LIBYAN AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES ALGERIAN STABILITY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001619

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KISL PGOV AG LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES ALGERIAN STABILITY,
VIEWS ON ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. Over lunch at the Residence August 6, newly
arrived Libyan Ambassador Abdel Moula El-Ghadbane described
to Ambassador and DCM his views on President Bouteflika's
role in stabilizing Algeria's internal political situation,
as well as his critique of Islamic extremism in Algeria and
throughout the region. El-Ghadbane, who previously served as
Ambassador to Algiers in the early 1990s, described
Bouteflika's role as crucial to a dual process of
marginalizing Islamist terrorism while also containing
divisions within the Algerian ruling elite. El-Ghadbane
expressed support for Bouteflika's promotion of National
Reconciliation, stated that Libyan security services
cooperate fully with their Algerian counterparts, and
described new Libyan investment in Algeria as partly intended
to support Algerian stability. El-Ghadbane asserted that
Libya had recognized the threat from Islamist extremism
already in the 1980s, and described some of the steps the
Libyans had taken to counter it. Ambassador noted that we
hoped Libya could serve as an example for other countries,
such as Syria, of how changed behavior can put bilateral
relations on a positive track. El-Ghadbane said Libya could
use its influence to counter the charge that the U.S. was
pursuing an anti-Arab policy. At the same time, he hoped
that the U.S. would remove Libya from the list of state
supporters of terrorism and commented that bilateral
relations should be conducted on the basis of dialogue and
not pressure. End summary.

Bouteflika Bringing Stability to Algeria
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador invited newly arrived Libyan Ambassador
El-Ghadbane to a working lunch at his residence August 7.
DCM also attended and translated for El-Ghadbane, who
understands English but does not speak it well. El-Ghadbane
began by noting that this was his second posting as
Ambassador in Algiers, having previously served here from
1991-94, at the height of the armed Islamist attempt to seize
power. He gave Bouteflika most of the credit for the
tremendous improvement in the security situation in Algiers
since his previous posting. Bouteflika, he said, had been
the only Algerian leader able to marginalize the Islamic
extremists while also balancing competing power centers
within the regime. Bouteflika had done this by recognizing
that counterterrorist efforts by the security services needed
to be complemented by political, economic and social
components, including Bouteflika's National Reconciliation
program which El-Ghadbane noted was "not supported by
everyone" in the Algerian regime. Now, with the Algerian
treasury flush with oil revenues, Algerians able to express
their views and not be confronted by government
"provocations," and a major public works and housing program
slated for implementation over the next five years,
El-Ghadbane said he was optimistic that Bouteflika would
succeed, and in the process help stabilize the entire Maghreb
and trans-Sahelian regions. Libya was doing its part through
private sector investment in Algeria's tourist sector, as
well as longstanding close cooperation between the two
countries' security services. Libya has 800 kilometers of
frontier with Algeria, he noted, and it was crucial to
Libya's security that Algeria remain stable "so we don't face
another Afghanistan on our border."

Algerians Marked by Violence
--------------


3. (C) Describing the internal Algerian situation in the
early 1990s, El-Ghadbane said that Algerians were a product
of their history. The violence of their struggle for
independence from France had left a mark on their mentality,
convincing them that violence was the best means to achieve
political change. Many veterans of the independence struggle
offered intellectual justifications of violence that the
Islamists then put to their own uses. FIS leaders Madani and
Benhadj publicly pretended to play by the rules of the
electoral system in place at the time, but they had no real
control over the mass of armed terrorists, many of them
veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan,
waiting to wage jihad against an "apostate" Algerian state.
After a string of unsuccessful Algerian leaders, Bouteflika
had been the first to recognize the importance of building up
moderate Islamic institutions, both formal ones such as the
High Islamic Council, and informal ones such as the Sufi
orders, which formed important elements of the President's
support base around the country. Education reform was also
essential, especially doing away with Islamic studies
programs at the secondary and university level since such
programs produced graduates who had no skills except the
ability to interpret the Quran, often according to extremist
conceptions.

Libyan Methods for Countering Islamic Extremism
-------------- ---


4. (C) Turning to Libya, El-Ghadbane said his country had
been among the first to recognize the threat from Islamic
extremism. Ambassador noted that during its attempt at
Arabization of the education system, Algeria had imported
thousands of teachers from Egypt, many of whom turned out to
be members of the Muslim Brotherhood. El-Ghadbane said Libya
had done the same, but had expelled any Egyptian teacher who
advocated Brotherhood viewpoints. As an example, he cited an
Egyptian teacher working in a small Libyan village school who
had cursed the memory of Nasser. The parents of the students
immediately demanded that the teacher be expelled. Libya
also banned Islamic studies as an area of academic
specialization. Any college graduate who studied the Libyan
version of liberal arts (largely Arab history and language)
could lead Friday prayers at a mosque, for example. Libya
had also recognized the potential for young Arabs to become
radicalized by the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan,
and had actively blocked young Libyans from volunteering to
fight there. It also prevented the few Libyan veterans of
that war from returning home.

Libya as a Model
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador said he was pleased to see the changes in
Libyan policies that had made possible the subsequent
development of U.S. relations with Libya, since Libya could
serve as an example for other countries that still supported
terrorism and pursued WMD. El-Ghadbane agreed, noting that
Libya could help counter the widely held Arab view that U.S.
policies were anti-Arab. "You are only against a small group
of Arabs who are the enemies of everyone," he commented.
El-Ghadbane added that Libya hoped the U.S. would remove it
from the list of state supporters of terrorism. El-Ghadbane,
who appears to be in his mid-forties, told Ambassador that he
was representative of his generation of Libyans, who "were
not brought up to hate." He said he hoped the U.S. would
learn to tolerate some differences of opinion with Qadhafi,
who he said was a man known for speaking his mind.


6. (C) Comment: We defer to USLO Tripoli as to the accuracy
of El-Ghadbane's description of Libya's handling of Islamic
extremism. We found him very personable, well-spoken,
thoughtful, and open to engagement with Ambassador. His
analysis of Algeria's internal situation tracks fairly
closely with our own. El-Ghadbane is not a career diplomat.
He studied biology in Libya, received a doctorate in Hungary,
and returned to Libya to teach at the university level.


7. (U) USLO Tripoli Minimize Considered.
ERDMAN