Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ADDISABABA3844
2005-11-14 13:45:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ENGAGING THE AU - THOUGHTS AHEAD OF THE AF COM

Tags:  PREL XA AF UNION 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003844 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, S/P. LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICA WATCHERS. EUCOM FOR POLAD.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL XA AF UNION
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE AU - THOUGHTS AHEAD OF THE AF COM
MEETING

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3010


B. ADDIS ABABA 3461

C. ADDIS ABABA 3313

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003844

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, S/P. LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICA WATCHERS. EUCOM FOR POLAD.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL XA AF UNION
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE AU - THOUGHTS AHEAD OF THE AF COM
MEETING

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3010


B. ADDIS ABABA 3461

C. ADDIS ABABA 3313

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY.


1. (SBU) Summary: The African Union (AU) is displaying
tremendous political will to address the continent's
problems, which differentiates it from the OAU, its defunct
predecessor organization. The AU is also serving as the
coordinating body for positive change in Africa by playing a
more proactive role in international fora and in promoting
member state implementation of continental and international
legal instruments. As many of the AU's programs are in their
beginning stages, now is the right time to engage the AU to
help ensure continental programs and policies are in line
with U.S. objectives. Despite positive developments, the
AU's ability to act remains constrained by inadequate
institutional capacity, which threatens to undermine critical
efforts to pursue peace and security and other objectives.
Post offers these comments ahead of the November 16
Washington COMs discussion on the future of U.S.-Africa
relations. End summary.

--------------
WHY FOCUS ON THE AU?
--------------


2. (SBU) The AU is positioning itself as Africa's premier
continental organization. It holds member states to a
higher standard on a range of issues while promoting peace,
security, development and prosperity. The AU sees peace and
security in Africa as necessarily linked to development and
good governance.


3. (SBU) AU responses to events in Darfur, Mauritania and
TOGO are examples of the AU's conscious decision to adopt a
stance of "non-indifference" regarding problems afflicting
the continent. Senior AU officials argue that
"non-indifference" distinguishes the AU from the OAU and its
ineffective policy of "non-interference." The AU is striving
to prove that it is no longer a pure rubber stamp of member
state whims, but rather seeks to develop the institutional
capacity and legal basis to be a proactive leader.
"Non-indifference" translates to a more attentive partner;
but, as evidenced by Somalia, also to a partner that may
attempt to move ahead on its own absent international
community support and dialogue.


4. (SBU) 53 member states increasingly look to the AU to
coordinate African positions in international fora such as

the UN and WTO. AU efforts are geared at bringing about more
positive outcomes for Africa. Member states look to the AU
to harmonize and bolster their efforts to implement
continental and international commitments in areas such as
counter-terrorism, health, infrastructure, peace and
security, etc.

--------------
WHY NOW?
--------------


5. (SBU) The AU is in the beginning stages of developing
policy and implementation plans for a wide range of issues
intersecting with the USG's own priorities for Africa. These
plans will set the continent's agenda, so providing technical
and financial assistance now will help ensure Africa's
programs are more in line with U.S. objectives.


6. (SBU) Doors are currently open for USG engagement. The AU
has requested USG assistance to develop a continental
"roadmap" for counter-terrorism and to provide technical and
other assistance to the Algiers-based African Center for
Study and Research on Terrorism. The AU has also requested a
U.S. health attache to help guide the institution's response
to HIV/AIDS, malaria, polio and other health threats. These
are but two specific examples of the AU's actively seeking
out USG engagement and input.

--------------
EXAMPLES OF KEY ACTIVITIES
--------------
Regional Integration
--------------


7. (SBU) Key to the AU's ability to project a positive
stance is a draft MOU with its regional economic communities
(RECs) to better define continental and regional roles and
responsibilities. The AU also seeks to harmonize membership
in the RECs. To improve the AU's outreach capability and
response time, various partners, including the USG, are
working to upgrade AU communications infrastructure.

Peace and Security
--------------


8. (SBU) The AU was forced to establish an ad-hoc mission in
Darfur, because it did not yet have a viable continental
peace and security architecture. Now the AU is making great
strides in concert with the G8 and other partners to develop
the African Standby Force (ASF). ASF efforts are geared
towards ensuring five regional brigades are formed and
possess sufficient doctrine; standard operating procedures;
training and evaluation mechanisms; command, control,
communication and information systems (C3IS); and logistics
capability to undertake progressively more complex peace
support operations. The USG is leading assistance for C3IS.
Other elements of the peace and security architecture under
development include a conflict early warning system, AU field
offices, and a Panel of the Wise.


