MOVING FORWARD ON ACOTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 000676

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR PHUM KPKO NI
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON ACOTA

REF: ABUJA 659 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)


1. (C) Summary. In meetings with visiting USG delegation
led by Gen. Wald, Dr. Courville and DASD Whelan on May 2, the
GON indicated its agreement to move forward on ACOTA.
Intra-GON coordination has been accomplished, at least for
now, and Post recommends keeping up momentum by dispatch
soonest of team or teams to work out training details with
the Nigerian military. End Summary.


2. (C) In meetings with National Security Advisor Aliyu
Mohammed, CDS Gen. Ogomudia and President Obasanjo on May 2,
visiting USDel was told that Nigeria agreed to an ACOTA
program. The Nigerian presentation emphasized training the
trainers as an approach, and doing that training at the
Peacekeeping Wing at Jaji, in coordination with ongoing
British training efforts.

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Earlier Meeting at Defense HQ and Peacekeeping Doctrine
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3. (C) On April 22, the DATT and ODC Chief met with Major
General PA Akpa, Chief of Training and Operations (Defense),
at the request of Defense Headquarters (DHQ). Also in
attendance were Brigadier General Hassan (Director of
Peacekeeping, Army HQ),Major General Guar (DHQ),the British
DATT and the British BMATT (ODC Chief equivalent). Hassan
was initially concerned about ACOTA training undermining or
interrupting the momentum of the Nigerian Army's development
of peacekeeping doctrine, an effort that is already far
along. He was eventually persuaded that Nigeria's ACOTA
program would be developed in close coordination with his
office and in line with the new doctrine. Hassan requested a
detailed program of instruction (POI) and details of the
contents of each instructional block for his review prior to
the return of an ACOTA team for detailed discussions. Hassan
left the meeting clearly very enthusiastic about entering an
ACOTA partnership.


4. (C) The Chief of Defense Staff, General Ogomudia, had
absented himself from any of the ACOTA meetings at DHQ. The
first indication of his involvement in the decision-making
process came after the April 22 meeting at DHQ when the DATT
received a telephone call from Nigerian DIA saying Ogomudia
had decided to accept the equipment side of ACOTA, but not
the training. The DATT made clear that there would be no
equipment without training, and the DIA representative said
he would pass that message. The DIA representative later
told the DATT that Army Chief of Staff Agwai was very upset
with the activities of DHQ.

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Recommendation
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5. (C) Post strongly recommends moving quickly to keep up
the momentum by sending a team or teams as soon as possible
to meet with the Nigerian military on ACOTA training
requirements and modalities. General Ogomudia had seemed a
roadblock; for now he on board. There is also a lack of
basic organizational infrastructure and transmission channels
in DHQ, and moving quickly on getting the planning team(s)
out here will help minimize that problem as well.
CAMPBELL