NIGERIA'S MILITARY: PART I OF THE SERIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000953

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/RSA; INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015
TAGS: MCAP MASS PGOV PINR KDEM KPKO NI POLMIL
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S MILITARY: PART I OF THE SERIES

REF: A. 04 ABUJA 1813

B. 04 ABUJA 1997

C. ABUJA 676 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (S) Summary. Nigeria's military is the largest in West
Africa, but is significantly less capable than its size and
equipment inventory would indicate. A large percentage of
the Army is capable of little more than basic defensive
operations, and most of Nigeria's ships and aircraft are
inoperable. The leadership of the military, from junior to
senior levels, recognizes the role that the Armed Forces play
as Nigeria's most effective national institution, and the
principal one committed to its unity. We do not know as much
as we would like about the attitudes and motivations of the
mid-grade officers, and they have missed opportunities to be
exposed to U.S. training during periods of IMET suspension.
The military continues to be intensively employed, and
stretched thin, with significant (and increasing) internal
and external deployments. There may come a point, perhaps
soon, when Nigeria's military can no longer meet all of its
commitments, particularly if one or more new internal
security crises erupt. The U.S. security assistance program
for Nigeria, while significant, can hope to do little more
than influence the direction Nigeria moves in, particularly
if Nigeria continues to fail fully to commit itself to the
modernization and improvement of its Armed Forces. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) This is the first in a three cable series
examining the current state of the Nigerian military, and
particularly its role in Nigerian politics. This cable
provides a broad overview of the military, its current
operations, and U.S. security assistance programs. The
second cable will delve into the "nuts and bolts" of the
major players in the defense establishment and the power
dynamics visible to Post. The final cable will examine the
question of whether the military is truly done in politics in
Nigeria, and the circumstances that could trigger a renewed
involvement.

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ORGANIZATIONAL REALITIES
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3. (C) As a large, complex organization, the Nigerian
military contains a number of contradictions, incongruities,
and internal disjunctions. It is the largest, most capable
military in West Africa with major foreign deployments under
ECOWAS and the AU, as well as extensive UN PKO commitments.
At the same time, chronic under-resourcing has led to low
operational readiness, lack of training, and relatively poor
conditions of service. These problems, along with endemic
corruption, have made the Nigerian military somewhat of a
hollow giant resting on its reputation -- more capable than
any other force in the sub-region, but considerably less
capable than it should be with 80,000 troops and a large
stock of major weapons systems and other equipment. A high
percentage of the heart of the force -- the 60,000-soldier
strong Army's 25 infantry battalions -- are capable of little
more than basic defensive operations. Most of Nigeria's
ships and aircraft are inoperable. Of its 8 C-130s, only one
is operational, and a recent USAF technical inspection
revealed that even this one serviceable aircraft does not
meet USAF airworthiness standards. There are six times as
many general officers and flag officers in the Nigerian Air
Force (NAF) and Nigerian Navy (NN) as there are operational
ships and aircraft.


4. (S) Nevertheless, the Nigerian Armed Forces,
particularly the Army, retains its role as the bulwark
against Nigerian anarchy. It is the nation's one
indispensable institution, committed to Nigerian unity and
sovereign survival -- a role military leaders revel in and
brag about. The Armed Forces is also arguably Nigeria's most
effective national institution. The leadership of the Armed
Forces, at the highest levels, consistently makes public
statements supporting civilian control of the military, and
recognizing the military's appropriate role in a democracy.
The senior leadership seems to understand the penalties that
would result if the military should "misbehave" again. They
recognize the missed training opportunities that have
resulted as the U.S. and other international partners have
suspended important programs in the wake of coups and human
rights abuses. Nigeria's top military leaders also
frequently comment about the need to "reprofessionalize" the
officer ranks. We do not know as much we would like about
the attitudes of mid-grade officers, and we have had little
opportunity to influence them -- they are among the lost
generations who have not been able to benefit from U.S. IMET
training during the years the program has been suspended.
What we do know is that the Army is frequently used in
internal security operations -- currently there are 10-12
battalions committed internally, including four in the
Bakassi peninsula. Whenever the Army is employed in this
manner, the availability for training is low and the
potential for human rights violations is high.


5. (S) This high level of internal security operations,
combined with participation in foreign peacekeeping missions,
has stretched the Armed Forces thin (Ref A). However, they
always seem able to find the resources for just "one more"
mission. For example, they were able to come up with a
battalion for Darfur in October 2004 when, on the face of it,
all their battalions were fully committed, and they have now
pledged an additional two battalions for Sudan (whether for
Darfur or the North/South peace process is not clear yet).
They are also from the "just do it" school of deployments.
They were able to deploy to Darfur in mid 2004 and then in
early 2005 using their own C-130s (even though one broke down
during the initial operation). The Nigerians recognize that
logistics and strategic lift are major weaknesses and have
repeatedly expressed an interest in U.S. assistance in these
areas (but have thus far taken little initiative on their
own). So far, the Nigerian military has been able to take on
and sustain "one more" mission, but we need to recognize
that, in the end, personnel, supplies, and equipment are
finite resources, and one day "one more mission" will be one
too many. Given the military's significant role in quelling
domestic violence, there could well be tensions in the face
of competing priorities for military manpower.


