Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ALGIERS1560
2005-07-26 17:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

MINISTER DELEGATE MESSAHEL CONFIRMS ALGERIAN

Tags:  PTER PREL AG IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001560 

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD PASS TO HWG - MARK WILDERMUTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL AG IZ
SUBJECT: MINISTER DELEGATE MESSAHEL CONFIRMS ALGERIAN
EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD STILL OPEN

REF: A. ALGIERS 1538

B. GERMAIN-SIEVERS E-MAIL 7/25

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001560

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD PASS TO HWG - MARK WILDERMUTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL AG IZ
SUBJECT: MINISTER DELEGATE MESSAHEL CONFIRMS ALGERIAN
EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD STILL OPEN

REF: A. ALGIERS 1538

B. GERMAIN-SIEVERS E-MAIL 7/25

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (S) Summary and Comment. Minister of State Abdelkader
Messahel confirmed to Charge and UK Ambassador Tesoriere July
26, in a meeting held at our request, that the Algerian
Embassy in Baghdad remained open officially. Messahel said
there had only been three Algerian diplomatic staff in
Baghdad, and with two kidnapped it made sense to evacuate the
remaining diplomat, as well as the wife of the kidnapped
Charge, Ali Belaroussi, to Amman. Messahel welcomed U.S. and
UK offers of support and assistance to Algeria and said, "We
are fighting the same enemy and need to work together." In
response to Ambassador Tesoriere's comment that the Iraqi
government was concerned that Algeria not appear to be
withdrawing from Iraq under terrorist pressure, Messahel
agreed it was important "not to hand the terrorists a
victory" by withdrawing from Iraq. Messahel noted that
Algeria had extensive experience in combatting terrorism, and
suggested that the Algerian intelligence service was
"pursuing every route" to determine which sources were
credible. Charge noted that the GOA had not yet responded to
our request, delivered by Charge to MFA on July 23, for GOA
officials working on this issue to be in contact with the
Hostage Working Group at Embassy Baghdad (see ref a).
Messahel appeared to be unaware of our previous request, but
instructed his assistant, Ambassador Aiouaz, to follow up.
We and the British remain puzzled at the GOA's hesitancy to
engage us directly in Baghdad, but our joint sense in Algiers
is that Messahel's reassurances about the embassy represent
an important indication of GOA determination not to give in
to terrorism. End summary and comment.


2. (C) As previewed by ref (b) e-mail from NEA/MAG, British
Ambassador Andrew Tesoriere phoned Charge the morning of July
26 to ask if the U.S. was interested in delivering a joint
demarche to the GOA to seek clarification of various reports
in the Arab and Algerian media July 25-26 that Algeria had
closed its embassy in Baghdad. Charge agreed the demarche
was a good idea, and noted that he would also like to press

the Algerians to respond to our outstanding request that they
establish direct contact with Embassy Baghdad's Hostage
Working Group. Tesoriere and Charge agreed that the demarche
should be delivered to Minister Delegate Abdelkader Messahel.
(Note: Messahel normally is responsible for African and
Maghreb affairs, but with Foreign Minister Bedjaoui in
London, Messahel is the senior MFA official in Algiers, and
he also had made a press statement July 25 that the Algerian
Embassy in Baghdad remained open.)


3. (C) Tesoriere and Charge began the meeting by noting the
interest and concern with which Washington and London were
following news of the July 21 kidnapping of two Algerian
diplomats in Baghdad. We stressed that we appreciated the
opportunity to meet with Messahel in order to clarify the GOA
position, particularly media reports that Algeria had closed
its Baghdad embassy. Messahel thanked the U.S. and UK for
their support and offers of assistance on the ground in Iraq.
Terrorism, he noted, has become a global phenomenon and it
requires a global response. "We are fighting the same enemy,
and need to work together," Messahel stated. He also
expressed appreciation for the security support provided by
the Iraqi authorities. Messahel observed that he had read
the statement issued by Zarqawi's group earlier in the day
declaring that the group's "Shari'a court" had tried the two
diplomats and sentenced them to death, but he said that such
statements were often issued by terrorists to shock and
spread fear and were not necessarily authoritative.


4. (C) Turning to the status of the Algerian embassy,
Messahel assured us that it remained open. The embassy's
staff had only consisted of three diplomats, and now that two
had been kidnapped it made sense to evacuate the remaining
diplomat and the wife of the kidnapped Charge, Ali Aroussi.
Both had left for Amman July 25. Algeria had not closed the
embassy, however. The Algerian flag continued to fly in
Baghdad, and the embassy was still staffed by Algerian
citizens who did not have diplomatic status. In addition,
former Algerian Ambassador to Iraq Moustafa Boutourah was
based in Amman and was following events in Iraq from Jordan.
In response to a question from Tesoriere, Messahel said
Boutourah had not yet presented his credentials to the Iraqi
Transitional Government, but he implied that Boutourah would
do so soon. In response to Charge's comment that State
Minister Soltani had been interviewed on Arab satellite
television and stated that the embassy was closed, Messahel
said that only statements released by the Algerian official
press agency were authoritative.


5. (S) Tesoriere asked about the "methodology" Algeria was
pursuing to free the two hostages. Messahel responded that
Algeria had suffered greatly from terrorism; terrorism had
been the GOA's top priority for over a decade. The GOA and
its intelligence services had a vast experience on which they
could draw in order to analyze terrorist incidents. In this
case, there were "various routes" to pursue, but expertise
was needed to determine which of the routes might be credible
in leading to the kidnappers. Charge noted that he had met
with MFA Director General for the Americas Chikhi July 23 and
given him the name and contact information of Embassy
Baghdad's Hostage Working Group coordinator Mark Wildermuth,
but so far, no one from the Algerian side had contacted him.
With all due respect for Algeria's expertise, the U.S. and
the UK, along with the Iraqis, were the ones with
capabilities on the ground and we needed to coordinate
urgently in order to avoid any mistakes or working at cross
purposes. Messahel appeared surprised and unaware of
Charge's July 23 meeting, but he instructed his assistant,
Ambassador Aiouaz, to follow up. Charge gave Aiouaz
Wildermuth's name and contact information. In response to
Charge's request for a point of contact at the MFA, Messahel
identified Director for Information and Communications
Abdelhamid Chebchoub as the head of the MFA's crisis working
group. We will follow up with Chebchoub July 27.



SIEVERS