ALGERIA DECLINES OFFER OF DELEGATION TO DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001853

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV AG SOFA
SUBJECT: ALGERIA DECLINES OFFER OF DELEGATION TO DISCUSS
SOFA

REF: A. ALGIERS 1804


B. STATE 158268 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, called on
MFA Americas Director Chikhi August 30 to press the need for
SOFA protections for U.S. personnel involved in exercises in
Algeria and to seek clarification on the issue of a SOFA team
visit in September. Chikhi doggedly adhered to the language
of the Ministry's recent note (Ref A) rejecting a SOFA on
sovereignty and constitutional grounds and, when asked
directly, said the GOA was not prepared to receive a visit by
a SOFA team in September. Ambassador stressed the need for
SOFA protections for U.S. personnel participating in mutually
agreed joint exercises and said if a general SOFA would not
be possible at this time, we then needed SOFA protections,
exercise by exercise. Chikhi seemed to suggest this might be
possible. Ambassador will seek greater clarity on this point
from Foreign Minister Bedjaoui in their next meeting. We
suspect the more negative tone reflects input from former FM
Belkhadem, currently a Minister of State, who had an icy
conversation concerning a SOFA with the previous ambassador
in 2002. We should also continue to work this issue with the
Algerian military, which has the greatest stake in seeing
joint exercises go forward and make a SOFA a continuing
agenda item in the Joint Military Dialogue. (End summary)


SOFA TEAM VISIT WAS TO DISCUSS,
NOT NEGOTIATE, A SOFA AGREEMENT
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador, during August 30 call on other issues,
pressed hard on the need for SOFA protections for U.S.
personnel involved in exercises in Algeria and sought
clarification on the issue of a SOFA team visit. He said
we had received the Ministry's diplomatic note explaining
that a SOFA would contravene Algeria's sovereignty and
Constitution. The purpose of a SOFA team visit was not to
negotiate a SOFA, Ambassador stressed, but to discuss what a
SOFA entailed and to address and assure the GOA on precisely
the kind of sovereignty concerns it had raised. Furthermore,
the issue at hand was not a permanent troop presence or
bases, but SOFA protections for personnel engaged in periodic
military exercises that were increasingly in our two
countries' mutual interest and benefit.

"SOFA WOULD CONTRAVENE SOVEREIGNTY"
--------------


3. (C) Chikhi predictably stuck closely to the mantra of the
diplomatic note, simply repeating that a SOFA would
contravene Algeria's sovereignty, its Constitution, and its
laws. Algeria was striving to establish rule of law and
could not be asked to violate its own laws. The Vienna
Convention contained no such provisions extending immunities
to military personnel. He said Algeria's position had been
made very clear in a diplomatic note to the Embassy in 2002
(Number 405/DGAM/2202) and that Algeria could under no
circumstances accept a permanent military presence on its
soil. (Comment: Embassy Algiers does not have a copy of
this 2002 note in its files and the MFA has also sheepishly
acknowledged to us that it cannot locate a copy either!)
There was no need for a SOFA team, he said, because the issue
had already been discussed in 2002.

WE HOPED ALGERIAN SIDE WOULD HEAR
US OUT BEFORE TAKING A DECISION
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador replied that so far as he was aware,
the 2002 discussion had been between the Ambassador and then
FM Belkhadem. There had been no team of SOFA experts and no
opportunity to provide background on SOFA agreements and
issues that might have allayed Algerian concerns. The
purpose of the proposed team visit, which had been discussed
positively both in Washington and subsequently in
Ambassador's meeting with Foreign Minister Bedjaoui, was not
to negotiate but to discuss. We had hoped that before taking
a decision, the Algerian side would at least hear us out.
Extending Vienna Convention-like protections to military
personnel engaged in mutually beneficial joint exercises
should be viewed as an exercise of sovereignty, not a
violation of sovereignty.


5. (C) We understood and respected Algeria's unique history
and its sensitivity toward the idea of a permanent troop
presence, Ambassador said. But at issue here was not bases,
but the ability to carry out joint exercises, which were of
increasing importance to Algeria, given developments in the
region. As for the 2002 note, this was 2005, not 2002. Much
had changed both in our relations and in the region in the
meantime, including our counterterrorism cooperation,
especially in the Sahel. Chikhi agreed that bilateral
cooperation had expanded since 2002, adding that Algeria was
very pleased with the relationship it currently enjoyed with
the United States.

CHIKHI IMPLIES GOA READY TO
CONSIDER CASE-BY-CASE PROTECTIONS
--------------


6. (C) The problem, Ambassador continued, was that U.S.
military personnel would not be able to participate in joint
exercises with Algerian troops in Algeria without SOFA-type
protections. At a minimum, we would need an agreement for
each military exercise, although this would be less efficient
and more work for all of us than a general SOFA that covered
all mutually agreed exercises. Chikhi implied the GOA would
consider a case-by-case approach. (Comment: Ambassador will
press for greater clarity on this point in his next meeting
with FM Bedjaoui.)

GOA NOT PREPARED TO RECEIVE SOFA TEAM
--------------


7. (C) Returning to the issue of a SOFA team visit,
Ambassador said the MFA note had addressed the issue of a
SOFA but had not addressed explicitly the idea of a SOFA team
visit to discuss what a SOFA actually entailed. Would the
GOA be prepared to receive such a team? Chikhi confirmed the
GOA did not want a SOFA team to come, reiterating that
Algeria takes its sovereignty seriously. Ambassador
concluded by noting that the U.S. had much experience in how
such arrangements function, whereas Algeria had none. It
would have been useful to have had an opportunity to share
these experiences with Algeria before reaching decisions on
this important issue.

COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION
--------------


8. (C) The proposal for a SOFA, made in 2002 to then Foreign
Minister Belkhadem by then-Ambassador Sandersen, was the
occasion for an icy exchange. We suspect that the very
different tone of the current negative response, compared to
FM Bedjaoui's initially favorable reaction to a SOFA team
visit, reflects input from Belkhadem, who may have been
consulted as new MFA players looked into the history of the
issue. In any case, we are where we are and the aversion to
the notion or suggestion of permanent basing or a permanent
troop presence is very real, given Algeria's colonial
experience with France, and will not go away anytime soon.
Our best bet will be to keep pressing the idea that we are
talking about SOFA protections for joint exercises, where
they have clear interests at stake, and that at a minimum we
will need case-by-case SOFA protections in order to engage in
such exercises with Algeria.


9. (C) Ambassador will seek a clearer commitment on this
point in his next meeting with FM Bedjaoui. That said, until
the Algerians get more used to doing business with us -- and
they have a long way to go -- they may well be skittish about
moving beyond the kind of oral assurance Bedjaoui gave us for
the Flintlock Exercise earlier this year. Since the Algerian
military has the greatest stake in seeing joint exercises go
forward, we should also focus our efforts on that institution
and make SOFA protections a continuing part of our Joint
Military Dialogue agenda.

ERDMAN