ALGERIA'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001661

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PLAN

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) Algeria is emerging from a decade of terrorist
violence and massive bloodshed beginning in the early 1990's
and is now looking to take necessary steps to allow the
country to heal its wounds. Much like his 1999 platform of
Civil Concord, President Bouteflika's 2004 presidential
campaign was anchored by his platform of "National
Reconciliation". Several sources and the press have
commented that Bouteflika considers National Reconciliation
to be his legacy and will invest considerable political
capital to ensure that it happens. What "National
Reconciliation" actually entails has been the subject of much
speculation and debate over the past year. Bouteflika has
not explained the details of National Reconciliation nor its
major component, General Amnesty, to be presented for popular
approval through a referendum. This lack of specificity has
not dissuaded many people from expressing support or
disapproval for the referendum.


2. (C) Bouteflika first proposed the holding of an amnesty
referendum before a October 31, 2004 gathering of African
Union terrorism experts. The Algerian media have reported
that the referendum will take place before the end of the
year with President Bouteflika likely to clarify his
intentions in an August 14 address. Our sense is that most
Algerians are tired after over a decade of terrorism and
would be induced to give the benefit of doubt to the national
reconciliation process in the hope that it would be the death
knell for remaining terrorist elements, now largely confined
to mountainous areas. That said, in light of statements by
some Algerian Islamists in support of the recent murders of
two Algerian diplomats in Iraq, Bouteflika may have lost
support for granting amnesty to the same genre of terrorists
who were involved in the Iraq murders. Bouteflika may need
to reconsider the type of amnesty included in the initiative
in order to garner a convincing level of support to pass what
he considers to be his legacy. (End Summary and Comment)

INTRODUCTION
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3. (C) Algeria is emerging from a decade of terrorist
violence and massive bloodshed beginning in the early 1990's
and has made great strides in normalizing daily life. One
element which led to the drastically improved security
situation was the 1999 Civil Concord, in which 6,000 former
terrorists and their sympathizers, who were not convicted of
murder, were granted amnesty by the GOA. Although the
Concord led to a dramatic reduction in attacks and allowed
warring elements back into society to live peacefully, it was
not without its flaws. The main flaws, as viewed by
Algerians, were the lack of transparency (the trials were
closed to the public) and the lack of thorough investigations
into alleged criminal/terrorist acts perpetrated by those
given amnesty. Civil Concord was key to Bouteflika's legacy
for his first term of office, and he reportedly views
National Reconciliation as the next logical step in adding to
the legacy in his second term. However, the problem for many
Algerians is that, unlike the 1999 Concord, the details of
this General Amnesty and National Reconciliation plan have
not yet been divulged.

CHANGE FROM GENERAL AMNESTY TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
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4. (C) Bouteflika's emphasis has changed over the last two
months from "General Amnesty" to "National Reconciliation"
when he discovered the term "General Amnesty" was unpopular
with a majority of Algerians, who closely linked the term
with impunity. Also, Algerians did not want to duplicate the
mistakes of the 1999 Civil Concord, namely the lack of proper
trials/investigations and transparency. While the plan may
not have changed, the term National Reconciliation was
thought to be softer and less controversial than its
predecessor. From an Islamic point of view, reconciliation
was viewed in a positive light and Bouteflika has used this
to his advantage. Additionally, after the murders of two
Algerian diplomats in Iraq, the subsequent statements by both
the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and the
former deputy head of the banned FIS (Islamic Salvation
Front) condoning/encouraging the murders, and the obvious
link between GSPC and Al Qaida, have led many Algerians to
question how Bouteflika could amnesty the very people who
perpetrated this barbaric act, further pushing Bouteflika
away from an emphasis on amnesty.

WHO WILL LIKELY BENEFIT FROM NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
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5. (C) Although details about National Reconciliation have
not been released, there has been speculation about who will
likely benefit from the plan. Embassy sources speculate that
only members of terrorist groups will benefit from any
amnesty included in the plan. In his recent speeches,
Bouteflika spoke highly of the Army and the Security Forces
and continually referred to them as 'Martyrs of the Nation'.
According to sources, in Bouteflika's view, the Security
Forces in general have done nothing wrong, and any criminal
acts attributed to them were perpetrated by individuals
operating outside the scope of their authority. To date,
Bouteflika has skillfully handled the military by repeatedly
praising its participation in defeating the Islamic terrorist
threat to the republic, while pushing it towards a change of
mission from internal politics to external defense of the
country. His focus on crimes perpetrated by terrorists
rather than by the military follows the logic of an implicit
trade-off between military acceptance of Bouteflika's
exercise of civilian authority over military retirements and
prosecutions in return for shielding the military from even a
hint of retribution for "excesses" during the 1990s.