6. (U) The Nigerian military has both suffered from and
gloried in its PKO (peacekeeping operations) participation.
The Nigerian military's reputation certainly took some hits
in the early days of ECOMOG for its unprofessional
performance. They generally fought well (with a few notable
defeats),but they also looted, engaged in corruption, and
committed human rights violations. The latter days of ECOMOG
and ECOMIL's performance in Liberia in 2003 seem to have
restored some pride in the military. The senior Nigerian
military leadership seems to see participation in
peacekeeping missions, especially UN operations, as a means
of restoring both soldiers' pride and public confidence in
the military. Current deployments include two battalions in
Liberia, one battalion in Sierra Leone, and one (soon two) in
Sudan. Nigeria also has military observers in Cote d'Ivoire,
DROC, Western Sahara, and Darfur. President Obasanjo has
mentioned the possibility of committing troops to missions in
Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire, and DROC, but he has not mentioned
where these soldiers would come from. Nigeria is starting to
make an effort to keep units deployed outside of Nigeria on a
6 month rotation schedule and has made a commitment to make a
motorized infantry battalion and a variety of combat support
and logistics elements available to the ECOWAS Standby Force.

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Security Assistance
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7. (C) The U.S. security assistance program in Nigeria has
4 objectives: the reprofessionalization of the military,
reinforcement of the military's subordination to civilian
control, improvement of Nigeria's capability to respond to
regional threats and conduct peacekeeping operations, and
enhancement of the military's capability to control Nigeria's
borders and territorial waters, particularly as it relates to
the Global War on Terrorism. Underpinning all of this, we
are also working to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS on the
Nigerian military. Until the Nigerian government makes a
real and sustained commitment to modernize and improve the
Armed Forces, however, the impact of U.S. assistance will be
minimal. Our FMF (Foreign Military Financing) budget for
Nigeria will never be enough to do more than influence the
direction that Nigeria moves in. IMET and various
military-to-military events will remain the best and most
effective way to guard U.S. long-term security interests in
Nigeria. IMET's positive impact on the military would be far
greater than its relatively modest budget would suggest, were
it restarted.


8. (SBU) Sanctions placed on Nigeria after the failure to
hold anyone accountable for the 2001 massacre of civilians at
Zaki-Biam were lifted in 2005, but the subsequent sanctions
relating to Charles Taylor remain. These sanctions prohibit
IMET training and the execution of new FMF cases. Other
forms of military engagement, however, are still permitted.
We are working to schedule a series of joint exercises that
will enhance the capability of the Army to work in riverine
areas. We are working to improve the tactical skills of the
Nigerian Air Force. We are attempting to bring Nigeria into
an ACOTA partnership (Ref C). We are also offering Nigeria
the opportunity to participate in naval exercises, such as
the West Africa Training Cruise (WATC).


9. (U) The U.S. funded and helps to run the only Joint
Conflict and Tactical Simulator (JCATS) in sub-Saharan Africa
(Ref B). This powerful simulator allows the Armed Forces to
realistically plan and train for a wide variety of
conventional peacekeeping and internal security operations.
The JCATS program has been successful, but once it is
entirely Nigerian-run in 2005, it will be difficult to
sustain the current level of effectiveness due to budget
constraints and the difficulty of retaining skilled and
experienced Nigerian operators. There are tentative plans,
however, to link continued U.S. funding of the Simulator to
Nigerian support for ECOWAS Peacekeeping training.


10. (U) Another important area of cooperation is with the
C-130 fleet. Even though we have a 7.5M USD maintenance and
training program (pre-sanction FMF),we will not begin to see
major improvements in the C-130 fleet until Nigeria decides
to dedicate a significant amount of its own resources to
conduct the maintenance. We are working with the Nigerian
Air Force on a plan to reduce the size of their fleet so
resources are better focused.


11. (U) We have an ongoing sustainment program to support
the four American-provided U.S. Coast Guard buoy tenders.
These boats have proven to be effective, with some small
modifications, in providing security to oil platforms. The
Nigerian Navy has recently taken delivery of the first 4 of
15 U.S. Coast Guard Defender-class patrol boats (a Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) purchase),and the Chief of Naval Staff
intends to push for the President to purchase more once these
are all delivered.


12. (U) Nigeria has an official HIV/AIDS prevalence of
about 5%, and the rate in the military is believed to be
significantly higher, particularly in units that have
participated in foreign peacekeeping missions. Nigeria is a
PEPFAR country and the Nigerian military has proven receptive
and energetic in working with the U.S. on combating HIV/AIDS.
In FY05, approximately 5.5M USD will be dedicated towards
combating HIV/AIDS in the military. A centerpiece of our
efforts will be the start this year of a U.S. DOD/Nigerian
HIV/AIDS Training Center. This will also serve as a training
laboratory to allow us to expand our effort to other Nigerian
military health care facilities.
CAMPBELL