interested in
contributing to its resolution. These were new, positive
factors, and the Polisario leadership should be preparing to
engage constructively rather than rattle sabers. No one,
including Algeria, would support Polisario's returning to
force, and they would find themselves completely isolated if
they took that path.

MOROCCO WILL ONLY RESPOND TO PRESSURE
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5. (C) Beissat said the Polisario believed the international
community had a responsibility to insist on the
implementation of UNSCR 1495, which unanimously endorsed the
Baker Plan. Morocco had made clear it would not accept the
Baker Plan on its own, but the Polisario and the Sahrawis in
the camps would not disappear as the Moroccans appeared to
hope. There would have to be pressure on Morocco if there
was to be any progress toward a settlement. That pressure
could either be diplomatic pressure from the Security Council
and the U.S., or it would come in the form of military
pressure from the Polisario. Beissat said Polisario
intelligence had concluded that the Moroccan forces in the
Western Sahara were poorly equipped and poorly led. Their
soldiers had no boots and their officers stole supplies to
sell them on the black market. King Mohammed did not trust
his army and had not modernized their equipment. If
Polisario attacked across the berm, they could administer a
powerful shock to Morocco. Polisario merely sought the
implementation of Security Council resolutions. This was not
"asking for the moon."


6. (C) DCM reiterated that use of force would be a terrible
error that would completely isolate Polisario. Rather, they
should engage van Walsum and make their case in diplomatic
channels. Beissat concluded that Polisario was looking to
the United States to take a position. There was great
sympathy for the Sahrawi cause in the developing world, but
the West had put itself in the position of blocking a
solution due to its support for Morocco. France was
completely aligned with Morocco, Chirac had even told
Bouteflika in 2003 that he considered himself a "member of
the Moroccan royal family," to which Bouteflika reportedly
responded, "I congratulate you on your descent from the
Prophet Muhammad." Neither Spain nor Germany would
challenge the French despite considerable popular support for
the Sahrawis in both countries.

POLISARIO OFFER TO WORK WITH EUCOM IN TRANS-SAHEL
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7. (C) Polisario, Beissat said, was not a threat to Western
interests, but rather sought to be a stabilizing factor in an
unstable region. He even suggested that Polisario was
interested in engaging with EUCOM in support of efforts to
fight GSPC and other terrorist organizations in the
Trans-Sahel, asserting that the only capable, indigenous
military forces with a proven desert combat record in the
Trans-Sahel were Polisario and the northern Chadians. Even
the Algerian army was not effective in the desert, he
claimed. DCM urged that Polisario focus on the opportunities
offered by the UN process and exercise utmost restraint.
ERDMAN