WHAT IS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
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6. (C) President Bouteflika's 2004 presidential campaign was
anchored by his platform of "National Reconciliation," the
exact definition of which has been elusive at best. During
his July 5, 2005 Independence Day speech, Bouteflika shed
some light on the big picture of National Reconciliation
without divulging any details of the plan. He stated that
"Algerians should forgive but not forget, accepting thus
another sacrifice on the altar of their country, which has
bled enough for its independence, and since its independence.
It is starting from these considerations that I have
launched the initiative of a policy of National
Reconciliation, with the objective of putting a definite end
to the violence and allowing our society to go beyond its
antagonisms and heal its wounds." Government officials have
publicly given their full support to Bouteflika's plan, even
without knowing its content. The public does not yet know
who will be amnestied (security forces and/or terrorists),
what crimes will be amnestied (economic, murder, rape,
supporting terrorism),or if those amnestied will be granted
amnesty following judicial proceedings out of which the full
extent of their crime would come to light. Additionally, the
media reported that a referendum on National Reconciliation
will take place before the end of the year, giving Bouteflika
little time to hash out his plan in detail and then garner
support for it.

SETTING THE EXAMPLE
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7. (C) His symbolic step towards National Reconciliation was
his cancellation of the June 19 holiday celebrating the 1965
coup that brought former President Boumediene to power at the
expense of then President Ben Bella. Ben Bella recently
publicly forgave all those involved in his overthrow and
advised all Algerians to do the same. To add further
symbolism to the opening act of National Reconciliation,
Bouteflika named the elderly Ben Bella as honorary President
of the National Commission for General Amnesty. He also
treated -- and publicly embraced -- Ben Bella at a lavish
November, 2004 ceremony celebrating the 50th anniversary of
the war of liberation against France.

WHO IS IN FAVOR OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION?
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8. (C) The answer to this question was clearer before the
murders of two Algerian diplomats in Baghdad July 27. The
public outrage at this barbaric act perpetrated by the same
genre of terrorists that plagued Algeria for over a decade;
the justification/encouragement of the killings by the number
two man in the banned FIS party Ali Benhadj; and the GSPC's
praise of the murders has led many to reconsider or qualify
their support for the plan. Yet, Bouteflika and his
governing coalition still see National Reconciliation as a
necessity, although with a less ambitious timeline in light
of the current situation. Foreign Minister Bedjaoui said
July 30 that the referendum will go forward, but in light of
the recent events it will need more reflection. The leaders
of the major political parties, FLN (National Liberation
Front, RND (National Democratic Rally),MSP (Movement for a
Society of Peace),and the Opposition Islamist Islah Party
continue publicly to support the President. President of the
Human Rights Commission and the Ad Hoc Mechanism (for the
disappeared) Farouk Ksentini also gave his enthusiastic
support. Others who support National Reconciliation include:
President of the National Union of Algerian Zaouias (Sufi
orders) Chaalal Mahmoud Omar, and far left Worker's Party
leader Louiza Hanoune.
WHO IS AGAINST NATIONAL RECONCILIATION?
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9. (C) Not surprisingly, the most outspoken groups against
National Reconciliation are the families of the disappeared,
who have been vehemently opposed to the General Amnesty
portion of the plan. While some of the Disparus groups are
against a General Amnesty in any form, most are willing to
entertain the idea of a limited General Amnesty, if a type of
"truth commission" is established. Their major concern is
extending an amnesty to people with blood on their hands.
While the groups do not differentiate between those who
committed the crimes (terrorists versus security forces),
they are agreed that those who committed human rights
violations, particularly rape and murder, must not be granted
amnesty. Joining the Disparus groups are international NGOs,
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who
have been critical of Bouteflika's process of going about
National Reconciliation and General Amnesty. In addition to
being opposed to the lack of transparency on the contents of
the plan itself, the NGOs believe that any amnesty without
some type of judicial hearings or truth commission will harm
the country in the long run.


10. (C) Disparus groups SOS Disparus, Le Collectif des
Familles des Disparus en Algerie, The National Association of
the Families of the Disappeared, and the Algerian League of
Human Rights (LADDH) all echo the same sentiment. First and
foremost they want the truth. They want to know what
happened to their family members and then, possibly, they
might consider a reconciliation of some kind. To these
groups, the idea of National Reconciliation without judicial
inquiries is premature.

HOW WILL BOUTEFLIKA MAKE THE REFERENDUM SUCCEED?
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11. (C) Embassy sources and the majority of the press believe
that Bouteflika will use all "weapons" at his disposal to
make sure the referendum passes. The first weapon Bouteflika
has in his arsenal is the influence of the Presidential
alliance, led by its standard bearer, FLN, but also joined by
the RND and the MSP political parties. Mobilizing the
members and student organizations of the MSP could be
especially crucial to the outcome of the referendum. Former
Foreign Minister and current Minister of State Belkhadem in
his capacity as head of the FLN can almost certainly secure
the votes of the conservative former FIS members. Second,
Bouteflika can probably count on the support of the senior
military, security apparatus, and those aligned with them.
They are hopeful an amnesty will help eliminate any residual
support for terrorist groups, which have been increasingly
marginalized. Third, and most critical, the President will
play on the fears of ordinary citizens reminded by recent
terrorist acts, including the execution of two Algerian
diplomats in Iraq. Bouteflika is expected to argue that the
alternative to National Reconciliation -- as embodied by the
referendum -- is further Algerian disunity and the potential
for slippage toward more insecure times. It is this fear,
ripe for exploitation on the heels of recent prominent
terrorist acts, that in the view of dispassionate Embassy
sources will ultimately turn the tide in Bouteflika's favor.
ERDMAN