ALGERIAN TERRORISM EXPERT COMMENTS ON MURDER OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001628

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR HOSTAGE WORKING GROUP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2015
TAGS: PTER ASEC MOPS AG IZ
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN TERRORISM EXPERT COMMENTS ON MURDER OF
DIPLOMATS, DEFEAT OF ALGERIAN TERRORISM


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary. Algerian journalist and terrorism expert
Mounir Boudjemaa told DCM August 6 that the GOA had
deliberately avoided mobilizing popular support for the
release of the two diplomats kidnapped in Baghdad July 21
because the government expected them to be killed. Boudjemaa
was uncertain how the GOA confirmed their deaths, but thought
it had been based on analysis of extremist websites, rather
than any specific information such as video tapes.
Boudjemaa said he thought average Algerians were focused on
domestic issues and not very concerned by Iraq, but the
killings of the diplomats increased their awareness of the
links between Algerian terrorists and Zarqawi's Al-Qaida in
Iraq. Turning to the state of Algeria's terrorist
organizations, he said their capabilities were greatly
reduced, especially in the cities. GSPC in particular
continued to operate in some mountainous areas, but they now
"lived like wolves" and had poor morale. GSPC had links with
Maghrebi terrorist networks in Europe, but Boudjemaa was
skeptical of the GSPC's ability to support direct ties to
Zarqawi, especially after the killing of the diplomats. If
Bouteflika's National Reconciliation plan is implemented,
Boudjemaa predicted, it would effectively put an end to the
remaining Algerian terrorist groups. That said, some former
terrorists have now turned to banditry, and Algeria faced a
growing problem of violent street crime. End summary.

GOA Response to Kidnapping of Diplomats
--------------


2. (C) Mounir Boudjemaa is a journalist for the respected
Algerian French-language daily Le Quotidien d'Oran, who
writes on terrorism and national security issues. Boudjemaa
is one of the few journalists who has contacts with both the
security services and Algerian terrorist groups. In an
August 6 conversation with DCM, Boudjemaa said his GOA
contacts had told him that the Algerian government
deliberately refrained from trying to mobilize public opinion
and Islamic leaders to demand the release of the two Algerian
diplomats kidnapped in Baghdad July 21 and reportedly killed
July 27. Algerian security services, he commented, had been
convinced from the beginning that Zarqawi would kill the two
captives shortly after taking them hostage, and therefore the
GOA decided to impose a virtual news blackout and avoid
getting the public involved.


3. (C) DCM asked specifically if Boudjemaa had any
information about the basis on which the Presidency had
confirmed the two diplomats' deaths less than two hours after
the release of an Al-Qaida in Iraq statement announcing they
had been killed. Boudjemaa said his contacts had told him
the confirmation was based solely on Algerian terrorism
experts' monitoring of extremist websites and analysis of
past practice by Zarqawi's organization. He did not think
the Algerians had received a videotape or eyewitness
confirmation of their deaths.

Impact on Algerian Public
--------------


4. (C) Asked about the popular reaction, Boudjemaa commented
that Algerians generally were exhausted by the terrorist
violence they had experienced in their own country in the
1990s, and had little real emotional engagement with problems
abroad. While the Algerian media covered Iraq extensively
and often with a slant hostile to what is usually described
here as the "American occupation," Boudjemaa said that before
the kidnapping of the two diplomats, genuine interest in Iraq
was limited to Islamist and leftist circles. He agreed,
however, that the GOA's Iraq policy had been much more
nuanced, that Algeria had supported Security Council
resolutions that provided legitimacy to the transfer of
sovereignty and to the role of MNF-I, even while these
positions were never clearly explained to the public.
Boudjemaa thought the intense attention in the press to the
deaths of the two diplomats, and especially the statements by
GSPC urging Zarqawi to kill them, had driven home the
connections between Algerian terrorism and terrorism in Iraq.



5. (C) Asked about former Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
number two Ali Benhadj's remarks to Al-Jazeera in which
Benhadj praised Zarqawi, justified taking the diplomats
"prisoner" on the grounds that they were supporting the
"occupation," and said it was up to Zarqawi to decide what to
do with them (statements for which Benhadj is under
indictment),Boudjemaa said it only proved that Benhadj is
"not a politician" and "lives in the Middle Ages." Boudjemaa
thought it was equally revealing that former FIS leader
Abassi Madani, who lives in Qatar, had issued an appeal for
the release of a French woman journalist kidnapped in Iraq
several months ago, but had said nothing about the Algerian
diplomats until after they were dead. Boudjemaa thought the
former FIS leaders' off-key response to this incident would
likely further undermine their reputations with ordinary
Algerians and confirm the view that they are dangerously out
of touch with reality.

Algerian Terrorists "Live Like Wolves"
--------------


6. (C) Turning to the security situation in Algeria,
Boudjemaa stated that even the largest Algerian terrorist
organization, the GSPC, now had minimal capabilities in any
of the urban areas. While terrorist ambushes of military
patrols and military counterstrikes continue almost on a
daily basis in several mountainous areas, Boudjemaa said he
did not think GSPC could mount a serious attack in Algiers.
In contrast to the mid-1990s, when GIA and GSPC "emirs" truly
lived like princes in their mountain hideouts, today they
"live like wolves," stealing sheep and wearing rags.


7. (C) Asked to project Algeria's security profile five
years out, Boudjemaa said that if Bouteflika succeeded in
introducing a National Reconciliation policy, including some
kind of amnesty, it would take away the terrorists' last card
and they would fade away within a few years.
Violence-hardened ex-terrorists, stripped of their Islamic
veneer but skilled at using weapons and without remorse,
however, were already feeding a growing problem of banditry,
and this kind of violent criminality would likely grow.
Boudjemaa added that Algeria also faced a growing problem of
violent juvenile delinquency. Middle class urban Algerians
no longer feared being killed by terrorist gangs when they
went out at night, but that fear was starting to be replaced
by a fear of being mugged by knife-wielding young thugs.

Algerian Terrorist Networks
--------------


8. (C) Boudjemaa concluded the discussion by observing that
Algerians, as well as Moroccans and Tunisians, were active in
European terrorist networks, with the Algerians particularly
active in France and the Moroccans in Spain. While he was
aware there were efforts to organize groups of young
Algerians to join Zarqawi's terrorist cells in Iraq,
Boudjemaa commented that he doubted these efforts would
amount to much because Algerians were not very familiar with
how to conduct themselves in Syria or Iraq and were not
comfortable operating in the eastern Arab environment.
Similarly, Boudjemaa said Algerian terrorists had established
a network in Canada but he thought they had failed to do so
in the U.S. for similar reasons. DCM agreed this made sense,
citing an MNF-I report that showed that Algerians only
constituted about one percent of captured non-Iraqi
terrorists held by U.S. forces in Iraq.


9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

ERDMAN