ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO TALKS DEMOCRACY, SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003997

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ET SOMALIA ELEC
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO TALKS DEMOCRACY, SOMALIA
WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Visiting DAS Don Yamamoto told Deputy
Foreign Minister Tekeda the GOE had to move faster to
strengthen key democratic institutions and to release
imprisoned CUD opposition leaders. He and Amb. Huddleston
highlighted increasing concern about Ethiopian human rights
and democracy at senior levels of the USG and among the U.S.
public. Yamamoto pressed for consular access to the detained
leaders, but received a cool response from Tekeda. The Deputy
Minister said the GOE objected to micromanagement of
relations with Ethiopia's opposition. He lamented that the
opposition was successfully tarnishing the GOE's image as
part of its long-standing, subversive agenda. Tekeda asked
for USG understanding as the GOE sought to balance the need
to ensure the rule of law and maintain civil order while
respecting democratic rights. He said the GOE had no problem
"in principle" with the democratic reforms the USG was
suggesting; the only differences were over speed and the
specifics of implementation. On Somalia, Tekeda agreed with
the USG plans to increase support for the TFG process, while
pressing TFG President Yusuf to build ties with other actors.
Yusuf shared Ethiopia's unwavering commitment to fighting
extremism, he added. Tekeda said the GOE believed
Somaliland's people should decide whether they wanted
independence. He recommended that the USG tell leaders from
both Somaliland and the TFG that the U.S. expected them to
work out their differences through dialogue. End Summary.


2. (C) AF DAS Yamamoto and Charge met over breakfast with
Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu
Nov. 28. Director for North American Affairs Grum Abay and
Deputy Alayew Mamo joined Tekeda, while AF/RSA rep Col Kenny
and PolEcon Counselor Kevin Sullivan also attended for the
USG.

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Yamamoto, Charge Press for Democratic Reforms
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3. (C) DAS Yamamoto told Tekeda that both Secretary Rice and
President bush wanted to know what was being done to address
the political crisis in Ethiopia. Both had taken notice of
Diaspora protests and the reports of the detention of CUD
leaders and wanted answers. Yamamoto asked the Deputy FonMin
how the country could move forward on democracy and human
rights. Tekeda replied that a small group of opposition
hard-liners were holding both opposition moderates and
society at large hostage. The return of CUD President Hailu
Shawel to Ethiopia had been the real blow to the democratic
process; the GOE should not be blamed for this. Tekeda asked
for USG understanding as the GOE sought to balance the need
to ensure the rule of law and maintain civil order while
respecting democratic rights. According to Tekeda, the way
forward was for CUD MPs to come to Parliament, hopefully
along with those leaders not implicated in "crimes." He added
that the GOE objected to too much micromanaging by the
international community of the GOE's relations with the
opposition. Ethiopians must learn to talk to and trust each
other, rather than running to outsiders for help. Tekeda
lamented that the CUD had been successful in its efforts to
tarnish the GOE's international image, which he said formed a
key element of the opposition's long-standing strategy to
undermine the EPRDF government.


4. (C) Yamamoto said that imprisoned CUD leaders would be the
biggest challenge for the GOE. Creative solutions would be
needed; amnesties linked to medical conditions were one
possibility. Col Kenny suggested revising widely criticized
changes to the rules of Parliament would be another
initiative the GOE could take to defuse the situation. Charge
Huddleston agreed, and argued that if the EPRDF had been more
willing to build trust with CUD moderates and the general
public, the objections of CUD hard-liners like Hailu Shawel
could have been overcome. Trust remained a problem, she
added. Everyone was waiting for the GOE to follow through on
its commitments. Prime Minister Meles had expressed his
agreement with reforming Parliamentary rules, opening the
media and building capacity at the NEB, but nothing had
happened. Tekeda responded that the GOE agreed "in principle"
with democratic reforms; the only issue was how and when to
implement them.


5. (C) The Charge and DAS Yamamoto pressed Tekeda for access
to detained CUD leaders; Yamamoto mentioned that he had
brought medication from the U.S. for Hailu Shawel. The Charge
noted that a series of major letter-writing campaigns had
begun at some of the U.S. most prestigious universities on
behalf of the imprisoned members of the opposition. Granting
DAS Yamamoto access would allow him to address these concerns
more effectively. Yamamoto pointed out that many of the
detainees had AmCit family members to whom the USG would have
to discuss their cases. While granting the USG access would
go beyond Ethiopia's Geneva Convention obligations, it had
been done before in other countries. Tekeda answered that he
hoped the USG would not insist on this point. Allowing
international community access to the detainees would
"maintain their illusion" that outsiders cold resolve their
legal problems. The GOE should be the primary interlocutor
for the opposition, not third country representatives.

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Somalia: GOE Favors More USG Support for TFG
-- With String Attached
--------------


6. (C) DAS Yamamoto briefed Tekeda on U.S. plans for greater
engagement on Somalia. The USG was looking for ways to show
increased support for the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) while at the same time mitigating President Yusuf's
tendency to go it alone, rather than reaching out to
potential rivals like the Speaker of the Parliament. The
Department had taken an initial step forward by having
Washington based officials meet Yusuf in New York on the
margins of the UNGA. A next step would be for a USG rep visit
to the TFG in Jowhar. Yamamoto underscored that the U.S.
continued to believe that the introduction of foreign troops
from neighboring countries would be counterproductive. At the
same time, the USG was looking for fresh ideas on how to
promote stability in Somalia. Yamamoto and Kenny also
mentioned stepped up USG efforts to combat Somalia-based
pirates in the Indian Ocean.


7. (C) Tekeda agreed that it was important to keep pushing
Yusuf to build relations with other actors in Somalia. He
noted that while many observers believed Yusuf was "in our
pocket," Yusuf had walked out on a meeting with GOE reps.
What kept the GOE close to Yusuf was their common commitment
to fighting Islamic extremism. Yusuf's determination on that
point was absolute, and no amount of money could buy him off.
The GOE was working more closely with other regional states
to support the TFG, even Egypt, which no longer posed an
obstacle to the process. The Deputy Prime Minister said
sending a USG representative to Jowhar would send a positive
signal -- the principal contribution the USG could make --
and did not appear to have a downside. Tekeda remarked that
most Somali leaders had a weakness, including links to
drug-trafficking or other illicit activities, in marked
contrast to their more responsible counterparts in Hargese.


8. (C) Asked what message Tekeda could carry Jowhar later the
same day, Yamamoto requested that the GOE ask Yusuf to act as
a national leader, rather than a warlord. He should engage
with the Speaker of Parliament and other leaders in Somalia.
If he is successful, the USG will engage with him at a higher
level.

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Somaliland: GOE Agrees Gradual Engagement,
Supports Self-Determination
--------------


9. (C) Tekeda told DAS Yamamoto that the GOE sought to
maintain honest and transparent relations with both the TFG
and Somaliland authorities in Hargese. Ethiopia had no
position on the substance of Somaliland's desire for
independence from Somalia; the GOE believed that the people
of Somaliland should determine their relationship with
Somalia. Tekeda added that Somaliland's quest for
independence was not a policy driven exclusively by an elite,
but rather enjoyed strong grassroots support. He called an
AU-organized referendum "one option" for gauging dealing with
the issue of independence. The Deputy Minister acknowledged
Ethiopians' strong sentimental affinity for the Issacs clan
in Somaliland, which had developed strong ties with Ethiopia
over the decades. Still, explicit GOE support for
independence of Somaliland or early diplomatic recognition of
authorities in Hargese would be damaging. The GOE would
instead seek to maintain "balance" between the TFG and
Somaliland. Tekeda claimed that Somaliland and Puntland
would have gone to war several times in recent years had it
not been for GOE intervention. In managing the issue of
Somaliland, the Deputy Minister suggested that Egypt would
not be helpful, but would not be as big an obstacle as in the
past, while Kenya was "neither here nor there."

10 (C) Yamamoto indicated that the USG would also be seeking
balance in its relations with the TFG and Somaliland
authorities. The U.S. would begin with low-level contacts
with Hargese. Tekeda recommended that as a first step, the
USG communicate to both Hargese and Jowhar its expectation
that the two sides would start talking in order to resolve
their disagreements through dialogue.

HUDDLESTON