Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUJA2148
2005-11-09 10:20:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: DEMOCRACY AT THE TIPPING POINT

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM NI ELECTIONS 
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091020Z Nov 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002148 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL, G, S/P, R

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMOCRACY AT THE TIPPING POINT

REF: A. SECSTATE 182307


B. ABUJA 2079

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i.Thomas P. Furey for reason 1.4 b
&d.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002148

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL, G, S/P, R

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMOCRACY AT THE TIPPING POINT

REF: A. SECSTATE 182307


B. ABUJA 2079

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i.Thomas P. Furey for reason 1.4 b
&d.


1. (C) With the shadow of the 2007 elections looming and a
democracy scorecard that is mixed at best, Nigeria finds
itself at a critical tipping point. There is great concern
about whether the GON has the political will to implement the
political reforms needed to increase transparency and enhance
the effectiveness of key electoral institutions. Failure to
do so will have a negative impact on the GON's burgeoning
domestic credibility gap, which is in large part a byproduct
of its dismal conduct of the 1999 and 2003 elections. Lack of
adequate preparation only fuels continued speculation about
the intentions of Obasanjo regarding a third term. As a
result, it is important for the USG to engage the GON about
laying the groundwork for a credible and democratic
transition process in 2007. The USG must continue and ratchet
up frank discussions with the GON about the need for free and
fair elections in 2007 and continue, when necessary, with
critical feedback on the GON,s progress in its preparations
for and execution of those elections. End summary.


2. (U) The following headings are keyed to the questions in
reftel, paragraph 6.

-------------- --------------

A. Identify key areas of democratic deficit and the 3 - 5
most important desired outcomes over the next 6 - 8 months
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Democratic deficit: Nigeria,s shortcomings are well
known: corruption, a weak judiciary, winner-take all
politics, weak political parties, a passive electorate, an
overly strong executive, no system of effective checks and
balances, and ineffective electoral institutions wholly
dependent on the executive branch. Taken together these
deficiencies impede Nigeria's democratization efforts and
raise important questions about the Obasanjo administration's
priorities and intentions.


4. (S) Given this difficult political terrain, the Obasanjo
administration's plans are of major concern. Political
activity is in a holding pattern as the body politic attempts

to decipher the intentions of the President (see ref B) to
either exit in 2007 and to pave the way for a successor. The
major concern is that although President Obasanjo is
constitutionally ineligible to run for a third term, he
continues to behave as if he is an incumbent candidate. He
has sought to punish anyone demonstrating opposition to a
potential third term bid or anyone making moves to position
himself to become Nigeria's next president. This is
especially true regarding his rival, Vice President Atiku
Abubakar. The shrinking political space has reduced the
normal pre-election politicking to a guessing game of "is he
staying or is he going," creating an environment in which
substantive movement on major electoral reforms has stalled
and political tensions and violence are on the increase.


5. (S) Desired Outcomes: Given this background, the most
important short term priority is getting President Obasanjo
to agree publicly to leave office in 2007. Further progress
flows from this simple declaration of his plans. Thus,
clarity on this fundamental issue would help open the
political space necessary to allow Nigeria to return to a
dynamic process and begin the process of implementing the
major reforms still necessary for credible elections in 2007.


6. (C) A second important short-term priority is to improve
the functionality and credibility of the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC). As an appendage to the
executive branch which is stacked with pro-government
politicians: it has a poor track record in organizing past
elections. INEC will play an important role in determining
whether the 2007 elections are credible. The specific agenda
of reform starts with bolstering INEC's independence and
continues with improving INEC,s capacity for the technical
and logistical business of organizing an election. The
discussion must be initiated and completed as soon as
possible in order to give INEC a chance to concentrate on the
details of organizing an election including, most
immediately, accurate registration of a voter,s roll for an
estimated 50 million eligible voters. Post is already
working with INEC through partner organization IFES, but
technical assistance from the USG and other donors is not
enough. Nigeria must commit to fully funding the commission
(as of October INEC still had not received its 2005 budget
allocation from the GON) and the GON must show the political
will to enable INEC to conduct free and fair elections.


7. (C) The third short-term priority outcome is to focus
Nigeria on quickly and decisively establishing the &rules of
the game8 for the 2007 elections and avoiding lengthy
debates on distractions. The National Assembly has been
considering a draft electoral bill since early this year.
Nigeria,s electoral rules need reform and the Assembly,s
draft bill would solve some of the problems in the system
while exacerbating others. However, if the new electoral
rules are not established soon, they will be very difficult
to implement and risk becoming too little, too late. INEC
has also stated publicly that it is committed to pressing
forward with an electronic voting system (EVS) for the 2007
elections. This is a controversial proposal, and there is
considerable debate about the feasibility and merits of
electronic voting amongst civil society and in the National
Assembly. Given the time frame, costs, technical challenges
and size of such a project in Nigeria, post believes that for
2007 the EVS issue is a non-starter and is little more than a
"red herring" which diverts time and attention from more
pressing issues. Eliminating this and any other pre-election
red herrings, including pedantic discussion of the electoral
reform bill, will encourage greater focus on the myriad of
technical and logistical problems waiting to be solved.

-------------- --------------

B. Outline a six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy
to achieve the outcomes and C. Identify specific needs from
the department or other parts of the USG, including
resources, high-level visits, public diplomacy-related
efforts, that would provide key support to accomplish these
objectives.
-------------- --------------


8. (S) A six-month strategy aimed at affecting these outcomes
should start with a policy anchored on convincing President
Obasanjo to articulate his plans to step down in 2007. This
policy should be communicated to President Obasanjo by the
USG at the highest levels and at the earliest opportunity. A
visit to Nigeria by a high level USG official with a major
policy speech on democratization in Africa would be a timely
and important way to communicate this important message.
Other visits by official and unofficial Americans respected
by President Obasanjo should reinforce the same message.


9. (C) This strategy could be complemented by a robust
in-country public diplomacy campaign in which post clearly
articulates the message that in a democracy the electoral
process is more important than any individual officeholder.
The USG should articulate consistent and unequivocal support
for a dynamic political process which leads to credible
elections for a new president in 2007.


10. (C) This campaign should seek to contrast the
impressive African regional and continental record
established by Obasanjo since 1999 with the challenge of
leaving an equally impressive domestic legacy. Success in the
international arena and failure in the domestic one would
only tarnish the overall reputation of the Obasanjo
administration. Thus, free and fair elections, credible by
international and domestic standards, could make or break the
president,s domestic legacy. Both public and private
feedback by the USG on the Obasanjo administration's progress
in implementing a free and fair 2007 election should be part
of an ongoing and high-level dialogue.


11. (C) While it is important to start at the top in the
Nigerian political context, it is also important to
simultaneously work other potential levers of influence. Key
targets are members of the National Assembly who are
currently debating important electoral reforms and who have
been called on to change the rules in order to extend the
present presidential mandate. Frank, private discussions
about the pace and content of the current electoral
legislation, supplemented by public statements underscoring
the vital role of the National Assembly in a democratic
system, would reinforce the consistent theme of reform paving
the way for a successful transition in 2007.


12. (C) Finally, the USG has to selectively provide clear
feedback on the electoral process. Actions by the GON,
especially those which contravene the country's laws, should
be criticized. Key deficiencies such as the lack of
electoral preparation, and the lack of overall credibility of
key electoral institutions should also be the target of
public critique. Thus, a selective strategy pointing out the
most serious shortcomings in preparation for 2007 should be
combined with positive messages reminding the current
administration of its heavy burden of responsibility in
helping create an environment that is consistent with the
aspirations of the Nigerian people.

