A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002073

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM NI XY XW
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
MOHAMMED

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: On 24 October, Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs Jendayi Frazer met with Nigerian National
Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed. They discussed the Sudan
Peace Process, recent Liberian elections, Cote D'Ivoire, the
Bakassi dispute with Cameroon, upcoming Nigerian elections,
the stability of the Niger Delta, Mauritania, Guinea, the
Gambia, Senegal and Guinea Bissau. End Summary.


2. Those in attendance:

Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer
Ambassador John Campbell
Special Assistant Kendra Gaither
AF/W Desk Officer for Nigeria Daniel Epstein
Notetaker: Gino Pagotto

On the Nigerian side:

National Security Advisor (NSA) Aliyu Mohammed
Permanent Secretary for the Office of the NSA
Policy Advisor Ambassador Kayode Garrick
Policy Advisor Moustapha Aliyu
Personal Assistant to the NSA Col. M.I. Idriss

Sudan Peace Process
--------------


3. (C) Assistant Secretary Frazer began the discussion by
expressing sympathy for the recent death of four Nigerian
peacekeepers attached to the African union (AU) peacekeeping
mission to the Darfur Region of Sudan. She noted the need to
put pressure on the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) to commit
to the peace process and to ensure that all stakeholders were
committed to working with each other to forge a lasting peace
deal. She believed that there should be only one team
negotiating on behalf of the government of Sudan, and that
team should consist of both the government delegation and
members of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement. A/S
Frazer queried the NSA as to how the USG and other donor
countries could increase the capabilities and impact of the
AU mission in Darfur.


4. (C) The NSA indicated he was in regular discussion with
the AU mediator of the Abuja talks Salim and Abdul-Wahid.
Abdul-Wahid recently met with Nigerian president Obasanjo and
made a request for US$600,000 in Nigerian support, because
his group is struggling for funds, food, and clothing.
Abdul-Wahid told Obasanjo that he did not have even enough
funds to support the delegation to the Abuja peace talks. In
order to provide support, which could not be misconstrued as
supporting the rebels, the NSA indicated Obasanjo provided
US$ 100,000 in support to Abdul-Wahid so they could sponsor
their peace-talk delegation.


5. (C) The NSA said he believed the AU mission to Darfur
should consist of 10,000 troops to ensure it could
effectively address security and peace building issues.
Nigeria believed it could contribute another battalion
(approx. 1,000 troops),but would need donor financing and
assistance in making the deployment happen. In discussions
with Salim, Salim believed that following this adjournment of
the peace talks, the parties to the Darfur crisis would be
able to reach a conclusion, making the next round of Abuja
talks the last.


6. (C) A/S Frazer said the USG believed that 6-7,000
peacekeepers were more realistic than 10,000. She thought
South Africa would not be able to fulfill its promise to
deploy a battalion to Darfur. The European Union also did
not want the force to get bigger than 6,000 troops. The best
course was to reinforce and enhance what the AU already had
in place. Sudanese President Bashir and Vice President Taha
were very wary of the proposal to have Canadian armored
personnel carriers (APC) deployed to Sudan. However, Bashir
would let 35 APCS into Sudan to see how it went. Bashir and
Taha were fearful that the rebels could seize control of the
APCS and use them against the government. The USG was
hopeful that the we could be successful in implementing a
peacekeeping model whereby regional organizations would be
the first to intervene in a crisis, followed by AU forces,
with eventual United Nations "blue-hatting" of forces, if
necessary. A/S Frazer was optimistic that by the middle of
2006 the AU forces in Darfur would be blue-hatted and come
under the control of a U.N. mission.


7. (C) The NSA hoped the U.N. would become engaged much more
quickly and that the forces would be blue-hatted closer to
the beginning of 2006. He concurred with the observation
that Bashir did not want any non-African troops in Darfur,
and said he would talk to Obasanjo with the goal of having
Obasanjo talk Bashir away from this position. In addition,
the NSA supported having Obasanjo, the U.S. ambassador to
Nigeria, and the Nigerian military leadership sit down to
discuss the path forward in Darfur and Nigerian involvement.


8. (C) A/S Frazer said that Nigeria and the USG must put
pressure on the rebels to adhere to the cease-fire agreement
and cease all attacks. The rebels must stop their infighting
and stop factionalization, otherwise, the Sudanese government
would take advantage of differences in the peace talks. The
NSA agreed. In closing on Sudan, A/S Frazer said she was
shocked at what she saw in Juba in Southern Sudan. In
comparing Juba with Monrovia, Juba was much worse off in
development and infrastructure.

Liberia
--------------


9. (C) The NSA said the run-up to and the actual elections in
Liberia seemed to have gone fine. Although it might seem
that the political parties were gravitating to Ellen
Sirleaf-Johnson for the runoff election, he firmly believed
the Liberian people would choose George Weah. The NSA was
skeptical about Weah's leadership and executive potential,
but with help from ECOWAS, and the USG, Weah should be able
to succeed. He had had a discussion with Obasanjo over
Liberia and the way forward if Weah is elected and Obasanjo
responded with the quip that "even a donkey can be a good
president", if he had a strong team of personnel supporting
him.


10. (C) The A/S Frazer had a very positive experience in
Monrovia and believed that from what she saw, the elections
went relatively smoothly and were credible. She thanked the
Nigerians for their continuing contribution to the UNMIL
mission. The USG would be ready to work with whomever
emerged as the victor from the upcoming runoff elections and
Embassy Monrovia and its ambassador were in touch with both
parties. The USG was standing ready to help the next
Liberian president build a strong leadership team. Turning to
former Liberian president Charles Taylor, she noted the USG's
continuing concern over the potential for Taylor to
manipulate the electoral process either by planting people
around various candidates, getting his people elected, or
outright stealing elections. Weah, being a younger Liberian
and having never been involved in Liberian politics, might be
susceptible to Taylor's influence should he become president.


11. (C) The NSA responded with what has become the Nigerian
party line on this issue by noting president Obasanjo's
previous declared position that he is ready and willing to
turn Taylor over to an elected Liberian government should
they ask for him. A/S Frazer did not want Taylor to go back
to Liberia but rather, asked that the Nigerians deliver him
to the special court for Sierra Leone. The USG was concerned
that Taylor's physical presence in Liberia could be a impetus
for instability. The NSA said Nigeria supported U.S. efforts
in the UN to pass the resolution that would give UNMIL the
authority to arrest Taylor if he were ever to set foot in
Liberia again. A/S Frazer attempted to clarify if that meant
that if the Nigerians would land at Roberts International
Airport in Monrovia with Taylor, that Taylor would walk down
the steps of a Nigerian aircraft, be arrested by UNMIL, and
then escorted up the steps of a U.N. aircraft and taken to
Sierra Leone. The NSA laughed and indicated that he was sure
that Taylor would one day get to the Sierra Leone special
court.

Cote D'Ivoire
--------------


12. (C) The NSA expressed concern that in Cote D'Ivoire,
because of the current constitution, president Laurent Gbagbo
would be in power for another year because a new president
could not assume office until the predecessor left. The NSA
was concern that the northerners, especially the supporters
of the late rebel leader Robert Guei, would never agree to
allow another southerner to become president. ECOWAS
chairman Mohammed Ibn Chambas had floated the names of
several candidates, unfortunately, none of who were majority
Ivoirian in their ancestry. Nigerien president Mamadou
Tandja was presently in Nigeria to discuss the Ivorian issue
with Obasanjo. In discussions with Bruno Joubert from the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France would support any
presidential candidate endorsed by ECOWAS and the AU. A/S
Frazer said the USG would support whichever candidate could
effectively deal with and disarm both Gbagbo's militias and
the new forces, and ensure that elections were held within
twelve months.

Senegal, the Gambia, and Guinea - Bissau
--------------


13. (C) The NSA said Obasanjo had recently traveled to Dakar
to participate in a discussion designed to mend fences
between Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade and Gambian
president Yahya Jammeh. As part of that trip Obasanjo
stopped in Bissau and met with the current president Joao
Bernardo Vieira and former head of state Kumba Yala. The
trip went well and Obasanjo was satisfied that things would
continue to be calm in Guinea-Bissau.

Guinea
--------------


14. (C) The NSA expressed concern about Guinea, stemming from
his belief that President Lansana Conte's health was
diminishing quickly and there were no real successors. The
NSA said he and Obasanjo were not sanguine about the concept
of the current prime minister succeeding Conte for what could
be a period of up to a year before new elections were held.
Obasanjo had a few ideas for interim arrangements should
Conte pass away, and at a future meeting in Washington would
like to discuss them with A/S Frazer and the administration.

Nigeria: Bakassi
--------------


15. (C) On the Bakassi, the NSA saidt Nigeria and Cameroon
were working together in a healthy dialogue with both the
U.N. and the mixed commission. Nigeria was pursuing a tact
by which they would lease the Bakassi. Obasanjo and Cameroon
president Paul Biya continued to have a dialogue on the issue.

Nigeria: Elections
--------------


16. (C) The NSA quickly moved to the looking 2007
presidential elections and alluded to the fact that the
political intrigue and machinations were already beginning.
A/S Frazer noted the importance of the 2007 election season
as a milestone in Nigeria's democratic development.
Obasanjo's successful transition from his civilian
administration to a successor civilian administration was
extremely important for Nigeria's nascent democracy. The USG
already was working with the national electoral commission,
civil society, and various civic education programs to ensure
that the 2007 elections were better than the 2003 elections.
Comment: The Assistant Secretary sought subtly to make the
key point that the USG would not support Obasanjo attempting
to stay for a third term. End Comment.

Nigeria: Delta Stability
--------------


17. (C) A/S Frazer asked about peace and stability in the
Niger delta. The NSA responded that for now, things seemed to
be calm and peaceful. He attributed this to the recent
arrest of Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) leader
Dokubu Asari. As a result, the Chambas and other militias
were crumbling. The most important thing for peace in the
Delta, however, was continued investment and development.
The Delta relied solely on money allocated to the governors,
creating problems when the governors stole all the money.
The NSA asked for USG assistance in tracking and locating
stolen and diverted funds, noting his impression that U.S.
law enforcement is particularly successful in this field. He
believed this would help fight corruption.


18. (SBU) The Ambassador said he would attend an upcoming
conference in London being hosted by the Nigerian High
Commissioner to London and Rivers State Governor Peter Odili.
The conference would brainstorm solutions for the way
forward in the Delta. The British High Commissioner to
Nigeria also would attend. The NSA was aware of this
conference, sponsored by the Coventry Foundation and Stephen
Davis. Nigerian State Security Service Director General
Lateef Kayode Are would attend.

Mauritania
--------------


19. (C) Touching briefly on Mauritania, the NSA said it
looked as if the current military regime would be in place
for circa two years before having free and fair elections.
In the interim, they would reform the government. When the
regime did have new elections, all those in currently
involved in the interim government would not be allowed to
participate. The NSA was concerned with Salafism in
particular to Mauritania and the Sahel. Nigeria still did
not have strong ties with Mauritania, ever since the latter
removed itself from ECOWAS.


20. (C) A/S Frazer said USG's position was that the current
regime needed to call and hold new elections within a year;
two years was too long. The current regime needed to infuse
itself with some civilians, be they newly retired military
officers or otherwise. If they did not move in that
direction, the USG would be forced to move in the direction
of levying sanctions on Mauritania. The NSA said he would
travel to Mauritania to deliver the message to the current
regime and tell them that having sanctions levied on them
would not help them to enact meaningful reforms in Mauritania.


21. (U) This cable was been cleared by the Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs.

SIPDIS
CAMPBELL