Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALGIERS1877
2005-09-06 10:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CONFIRMS GOA READINESS

Tags:  MARR PREL PGOV AG SOFA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001877 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV AG SOFA
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CONFIRMS GOA READINESS
TO ACCORD SOFA PROTECTIONS, BUT THROUGH MORE INFORMAL MEANS

REF: A. ALGIERS 1853


B. ALGIERS 1804

C. STATE 158268 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION
----------------------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001877

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV AG SOFA
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CONFIRMS GOA READINESS
TO ACCORD SOFA PROTECTIONS, BUT THROUGH MORE INFORMAL MEANS

REF: A. ALGIERS 1853


B. ALGIERS 1804

C. STATE 158268 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION
--------------


1. (S) FM Bedjaoui told Ambassador August 31 that political
sensitivities over the fact or appearance of a permanent U.S.
troop presence or basing arrangements precluded Algeria from
agreeing to a public, formal SOFA agreement. That said,
Algeria understood the importance and mutual benefit of our
growing military cooperation, including joint exercises, and
was prepared to find a way to grant us the protections we
needed on an exercise by exercise basis. Specifically, he
said Algeria was prepared to give oral assurances and, when
pressed by the Ambassador, said it might even be possible to
give general, written assurances that participating troops
would be treated as administrative/technical personnel under
the Vienna Convention. Ambassador underscored U.S.
disappointment over having received the MFA's August 23 note
ruling out a SOFA agreement and over having been told the
SOFA team should not come. This posture was not consistent
with either the Minister's earlier discussion with the
Ambassador welcoming such a visit or with Algeria's usual
posture of welcoming dialogue when there were issues of
mutual concern.


2. (S) Ambassador said he would convey Bedjaoui's idea for
more informal assurances to Washington and asked if he would
be prepared to receive a smaller delegation, for example,
Ambassador Loftis plus one, to discuss it further. Bedjaoui
thought this might/might be possible, provided a visit were
handled in a low-key way, and Ambassador said we would be
back in touch if there was Washington interest in that kind
of visit. As we have reported elsewhere, the political
sensitivities here are real and part of Algeria's liberation
war legacy. Former FM Belkhadem, a conservative nationalist
who serves as Minister of State and Personal Representative
of the President and who heads the largest party in the
presidential coalition and in the National Assembly, is

strongly opposed to a SOFA and, we suspect, had a direct
personal role in the MFA note rejecting a SOFA. Bedjaoui
clearly has to navigate within these political constraints.


3. (S) In this context, the Foreign Minister's emphatic
embrace of expanded military cooperation, including joint
exercises, and his assurances that SOFA-like protections
would be granted on a case by case by case basis are a
measure of how far this country has come in just the last 2-3
years. In our judgment, we should view the GOA's inability
to move ahead with a formal SOFA as a tactical setback only,
while keeping our eye on the longer term strategic prize of
expanding cooperation where possible with a country of
increasing importance to the United States. While we
initially felt a low-key visit by a smaller SOFA delegation
might be useful at this juncture, on reflection we believe
the timing is not good. Bedjaoui is abroad now and will be
going on to the UNGA, with his return dates not entirely
clear. More substantively, since he appears to be an ally in
wanting to expand military cooperation and find a way to
provide SOFA-like protections, we need to avoid undercutting
him by getting into the political crosshairs of those with
less helpful political agendas. In our judgment, our best
bet for now will be to: 1) continue to discreetly press our
SOFA concerns here and in Washington; 2) build a track record
of joint exercises that will help the Algerian public view
this kind of cooperation as normal, non-threatening, and
mutually beneficial; and 3) use the Joint Military Dialogue
session in Algiers this coming spring -- and the leadup to it
-- to have the fuller SOFA discussions we had hoped to have
during the SOFA team visit this month. (End summary/comment).