-------------- --

D. Impediments to progress in democratization
-------------- --

13. (C) In Nigeria, the major roadblock to democratization
lies with the lack of political will thus far demonstrated by
the Obasanjo administration. With its intentions not clearly
articulated, the political environment is confused and
preparations for the election of a new administration
stalled. With a strong record of getting what it wants in
terms of policy and legislation, it is easy to conclude that
the current confusion is intentional. This is especially true
regarding the continued institutional deficiencies of the
national and state electoral bodies. The obvious conclusion
is that by leaving election institutions weak and dependent,
one will be able to manipulate them later.


14. (C) Ironically this pattern of behavior runs contrary
to the ideals espoused by Nigeria in its official capacity as
respected leader in ECOWAS, the African Union and its New
Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD),and the
United Nations. In front of these international bodies,
Nigeria has spoken out, often eloquently, in defense of
democracy and the rule of law. In a sense, this pro-active
strategy, in which President Obasanjo has become an important
African interlocutor and symbol of African leadership, has
insulated him from probing criticism about domestic
shortcomings in Nigeria's implementation of these same
ideals. As a result, African and European leaders most likely
to be able to influence Nigeria's haphazard implementation of
democracy are probably reluctant, primarily because of its
importance in regional and international issues.

-------------- --------------

E. Identify Other Countries, Organizations or Groups with
significant impact
-------------- --------------


15. (S) President Obasanjo is most influenced by the opinions
of other leaders whom he considers to be his peers on the
world stage. He is concerned about his legacy. U.S. and
European leaders are most likely to have some sway over his
decision regarding whether or not to remain in office beyond
2007 and how well his administration will conduct the 2007
elections. Within Nigeria, the two groups most likely to
have an impact on these matters are the National Assembly,
who need to pass any constitutional changes enabling a 3rd
term, and the judiciary, who play a vital role in enforcing
the constitution and the electoral rules. However, the weak
judiciary has failed to adequately play this role in past
elections. We should also remember the potential impact of
Nigeria,s largely passive electorate. If this &sleeping
giant8 is roused to action, most likely by a
political/economic crisis, the power of 150 million people
could be channeled to advocate for democratic change.

-------------- --------------

F. Identify key areas of democracy promotion supported by
host government. Identify areas in which host government
policies run contrary to USG goals
-------------- --------------


16. (C) Nigeria largely has in place the necessary democratic
structures, laws, and institutions and there are no overt
government policies which would impede our pursuit of
democracy promotion. However, poor implementation and lack
of political will often cause these institutions and
structures to underperform. Nigeria is making some efforts
to attack root problems such as corruption and to improve
transparency, especially through institutions like the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC),Independent
Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC),and through their
participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI),although to date the efforts are perceived
to be focused on the President's political enemies. These
initiatives need to continue and to be applied more widely
and vigorously.

--------------

G. Evaluate the consequences of this policy
--------------


17. (U) The USG's relationship with Nigeria is based on
mutual need and respect. Nigeria provides critical support
for USG policies in Africa, through leadership on important
political issues and especially by providing peacekeepers for
trouble spots around the continent. As a country with major
international aspirations, Nigeria is likely to continue
these activities in lines with its own view of its role on
the world stage.


18. (C) Implementation of a proactive policy does run the
short-term risk of alienating the Obasanjo administration.
With the political stakes for 2007 high, and a sense that the
USG has formed a unique and interdependent relationship with
the Obasanjo administration, he could view public criticism
of Nigeria's democratic deficiencies as a lack of
appreciation for his efforts in moving Nigeria forward on
issues such as corruption and therefore alienate him at the
end of his mandate.


19. (C) However, an equally sizable risk is that lack of
action in taking a stand about Nigeria's democratic
deficiencies will risk alienating both Obasanjo's successor
and the Nigerian people. With the potential for violence
particularly high in a confused and manipulated transition,
failure by the USG to take a clear stand in support of basic
democratic principles risks creating greater long-term
problems. Ultimately in Nigeria, as elsewhere, the process is
more important than any one individual. Building policy on
this basic pillar, while not without risks, will in the
long-term pay the best dividends both in terms of the process
of democratization as well as long-term stability.

FUREY