ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BORDER: UNMEE FEARS MORE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003657

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MOPS KPKO ET ER EE BORDER UNSC
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BORDER: UNMEE FEARS MORE
RESTRICTIONS, PEACE-KEEPERS' WITHDRAWAL

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3624 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B, D).



1. (S) SUMMARY: UNMEE officials told Charge on October 20
that they fear the Eritrean Government will continue to
impose new restrictions on its operations in order to
increase pressure on the international community to force
Ethiopian compliance with the EEBC border decision. UNMEE
warned of the possible withdrawal of Jordanian and Indian
peace-keepers -- the bulk of UNMEE personnel -- if increasing
restrictions further weaken their ability to defend
themselves or evacuate. While UNMEE military advisors still
characterize the military posture of both sides as
"defensive," they point out that the forced redeployment of
UNMEE observers following the GSE's ban on helicopter
operations has left gaps of up to 600 km between UNMEE
posts. Deputy SRSG Azouz Ennifar asked whether the USG could
provide detailed satellite imagery to fill the new gaps in
UNMEE's ability to physically monitor the border. Ennifar
(strictly protect) told the Charge privately that the UNMEE
may be consolidating too rapidly in response to the Eritrean
flight ban. Ennifar urged that the U.S. act urgently to
"cool down" the Eritrean Government and "push" the Ethiopian
Government on EEBC implementation. He reiterated his hope
that the U.S. will move quickly to appoint an envoy and
launch a sustained diplomatic initiative on the border. Post
believe that a US envoy -- with previous experience and
garvitas -- is needed to calm the situation before it spins
up into a new conflict and to get both governments agreement
to border demarcation. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge, Pol/Econ Counselor and Poloff called on United
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Deputy
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (DSRSG)
AMB. Azouz Ennifar on October 20 to receive a detailed
briefing on the recent redeployment of UNMEE personnel
(reftel) in the wake of Eritrea's Oct. 4 ban on helicopter
flights. Ennifar was joined by UNMEE Senior Political
Affairs Officer Dr. Abdul-Kader Haraiche and Chief Military
Liaison Officer Col. Jarmo Helenius.

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INDIA AND JORDAN CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL FROM UNMEE
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3. (C) DSRSG Ennifar said the UN had not received any
response from the Eritrean Government (GSE) to an October 18
letter from UNSYG Annan to President Isaias, which expressed
concern about the "major impact" the GSE's flight ban and
other restrictions had on UNMEE operations. UNMEE political
advisor, Dr. Haraiche said that such restrictions were
"disabling" and were likely to increase as the GSE sought to
force the international community to enforce the 2002
decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC).
He noted that observing the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ)
from the Ethiopian side of the border would still require
coordination with the GSE to avoid aerial patrols from being
shot down. Col. Helenius noted that UNMEE lacks the
capability to monitor the TSZ via unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs),and asked if the USG could assist with collection of
information via satellite or other means.


4. (C) For the last two to three weeks, Ennifar said, UNMEE
peace-keepers faced daily violations of the right to freedom
of movement, but had not fallen victim to any violent acts.
Nevertheless, he added, concern about the safety of
peace-keepers had prompted Jordanian and Indian permreps to
observe during October 19 UNSC consultations in New York that
they were both considering withdrawal of their forces.
Ennifar noted that the potential withdrawal of Jordanian and
Indian contingents would cripple UNMEE, as they constitute
more than two-thirds (India: 1,000; Jordan: 1,300) of UNMEE's
current force strength of 3,292.


5. (C) UNMEE currently assesses that the deployment of
Eritrean and Ethiopian forces is "not offensive in posture."
Ennifar added, however, that there was "no doubt" of some
military buildup by Eritrea; he confirmed Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi's October 19 assertion to the media that
additional Eritrean militia had entered the Temporary
Security Zone (TSZ),explaining that Eritrean troops often
changed uniforms and returned disguised as militia members.
Eritrea had also begun calling up reservists earlier this
year. Dr. Haraiche noted that additional reinforcement of
Ethiopian troops at the border was also possible in the near
future.

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MORE THAN HALF OF BORDER AREA GOES UNOBSERVED
--------------


6. (C) Col. Helenius underscored that with the GSE's
restrictions and UNMEE's October 17 decision to vacate 18 of
40 observation posts (reftel),UNMEE faced significant gaps
along the 1,100km border: including a 600km "blind spot" in
UNMEE's central sector to Bada, and two 100km gaps in the
western and eastern sectors. Ground troops could infiltrate
through these gaps, he said, but difficult terrain would
impede the movement of tracked vehicles. He hypothesized
that any offensive by Eritrean forces would likely occur
along the same four avenues of approach used during previous
hostilities: along the north-south Barentu corridor; along
the main road from Asmara to Addis Ababa; from the port of
Assab to Ethiopia; and along the western border with Sudan.

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APPEAL FOR USG INTERVENTION
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7. (C) DSRSG Ennifar asked whether, in the absence of aerial
patrols that previously accounted for most of UNMEE's
monitoring, the USG could provide satellite imagery to help
UNMEE monitor the border. Better equipment and capabilities
could reduce UNMEE's costs, he added, as UNMEE's force
strength (which was already being downsized) could be reduced
even further. He also noted that leased helicopters
currently cost UNMEE $15 million annually.


8. (C) Ennifar underscored the need for action by the
international community, and particularly the United States,
to forestall future conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
He added that no action had been taken to address the impasse
since the 2002 EEBC decision. He asked if we had any further
information on the planned appointment of a U.S. envoy. We
responded that we were hopeful but had no further
information.


9. (S) Ennifar (strictly protect) told the Charge privately
that the UN may be overreacting to force protection concerns
in the wake of the flight ban, in order to force the UNSC to
engage on the border issue. He appealed for UNSC action to
press the GSE to reverse its restrictions on UNMEE, and
advocated the appointment of a U.S. envoy to the region,
noting that some observers considered the "weak" reaction of
the United States to Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE
tantamount to "giving a blank check to Asmara." Ennifar
called for urgent action to "cool down" Eritrea and press
Ethiopia, so that the political process could start again.
Noting that disputed areas awarded by the EEBC to Ethiopia
were largely uninhabitable desert, Ennifar recommended
providing Ethiopia with a package of economic incentives:
such as guaranteed access to the port of Assab, as well as
World Bank assistance to resuscitate Assab's port operations
for the joint benefit of Eritrea and Ethiopia.


10. (C) Dr. Haraiche observed that while the EEBC declared
that its decision would be "final and binding," thereby
giving no provision for discussion, article 416 of the 2000
Algiers peace agreement specifies that the UN can use its
good offices to facilitate consultations between the parties
on implementation.


11. (SBU) UNMEE officials noted the lack of any mechanism
bringing together Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives,
other than the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) headed
by UNMEE's force commander, most recently convened two weeks
ago in Nairobi. UNMEE has proposed that the next meeting
occur in Nairobi on November 18, as both parties refuse to
meet in either Addis Ababa or Asmara, citing concerns for the
safety of their delegations.


12. (C) COMMENT: The GSE's current restrictions on UNMEE, as
well as the threat that troop-contributing countries may
withdraw contingents, jeopardizing UNMEE's effectiveness as
well as setting the stage for a spinning up of tensions on
both sides of the border that could result in unintended
consequences. This is the ideal time for the USG to name an
envoy -- with clout -- who could first calm the roiled waters
and then began the process of resolving the border
demarcation dispute. END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON