Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUJA59
2005-01-14 15:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

OBASANJO ON SUDAN TRIBUNAL CONCEPT

Tags:  PREL KAWC SU NI DARFUR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 000059 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2015
TAGS: PREL KAWC SU NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: OBASANJO ON SUDAN TRIBUNAL CONCEPT

REF: STATE 8981

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 000059

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2015
TAGS: PREL KAWC SU NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: OBASANJO ON SUDAN TRIBUNAL CONCEPT

REF: STATE 8981

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D).


1. (C) Ambassador presented the Sudan Tribunal Concept
demarche to the Foreign Ministry and National Security
Advisor, and then to President Obasanjo, on January 14.
After explaining where he was going on the Darfur talks
(below),Obasanjo asked how it would be decided who would be
prosecuted by the Tribunal. While Obasanjo was friendly
during the entire conversation, he clearly said that "how
suspects will be identified, arrested and brought to the
Tribunal must be answered before we move forward."


2. (C) "Rwanda (the ICTR) was easy, as everyone involved
agreed there had been a genocide," Obasanjo explained. "If
the UN Darfur Commission of Inquiry (COI) decided that there
had been genocide in Darfur, then the COI could identify
those to be pursued, he continued, "But if the COI did not,
how would suspects be procured for the court?" It was the
key to the process and to AU involvement, Obasanjo said,
because Sudan is a member of the AU and has never denied
arming the Janjawiid. Disarming the Janjawiid would be
difficult enough as it was, as the GOS was naturally
protective of the Janjawiid for having helped GOS forces
against the rebellion.

ON THE NEXT ROUND OF DARFUR TALKS


3. (C) Obasanjo said that he had been in Darfur and met with
President Bashir on January 8, and then flew to Libreville
where Darfur was at the top of the AU peace and security
summit agenda. He had stopped in Libya on the way, and made
the point (again) to Qadhafi that everything done on Darfur
politically must be within the Abuja talks framework.
Qadhafi at the time was meeting with around 400 notables from
Darfur, and kept Obasanjo waiting for an hour -- for the
first time. Obasanjo said he would stop in Libya again on
January 27 or 28 just before the AU Summit in Abuja to find
out what Qadhafi had been up to since, and would be prepared
to engage on the Tribunal at that point (assuming his
question on how suspects would be identified had been
answered by then).


4. (C) Obasanjo said he has decided to hold off re-starting
the Darfur talks until the first week of February, to give
SPLA leader Garang an opportunity to use his good offices
with the various Darfur parties. Obasanjo said he was
thinking of holding the next round of talks outside Abuja
(although within Nigeria),to get the rebels away from the
press. Without that distraction, he believed all sides might
be able to come to agreement in about four weeks. He thought
a four week period from the first week of February might also
fit well with the north-south agreement implementation
schedule in Sudan. Obasanjo had heard from Garang that the
SPLA leader would go to Khartoum only after the new
constitution had been passed by the National Assembly, which
Garang thought would be in April, and Obasanjo thought
holding the Darfur talks from the first week of February
would allow them to feed into the constitution-making process.


5. (U) Minimize considered.
CAMPBELL