Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUJA970
2005-06-03 13:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIAN DEFENSE POWER DYNAMICS: PART II OF THE

Tags:  PGOV PINR MARR MCAP KPKO NI POLMIL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 000970 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR AF/RSA; INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINR MARR MCAP KPKO NI POLMIL
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN DEFENSE POWER DYNAMICS: PART II OF THE
SERIES

REF: A. STATE 37653

B. ABUJA 412

C. ABUJA 526

D. ABUJA 539

E. ABUJA 659

F. ABUJA 676

G. 01 ABUJA 2855 AND PREVIOUS

H. 04 ABUJA 1793 AND PREVIOUS

I. ABUJA 797

J. 04 ABUJA 2076

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (B & D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 000970

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR AF/RSA; INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINR MARR MCAP KPKO NI POLMIL
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN DEFENSE POWER DYNAMICS: PART II OF THE
SERIES

REF: A. STATE 37653

B. ABUJA 412

C. ABUJA 526

D. ABUJA 539

E. ABUJA 659

F. ABUJA 676

G. 01 ABUJA 2855 AND PREVIOUS

H. 04 ABUJA 1793 AND PREVIOUS

I. ABUJA 797

J. 04 ABUJA 2076

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (S/REL UK) SUMMARY: Leadership of the Nigerian military
is personality-driven, from the President through the officer
corps. Senior leaders rarely delegate decision-making
authority and the "transmission lines" from these power
centers are often weak and erratic, frequently leading to a
failure by subordinate leaders to implement decisions made by
their leadership. Defense Headquarters, led by the Chief of
Defense Staff, is staffed by the "second team" and does not
seem to have accepted the centrality of peacekeeping to the
Nigerian military's mission. The Chief of Army Staff, on the
other hand, is using peacekeeping as an engine to drive
reform. Despite the professionalism of the Chief of Army
Staff, however, personal relationships and political
positioning still drive the promotion and assignment
processes in the Army. Senior leaders of the Air Force
cannot explain why Nigeria even needs an Air Force, but they
continue to pursue combat aircraft to battle an unknown
threat. Their C-130 fleet will continue to deteriorate
beyond its already abysmally low operational readiness until
the Nigerian Air Force decides to focus considerable
resources and attention on airlift capacity. The Navy is
known throughout Nigeria as the most corrupt of the services.
Civilian control of the military is in its infancy, but
there is some hope that, with the right personalities, both
the Ministry of Defense and the legislature will begin to
exert more control over the uniformed services. U.S.
security assistance efforts will continue to be frustrated by
power-jockeying within the services, a lack of basic
infrastructure in the headquarters, and by a lack of

initiative to follow through on programs seen as being
imposed on Nigeria by donor nations. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/REL UK) This is the second cable in a three cable
series examining the Nigerian military. This cable will look
specifically at some of the key actors and agencies in the
Nigerian defense establishment, and at the power dynamics
among them. The initial series of conversations with the GON
about the possibility of opening an ACOTA (African
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance) program (Ref
A-F) have shed a bit of light on military power dynamics and
decision-making in Nigeria, as did the deployment of
peacekeepers to Darfur in late 2004.

--------------
The President
--------------


3. (S) President Obasanjo is always introduced as the
President of the Federal Republic and Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces, and seems to take the latter designation
very seriously. He even appears at some military events in
camouflage uniform (without rank). His past military service
has left him very comfortable dealing with the military, and
most members of the government seem to accept the prerogative
of the President freely to manage the affairs of the
uniformed services. The President selects service chiefs
without confirmation by the legislature and the Presidency
seems to control the military budget, which is anything but
transparent. Nevertheless, commitments made by the President
still must be acted on by the military, and the "transmission
lines" to subordinate authorities seem to be weak and
erratic. Getting an assurance from the President that a
program will move forward or that a deployment will happen at
a particular time has, so far, shown to have little
relationship to whether those programs or deployments
actually move forward, or how fast they will go.

