GHANA PRESIDENT KUFUOR AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS WAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 001317

SIPDIS

MCC FOR ROD NORMAN
TREASURY FOR LUKAS KOHLER, ALEX SEVERENS, JOHN RALYEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2010
TAGS: EAID KMCA GH MCA
SUBJECT: GHANA PRESIDENT KUFUOR AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS WAY
FORWARD ON MCA

REF: HARRINGTON/LANDBERG EMAIL 07/01/05

Classified By: Ambassador Mary C. Yates for Reasons 1.5 (B and D)


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Yates met July 1 with President
Kufuor to discuss ways to accelerate Ghana's Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) program. Ambassador delivered Ref A
talking points, emphasizing that both sides needed to
increase engagement in order to conclude an agreement within
a reasonable timeframe. Kufuor stated that he had already
assigned a new, senior level point of contact -- Deputy
Finance Minister George Gyan-Baffour -- to oversee a
full-time, dedicated MCA team. He agreed that solid program
design was essential for successful implementation, and
acknowledged this would take time. He called for greater MCC
presence in Ghana, and showed interest in arranging an
interim, public agreement. End Summary


2. (C) On July 1, a ghanaian holiday, during an informal
meeting at her residence with President John Kufuor,
Ambassador verbally delivered the MCA talking points (Ref A)
jointly developed by Post and the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC). Ambassador also provided a hard copy for
Kufuor to pass to Ghana's MCA team. The Ambassador noted
that the MCC delivered the same demarche in Washington to
Ghana's Ambassador Poku on June 30. Kufuor said he had not
yet received Poku's report.


3. (C) The Ambassador explained that Ghana's draft MCA
concept was extremely complex and ambitious, and therefore
would require greater care, resources, and time to complete.
She emphasized that it was important to spend the extra time
and resources upfront to develop a solid, well-designed
Compact. She commented that good design was critical to
implementation, noting that the MCC officials have clearly
stated in past meetings with GoG leadership that it will pull
funding of MCA Compacts that are improperly implemented.


4. (C) The Ambassador emphasized repeatedly that the team had
to work full time and the senior-level leader had to be
available daily for consultations. She diplomatically asked
if the President felt current team leader Michael Ansah had
adequate field experience to be in charge of MCA planning and
project implementation. She also pointed out that our recent
experience has been that when MCC experts visited Ghana they
had not found GoG counterparts who were prepared or
knowledgeable.


5. (C) The Ambassador assured Kufuor that the MCC was
prepared to increase its financial and personnel commitment
to the Ghana MCA process, in order to complete a mutually
acceptable (and fundable) MCA program. She added that the
MCC would send out a high level delegation July 7-8 to begin
discussions with the Ghana MCA team on next steps.


6. (C) President Kufuor responded that he met with the Ghana
MCA team on June 29 and had already taken the actions the MCC
was looking for: 1) he appointed Deputy Finance Minister
Gyan-Baffour to serve as lead-GoG contact for the MCC and
focus exclusively "over the next three months" on completing
an MCA agreement; 2) Michael Ansah will continue to serve as
MCA team leader, but Kufuor left open the option of bringing
on someone with more field experience as co-team leader; and
3) he instructed the Finance Ministry to hire all Ghana MCA
team members on a permanent basis, and ensure adequate
compensation packages for them.


7. (C) Kufuor said he would meet soon with Finance Minister
Kwadwo Baah Wiredu and Deputy Minister Gyan-Baffour to
discuss the talking points with them, re-emphasize that MCA
would be Gyan-Baffour's priority for the next three months,
and motivate the Ghana MCA team for the July 7-8 meetings
with the high-level MCC team.


8. (C) While Kufuor seemed to accept that the GoG was
partially responsible for delays to date, he was adamant that
Ghana has the capacity to design and implement its MCA plan.
He acknowledged that Michael Ansah is more of a consultant
than project manager, and discussed the possibility of
bringing on someone with project design and implementation
experience. He gave the example of the person who is
currently in charge of the Presidential Special Initiative on
oil palm. However, he was open to suggestions, including
from the Embassy or MCC on possible candidates. (Comment:
Kufuor stated unequivocally that Michael Ansah would stay as
team leader. Unstated was Kufuor's clear understanding that
there are concerns -- within his own government and the MCC
-- about Ansah's ability to manage this unwieldy project.
Nevertheless, Kufuor stated that Ansah was highly motivated
to succeed, not least because he might have political
ambitions. End Comment)


9. (C) The President stated that he wants the MCA process to
operate more as a joint venture between Ghana and the MCC,
and called for a more robust MCC presence in Ghana. He
acknowledged that it would take time to design the program,
but stated that his government was prepared to do the
necessary to speed up the process. He pointed out that the
GoG was even planning to purchase the 28,000 hectares
necessary to implement Ghana's agriculture-focused MCA plan,
and commented that this should eliminate land title issues
for investors and also obviate the need to negotiate with
local Chiefs.


10. (C) Comment: Kufuor did not comment directly on the
statement in the talking points about developing an interim
agreement, encompassing both MCC and GoG plans to increase
engagement. However, we know from his meetings in
Washington, as well as our conversations with GoG officials
that he wants some kind of public dividend from the GoG's MCA
commitment. Although the President was reassuring on the
GoG's capacity to design and implement this complicated
project, we at Post are less assured. The GoG has many
extremely intelligent and competent people, especially at the
Ministry of Finance and Bank of Ghana. However, they are all
already in positions of great responsibility and are
overworked. It will be difficult for many of these people to
leave their day jobs to work on MCA full-time. Furthermore,
Post believes that even the capable GoG officials lack
experience in designing and managing assistance projects, and
therefore have little conception of the length of time and
resources a project takes just to develop.


11. (C) Comment Continued: Michael Ansah himself emphasized
this point to Econoff at Post's July 4 party, commenting that
most GoG officials have only seen the implementation side of
foreign assistance projects. They have no experience with
the massive preparation that goes on prior to implementation
of a big project. He added that it took him until March 2005
to convince the President and Minister of Finance to
appropriate just $500,000 to fund the GoG's own MCA planning
process. He concluded that the GoG should have put in
millions ("at least 1%" of projected funding) at the
beginning, but GoG leaders did not -- and likely still do not
-- understand that it often takes money to get money.
Ansah's private comments bolster this Embassy's strong belief
that the real solution to the capacity issue is to hire a
consulting company or large team of consultants, with
experience implementing large assistance projects in Ghana.
Most donor countries' assistance agencies (USAID, DFID, EC)
do at least some of their work through private consulting
companies, so it might make sense for Ghana to consider a
similar arrangement. End Comment
YATES