9. (SBU) The African Center for Study and Research on
Terrorism (ACSRT) and the nascent CT cell in Addis Ababa seek
to assist member states with harmonizing CT efforts and
implementing both continental and international CT
commitments. The NDU's Africa Center for Strategic Studies
has been working with the AU in this pursuit.


10. (SBU) The AU is seeking to carve out a complementary role
for itself in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.


Good Governance
--------------


11. (SBU) The AU is leading a review of the Lome Declaration
on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, which may give the
AU a greater say in addressing poor governance and other
factors which may lead to coups.


12. (SBU) Ongoing integration of the New Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD) into AU structures and
streamlining NEPAD's focus is expected to increase the
effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and
streamline AU efforts to build African infrastructure.


13. (SBU) The AU is working to field more capable elections
monitors at each African election.

Trade
--------------


14. (SBU) The AU sees improving infrastructure as key to
increasing African trade and development. To this end, the
AU promotes harmonization of policies and strategies for
development of land and maritime transport infrastructure, as
well as member state adherence to maritime security standards.


15. (U) The AU is also spearheading programs to harmonize
policies and regulations in the information and
telecommunications technologies fields, and to develop a
general energy policy.


16. (SBU) The AU seeks to harmonize member state positions in
the Doha round of the WTO.

Health
--------------


17. (U) Efforts are underway to develop an Integrated Health
System in Africa to confront HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis
and other infectious diseases.
Institutions
--------------


18. (SBU) The AU continues work to establish the African
Central Bank, African Investment Bank, African Monetary Fund,
and African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights.
In addition, the AU is developing a strategic plan for the
Pretoria-based Pan African Parliament. The Economic and
Social Council was established in March 2005 to serve as the
principal interface between the AU and civil society.

--------------
CHALLENGES
--------------


19. (SBU) The AU is an organization of 53 member states
ranging in attitude and influence from South Africa to
Nigeria to Libya to Comoros. The AU Commission is often
constrained by the need to secure member state buy-in each
step of the way. The need to not stretch too far beyond
member states' vision can render the AU slow to accept some
forms of assistance from outside Africa, though the United
States and other partners can build upon the AU's ultimate
positive experience with partner technical assistance for
Darfur. The Commission can also be hindered (TOGO) or
prematurely pushed (Somalia) into action by strong member
states.


20. (SBU) Currently, the AU lacks sufficient administrative
and financial structures to implement many of its programs.
The lack of a separate DPKO-like mechanism to support
missions such as AMIS in Darfur negatively impacts the AU's
ability to meet contractor commitments or ensure adequate
staffing. Encouragingly, the AU is working with a group of
partners to undergo an institutional assessment and implement
follow-up recommendations to streamline processes and
procedures. The UN is also assisting the AU with improving
its peacekeeping support structures.


21. (SBU) Lack of full compliance by member states in paying
assessed and voluntary contributions renders the AU overly
dependent on contributions from outside the continent and
produces delays in program implementation.


22. (SBU) The AU lacks sufficient database collection, input
and analysis capability, hindering its ability to make
informed decisions to target initiatives with member states.


23. (SBU) The AU sees its leadership in the military and
political aspects of finding a solution to the Darfur crisis
as a test of its credibility and partnership both with the
international community and its member states. Perception of
AU failure in Darfur will negatively impact the AU's ability
to serve as intervening agent of first resort to address
other African conflicts.

--------------
KEEPING ENGAGED
--------------


24. (SBU) Ensuring that Embassy Addis, and indeed the
eventual U.S. Mission to the AU, is properly staffed is
crucial to USG ability to track the ever-increasing scope of
AU activities and to positively influence outcomes. Proper
staffing at this stage includes the assignment of additional
senior foreign service officers, including additional USAID
officers, a permanent U.S. Military Liaison Officer, and a
Health Attache.


25. (SBU) The U.S. should continue to build on its lead
partner role in the niche area of communications support to
the AU, and work to ensure the AU takes advantage of NATO
expertise for peace and security capacity-building. The U.S.
should also expand its focus to direct support efforts at
institutional capacity building through ESF and other
mechanisms. Without proper institutional structures, even
peace and security efforts will falter. U.S. support to the
AU should also continue to expand beyond peace and security
to health, development, political affairs, economic affairs
and other areas.


26. (SBU) More positive outcomes of AU Peace and Security
Council (PSC) decisions could be fostered by working more
closely with key AU member states, including the 15 PSC
members.


27. (SBU) Engaging senior AU leaders through regular U.S.-AU
Policy Talks will better target USG interaction with and
support to the AU.




HUDDLESTON