-------------- -
Chief of Defense Staff Ogomudia and Defense HQ
-------------- -


4. (S/NF) A source who has dealt with the Nigerian military
for more than 30 years as a vendor of communications
equipment, and has known the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) for
many years (Ogomudia came through the ranks as a signal
officer) has some interesting insights into Ogomudia's tenure
at Defense Headquarters (DHQ). According to the source,
Obasanjo promoted Ogomudia to the position of CDS as a
political reward for "taking care" of the situation in
Zaki-Biam in 2001, at the direction of the President, while
Ogomudia was the Chief of Army Staff (ref G). Understanding
Ogomudia's role in the massacre may explain the very
emotional response of the CDS to the refusal of the USG to
support the deployment of the 72d Para Battalion to Darfur in
October 2004 (Ref H).


5. (S) The command philosophy of the CDS seems to favor the
"Big Army" concept, dedicated to the defense of the
territorial integrity against foreign intrusion (despite the
fact that there is no real threat). This means that he does
not see peacekeeping as the major mission of the military,
and he does not dedicate resources or attention to increasing
the military's peacekeeping capacity.


6. (S) DHQ is widely viewed as the "second team." Many of
the officers who fill positions there are second string
officers and enlisted men. The star performers are more
often found in their service headquarters or in operational
assignments. There is also no Vice or Deputy CDS. There
are, however, three Chiefs who run Training and Operations
(CTOP),Logistics, and Administration, and the most senior or
the most appropriate to the issue will act in the capacity of
the CDS in his absence. Post frequently has difficulty
getting access to the CDS. Subordinate officers whom we do
end up meeting with, including the three Chiefs, are
typically unable to make commitments until they confer with
Ogomudia. And often when we do meet with Ogomudia himself,
he tends not to engage in conversations.


7. (S/NF) Post reporting from late 2004 indicated that
Obasanjo was going to rotate the service chiefs, including
the CDS, in early 2005 (Ref J). That plan has fallen by the
wayside, and there is no planned rotation in sight. One
Embassy contact has told us that although the President has
been disappointed in the performance of the CDS, Ogomudia's
tenure has been extended through the end of the year. This
will allow an additional tranche of officers to retire,
without being forced out, perhaps so that the President can
dig a little deeper into the ranks to select the next CDS.

--------------
The Army
--------------


8. (S/NF) Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai, the Chief
of Army Staff (COAS),is viewed by Post as an effective
leader of the Army, and is a proponent of closer cooperation
with the U.S. He seems to have direct access to the
President, and the President seems to rely on Agwai's
counsel. However, Agwai shows real deference to the CDS,
always referring to him as the boss, and is seemingly
unwilling or unable to negotiate around policy roadblocks
from DHQ. The idea of "managing up" does not seem to exist
in the Nigerian military. "With these guys, seniority is a
cult" is the way one observer recently described this
relationship. A contact from the Nigerian DIA, in a recent
casual conversation, said Agwai is the only service chief who
is not corrupt. Nevertheless, Post takes this comment with a
dose of salt. "Not corrupt" may better be understood as "not
as corrupt" as the others, given the endemic nature of
corruption among Nigerian leaders.


9. (S) The command philosophy of the COAS seems to favor
peacekeeping as the engine to drive reform. Agwai has said
that the legacy he wants to leave is a military better able
to conduct peace support operations. The resources for this
vision have not been made available just to reform or
reprofessionalize the military, but they are available if the
word "peacekeeping" is attached, especially from the
international donor community. The Peacekeeping Wing at the
Infantry Center in Jaji is a great example of Agwai putting
his words into practice.


10. (S/NF) Promotions are political at Colonel-level and
above, and are completely within the purview of the COAS.
Officers need to start worrying about politics as Majors and
Lieutenant Colonels to position themselves for future
promotions and assignments. Command of the Ikeja Cantonment
(Lagos) and of the 3rd Armored Division (Jos) are key
positions given to loyal officers, because of the
significance of these commands in the event of a national
emergency, particularly regime instability (Ikeja can control
Lagos, and the Armored Division has tanks that are reasonably
close to Abuja).


