JULY 3 DISCUSSION OF MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS

					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PGOV AG MO WI
SUBJECT: JULY 3 DISCUSSION OF MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS 
AND WESTERN SAHARA WITH BELKHEIR 
 
REF: A. STATE 122658 
     
B. ALGIERS 1250 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman; reasons 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
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1. (C) In an extended exchange July 3 with Presidential Chief
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador reviewed reftel talking points,
expressing strong U.S. disappointment over recent setbacks in
Moroccan-Algerian relations, noting that provocative actions
from both sides had contributed to the current serious
impasse, and underscoring the need for restraint and renewed
efforts at rapprochement. Belkheir reviewed the litany of
Algerian grievances against Morocco; repeated previous
arguments that by rejecting the Baker Plan, Morocco had
missed a chance to resolve the Western Sahara issue in a way
that would meet its concerns; and initially insisted that
Algerian references to the Sahrawi right to independence, not
just self-determination, was a longstanding Algerian
position. He contrasted this behavior to Algeria's
unswerving and principled support over the last three decades
for a UN-based solution to the Western Sahara issue that
honored the principle of self-determination.



2. (C) Belkheir also argued that if the United States really
wanted to help, it should press Morocco to accept the Baker
Plan, just as Algeria had pressed the Polisario to accept it.
Belkheir later in the day briefed the Ambassador on
President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche. In the
clearest explanation to date as to why Algerian rhetoric may
have hardened in recent weeks, Bouteflika said that in the
context of current unacceptable Moroccan behavior, as long as
Morocco was rejecting "international legality" by reversing
its position on the holding of a referendum and by refusing
to accept Baker, Algeria reserved the right, in reaction, to
speak about Sahrawi rights to both self-determination and
independence. Should Morocco accept "international
legality," Algeria would respond accordingly. In the
meantime, however, it would not accept a "fait accompli" on
the Western Sahara. Septel will offer an analysis and
recommendations, from an Algiers perspective, on how we might
manage -- and reverse -- the current setback in
Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. (End Summary)

U.S. DISAPPOINTED OVER SETBACK TO
ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS


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3. (C) During July 3 morning meeting with Presidential Chief
of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador expressed strong U.S.
disappointment over recent setbacks in Moroccan-Algerian
relations, triggered in part by provocative Algerian
statements, and underscored the need for both sides to act
with restraint and renew efforts at rapprochement. Reviewing
each of the talking points and noting that we understood
Algerian frustrations, Ambassador argued it that both sides
had contributed to the current impasse and that it was in
both sides' interest to get things back on track. Algeria
and Morocco were neighbors and would always be so, and it
served neither their interests nor the interests of the
region to allow the current state of affairs to continue.
Sooner or later, both sides would have to take up the work of
resuming rapprochement, as they have periodically done in the
past, so they might as well resume their efforts sooner
rather than later. Ambassador emphasized we were counting on
the vision and statesmanship of President Bouteflika to
choose a course of action that reflected Algeria's interests
in regional cooperation and improved relations with Morocco.

BELKHEIR: ALGERIA CAN'T ENGAGE WHEN MOROCCO
IS CONTINUING SUCH UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR


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4. (C) Covering familiar territory, Belkheir reviewed the
litany of Algerian complaints against Morocco, among other
things, its rejection of the Baker Plan, its rejection of a
referendum Morocco had previously agreed to, the extremely
insulting manner in which the Moroccans had treated the
Algerian prime minister by abruptly canceling his visit, the
organization of anti-Algerian demonstrations by the Moroccan
services, the violent suppression of Sahrawi demonstrators,
insinuations that Algeria -- as opposed to Moroccan
stonewalling -- was behind current Sahrawi unrest, inflows of
Moroccan drugs, which was corrupting Algerian youth. If this
was the posture Morocco chose to adopt, so be it. Algeria
did not wish Morocco ill, but it could not engage with
Morocco if it persisted in taking such positions.
BELKHEIR: IT'S TOO SOON TO
RESUME RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS


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5. (C) Ambassador pushed back, repeating that continued
tension helped no one and that both sides needed to find a
way to rebuild confidence and get things back on track.
Belkheir appeared to take the point but said it was too soon
to consider such steps. In this regard, he noted that after
the cancellation of the Ouyahia visit, Moroccan Deputy
Interior Minister al-Himma had called him to say they needed
to continue dialogue. Belkheir said he told al-Himma it was
hard to talk about dialogue in the context of such publicly
insulting behavior toward the Algerian head of government. At
the very least, Ambassador rejoined, Algeria should avoid
steps and declarations that would further complicate the
situation. Belkheir argued unconvincingly that, in any case,
both the Polisario letter language and subsequent statements
reflected longstanding Algerian positions.