NEED FOR SOFA DIALOGUE
--------------


4. (s) Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, called on
FM Bedjaoui August 31 to discuss the issue of SOFA
protections and to urge the GOA to receive a SOFA team which
had hoped to visit Algiers later in September. Bedjaoui was
unaccompanied. Ambassador said that we had been disappointed
by the MFA's diplomatic note of August 23 rejecting the
possibility of a SOFA agreement and by the MFA's subsequent
indication that the SOFA team should not come. Ambassador
said we had been surprised by these developments because the
purpose of the team visit had been to discuss, not negotiate,
a SOFA agreement. In addition, the idea of a visit had been
discussed positively at the Joint Military Dialogue talks in
May in Washington and had been welcomed by the Minister
himself in an earlier conversation with the Ambassador. It
was unfortunate that Algeria, which usually urged dialogue
when there were mutual concerns and differences, was reaching
decisions and rejecting an agreement without any discussion.
U.S. PERSONNEL CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT SOFA PROTECTIONS
-------------- --------------


5. (S) Ambassador stressed that U.S. military personnel
engaged in mutually agreed exercises on Algerian soil need
SOFA protections. Without them, we would not be able to
engage in joint exercises, which were of increasing
importance to Algeria, as recent developments and threats
from the south had shown. The Flintlock Exercises this
spring, in which 8-9 countries in the region had
participated, had underscored the benefits of this kind of
enhanced cooperation. The United States was not seeking
permanent bases or a permanent troop presence, Ambassador
emphasized. We were simply seeking for our personnel the
kind of protections accorded administrative and technical
personnel under the Vienna Convention. In the absence of
such protections, our mutually beneficial military
cooperation with Algeria could not progress very far.

BEDJAOUI: WE WANT MORE EXERCISES AND ARE
READY TO EXTEND INFORMAL SOFA PROTECTIONS
--------------


6. (S) Bedjaoui was categorical in saying that Algeria wanted
these exercises, understood our need to assure protection for
U.S. forces participating in such exercises, and was prepared
to grant the Vienna Convention-like protections we required.
"We will never refuse such protection," he asserted. "Algeria
was very happy about this military cooperation, which was in
Algeria's interest and benefit." He added that "before
troops arrive, we'll find a solution to give them sufficient
protections." It would not be difficult, for example, to
treat exercise participants as technical personnel
(temporarily) attached to the Embassy for the duration of the
exercise. A more general SOFA agreement, however, raised
both legal and political issues.

GOA NEEDS TO NAVIGATE POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES TO
APPEARANCE OF PERMANENT BASING OR TROOP PRESENCE
-------------- ---


7. (S) The legal concerns, Bedjaoui explained, involved only
a few relatively simple language changes in existing Algerian
law. The real difficulty, however, was not legal but
political. There were considerable political sensitivities
surrounding the idea of permanent bases or a permanent troop
presence. The government thus had to proceed carefully, in a
way that allowed our cooperation to develop while avoiding
criticism that it was "selling Algeria to the United States."
It was essential to avoid steps that could give this false
impression to the public. The Flintlock Exercises had gone
well, without any serious criticism, Bedjaoui continued. We
should continue in that spirit, getting the public used to
this kind of cooperation and avoiding giving the false image
of a permanent U.S. military presence. In this regard,
Bedjaoui cited the greatly exaggerated influence attributed
by the public and in the press to the U.S. following
Algeria's adoption of hydrocarbon reform legislation,
implying that a formal SOFA would generate considerably
greater speculation about "U.S. pressures."

MINISTER WILLING TO CONSIDER
CASE BY CASE WRITTEN ASSURANCES
--------------


8. (S) Noting that he liked transparency, Bedjaoui again
emphasized that Algeria would provide protections for
participating U.S. forces before their arrival in Algeria,
though not in a formal SOFA document. Ambassador asked if
such assurances would be in writing. Bedjaoui thought this
might be possible on a case-by-case basis, provided it was
outside the public view. "Trust me," he said. There was no
other motive behind Algeria's negative reaction to the idea
of concluding a formal SOFA. Concluding, Bedjaoui urged
Ambassador to frame the MFA's diplomatic note (declining a
SOFA) in the context he had just presented. Ambassador noted
that the SOFA team would be visiting Tunis later in the month
and that it might build confidence for Ambassador Loftis to
come with a smaller team to hear directly the Foreign
Minister's assurances. Bedjaoui thought that might be
possible, provided it was very low-key and could be presented
as "just another discussion" with a visiting U.S. official.
Ambassador and the Minister agreed to be in touch on this
issue.

ERDMAN