11. (S/REL UK) The Nigerian Army always has a pool of fresh
young soldiers coming up through the ranks, and recruitment
appears to be continuous. A key concern is "Federal
Character" in the recruiting pool, ensuring that the Army
does not take on a regional imbalance. The recruitment
process as full of opportunities for corruption as each
potential recruit has to get a series of signatures on a form
-- and each signature requires a bribe. The total amount of
bribes can be significant and the young recruit certainly
won't have that amount of money (If he did, he wouldn't be
enlisting). The British DATT offered an anecdotal account of
one "system" set up to work around this problem: A potential
recruit will find a serving soldier and "rent" his weapon.
The recruit will then use the weapon to commit enough armed
robberies to collect the funds necessary to pay all of the
necessary bribes and the rental fee for the weapon. Once the
soldier is in the Army, he will then rent his weapon out to
future recruits, and the system lives on. While we do not
know how widespread this practice is, it is certainly
plausible to believe that it does occur.


12. (S) Once in, recruits are integrated into units with
soldiers from every state and region of Nigeria, and receive
indoctrination training meant to impart a Nigerian national
identity on the soldier. This national identity is one of
the features the Army is most proud of, and makes the Army
one of the only institutions that truly identifies with
Nigeria rather than an ethnic group. It also makes the Army
function more as a "tribe" separate from the various Nigerian
groups, with a similar level of identification and loyalty.
This indoctrination begins failing at the upper reached of
the officer corps largely because promotions at that level
are politically influenced, which in Nigeria more often than
not takes on ethnic and religious meaning. Officers who are
not promoted often seek to find a religious or ethnic reason
for their failure to advance. Whether this is or is not true
has been difficult for us to assess, but the perception of
discrimination, if widely accepted, could have a
destabilizing influence on the Army's officer corps, and on
the nation.

--------------
The Air Force
--------------


13. (S) The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) is largely irrelevant.
Most of the Generals are pilots who feel the need to focus
on fighter aircraft to protect Nigerian airspace against
foreign incursion (by whom they won't say). With the
exception of the helicopter fleet being used in the Niger
Delta, most of NAF's aircraft are non-functional. There has
been some press coverage of a plan to rehab or replace the
MiG-21 fleet with Russian or Romanian support (and Israeli
assistance),but there have been no definite moves in this
direction. Recent reporting indicates that Nigeria will
purchase 18 Chinese F-7 fighters (the Chinese version of the
MiG-21) (Comment: Purchasing new aircraft offers
significantly more opportunity for graft than refurbishment
of the current fleet. End comment.) When asked to justify
their service, Air Officer-Operations at Air Force
Headquarters (an Air Vice Marshal, and essentially the Deputy
Chief of Air Staff) can not articulate a reason for Nigeria
to have an Air Force. Post has had no problem with access to
the Chief of Air Staff, but he really doesn't have much to do
that would keep him from seeing us.


14. (S/NF) The heavy lift capability of Nigeria's C-130
fleet is the feature that distinguishes NAF from most other
sub-Saharan African air forces, and the feature that gets
them the most attention from the USG. NAF currently has
eight C-130s, all in Lagos, but only 1-2 fly on a regular
basis (and even these do not meet USAF airworthiness
standards). The U.S. has invested significant time and money
to assist the NAF to create a plan increasing the utility of
this fleet, but the NAF does not seem willing to take
ownership of the process. Until they do, there will be no
real progress on the issue, but we can expect to hear
frequent pleas from senior leaders (including the President)
to help them get their C-130s in the air. Pre-sanction FMF
(Foreign Military Financing) cases valued at 7.5M USD are
open for the C-130s, but this support can only meet a limited
part of Nigeria's requirements. For example, to conduct
Program Depot Maintenance (PDM) on 6 of the 8 aircraft that
are in the best condition will cost approximately 25-30M USD.

--------------
The Navy
--------------


15. (SBU) Corrupt through and through.