BELKHEIR UNFAVORABLY COMPARES
CURRENT KING TO HIS FATHER


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6. (C) As in their previous conversation (Ref B), Ambassador
said in the current context the "independence" rhetoric was a
departure from the rhetoric of at least the last two years,
which had stressed the right of self-determination, not the
right to independence. Morocco would never accept
independence just as the Sahrawi would never accept
integration. That left autonomy as the only area of possible
common ground, Ambassador continued. So references to
independence were not helpful in guiding expectations toward
realistic outcomes. Belkheir countered that the Baker Plan
had provided a mechanism to achieve such an outcome by
allowing all the inhabitants, Moroccan as well as Sahrawi, to
vote in a referendum. Unfavorably comparing Mohammed VI to
his father, Belkheir argued the root of the problem was that
Morocco lacked confidence and strong leadership. Hassan II
had been a tough adversary.



7. (C) In the end, Belkheir claimed, Hassan (with whom he met
many times as a secret emissary) understood what had to be
done to protect Moroccan interests vis-a-vis the Western
Sahara. Accordingly, he had accepted a referendum and,
subsequently, the autonomy approach Baker developed.
Mohammed VI, by contrast, did not have his father's
experience, was timid, and was surrounded by unhelpful
advisers. As a result, Morocco has rejected previously
accepted positions and lost an opportunity -- via referendum
voting procedures that would have allowed all Moroccan
residents to participate -- to assure the outcome it needed.

BELKHEIR STRESSES ALGERIA'S PRINCIPLED,
UNSWERVING SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION


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8. (C) If the United States really wanted to help, it should
pressure Morocco to abide by UN Security Council resolutions,
just as Algeria had pressured the Polisario to accept the
Baker Plan. With some passion, Belkheir emphasized that no
one had worked harder than he over the years for improved
relations with Morocco and a settlement of the Western Sahara
issue. He also stressed the consistency of Algeria's
position on self-determination over the years, noting Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos' recent testimony that when Spain
withdrew from the Western Sahara, it had transferred
administrative responsibilities but not sovereignty to
Morocco (and Mauritania). He also cited Algeria's principled
support for East Timorese self-determination, despite its
very close and sentimental ties with Indonesia stemming from
its support for Algeria's liberation struggle.

BELKHEIR DISMISSES ANTI-SETTLEMENT
ELEMENTS AS UNIMPORTANT IN GUIDING GOA POLICY


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9. (C) Ambassador said he had no doubts about Belkheir's
personal commitment to improve relations and resolve the
Western Sahara issue in a manner that would address Moroccan
concerns. However, there were pockets of hardline thinking
in the FLN as well as Algerian elements who had a vested
interest in keeping the border closed and profiting from the
illicit border trade. Belkheir acknowledged that such
attitudes existed but dismissed them as unimportant,
insisting that the FLN, and especially minority elements
within the FLN, did not/not make government policy. As for
the illicit border trade, the government was acutely aware of
the problem and beginning to take strong measures against
those involved. (Note: in fact we have begun to see some
interesting, relatively high profile anti-corruption
prosecutions -- see septel.)

BOUTEFLIKA: HARDENED ALGERIAN RHETORIC A
RESPONSE TO ATTEMPTED MOROCCAN FAIT ACCOMPLI


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10. (C) Later in the day, Belkheir phoned Ambassador to relay
President Bouteflika's reaction to our demarche earlier in
the day. In the clearest explanation to date as to why the
Algerian rhetorical position has hardened, and abandoning all
pretense that current rhetoric simply reiterated longstanding
positions, Belkheir explained that Bouteflika had become
increasingly fed up with Morocco's behavior on the Western
Sahara. Morocco had reversed its previous acceptance of a
referendum and had rejected the Baker Plan. In so doing, it
had rejected international legality. "Tell the Ambassador,"
Bouteflika instructed Belkheir, "that until Morocco accepted
this international legality, Algeria reserved the right to
speak about the right of the Sahrawi people to
self-determination AND independence." Cutting to the chase
and echoing comments in a recent interview with a Tunisian
daily, in which he referred to Moroccan "chantage"
(blackmail), Bouteflika vowed that Algeria would never accept
a Moroccan fait accompli on the Western Sahara.
ERDMAN