--------------
The Ministry of Defense
--------------


16. (S) When President Obasanjo came to office in 1999, he
did not appoint a defense minister, preferring to personally
handle those responsibilities. He did eventually appoint a
minister, though both the Minister and the Ministry remain
largely irrelevant. The uniformed services openly express
their contempt and disregard for the Ministry, and the
Ministry does not seem to want to assert itself. The biggest
bright spot, at least from a U.S. standpoint, is the Minister
of State for Defense (essentially the junior Minister). A
medical doctor, he has carved out a niche for himself in the
Ministry -- improving the conditions of service for Nigeria's
soldiers, sailors, and airmen. All of the HIV/AIDS
mitigation programs we are engaged in with the military are
done with the active partnership of the Minister of State.
These efforts may have come to the attention of the President
and have shown him that the Minister of State is effective in
his position. In the last two weeks, the Minister of State
has received press coverage for comments made on the
deployment of additional soldiers to the Niger Delta and on
small arms destruction programs. Whether this is the
Minister of State getting more involved in policy matters, or
simply a temporary media blip, will be shown with time. The
Embassy contact who shared the information on the tenure of
the CDS being extended also bruited Agwai's name as a
possible Minister of Defense after the latter's retirement.
The installation of a strong Minister, whether Agwai or
someone else, would be a signal that the President wanted
more effectively to subordinate the military to civilian
control as opposed to his own personal control. The military
would likely only respond to a move like this if the Minister
were someone well-respected from within their ranks.

--------------
The Legislature
--------------


17. (S) The National Assembly plays a limited role in
national politics, and their involvement in defense issues is
no exception. The idea of defense oversight by the
legislature is resisted by the military, the Presidency, and
even by many members of the Assembly (particularly those who
formerly wore uniforms). However, some legislators envision
a Nigeria where the military does answer to the National
Assembly. The visit by the U.S. National War College to the
House Committee on Defense (Ref I) highlighted many of the
issues and opportunities present. In conversations following
the formal session, several members of the Committee
commented to U.S. students that they wanted to be "more than
just a rubber stamp" for the President. The session exposed
the legislators' lack of a clear idea about how to go about
becoming something more, and what responsibilities they
should seek.


18. (S) A bill on military professionalization is on the
floor of the National Assembly. It would create an Armed
Services Commission, composed of interested members of
Nigerian society, to examine the military's promotion system
and to recommend changes creating a set of standards and
essentially removing the current political aspect to
promotions. The bill is stuck in Committee, its author said,
because legislators who are former members of the military
don't see this level of oversight as appropriate, and because
there has been significant pressure from senior military
leaders, including Agwai, to kill the bill. Movement on this
issue is unlikely until after the National Assembly's summer
recess.

--------------
Comment
--------------


19. (S) Working with the Nigerian military, both as an
operational partner for peacekeeping operations and with
security assistance programs, is frequently frustrating, and
the responses we get from our approaches often do not seem to
make sense. Whether our difficulties stem from a nationalist
reluctance to work with America, disagreement with policy, or
an "oga" (Nigerian term for chief/"big man") carving out some
bit of authority and making sure that everybody sees his
power, the results are the same. When working with the
Nigerian government on defense issues, whether for specific
initiatives or toward broader goals such as counter-terrorism
or a secure Gulf of Guinea, the Nigerians want to create a
plan that they own. In principle, they will accept any donor
proposal that comes with a budget, but there will be constant
frustration from the donors when projects fail to move
forward. Sometimes delay will stem from a lack of basic
infrastructure in their headquarters (phone lines, dedicated
computer access),but a significant part also comes from a
lack of Nigerian initiative to follow through on programs
that they see as imposed by the West. This is especially
true when many military leaders question whether America can
be trusted as a friend over the long term. We frequently
hear about how unfair Leahy sanctions are, and confusion
about how we can approach them with new proposals, like
ACOTA, when we can't involve them in IMET, which they crave.


20. (S) Many in both the Nigerian military and the broader
government are concerned about U.S. intentions, seeing us as
seeking to control Gulf of Guinea oil reserves. This concern
could worsen over time as the coming generational change in
military leadership will bring in many of the officers who
have been lost to U.S. influence as a result of sanctions.
Still, the U.S. is still revered by most individual officers,
even in the absence of real contact with U.S. training.
Most, if not all, officers and soldiers who have been exposed
to U.S. trainers have come away with a very positive
impression. The challenge is finding programs the Nigerian
government and military see as beneficial to their interests,
and then finding ways to apply American influence to those
programs. Sending a constant stream of offers to Defense
Headquarters for programs the Nigerians have never asked for
has not created a bank of goodwill for us to draw on in times
of need. In fact, the "recipient fatigue" that the higher
echelons of Nigeria's military seem to suffer often works
against us when we really need access, such as during the
deployment of peacekeepers.
CAMPBELL