INEC'S PROMISES RAISE QUESTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002037

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: INEC'S PROMISES RAISE QUESTIONS

Classified By: Political Counselor Russell J. Hanks for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a rhetoric-heavy and superficial
one-hour presentation to the donor's election support group,
Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) chair,
Professor Maurice M. Iwu, laid out his strategy to organize a
high tech enabled election that would cost $66 Billion Naira,
"and be the freest in Nigerian history and a model for
Africa." In a private meeting with DCM, Iwu made the same
points but came up short on the means to implement such an
ambitious undertaking. INEC's history does not instill
confidence in outside observers and the Commission's habit of
changing stances to meet the political requirements of the
moment has not changed. Without serious reform of the
institution, Nigeria's INEC could be headed for a repeat of
its performance in 1999 and 2003. END SUMMARY.

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INEC AND DONORS ADDRESS THE PUBLIC . . .
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2. (U) In a rhetoric-heavy and superficial one-hour
presentation to the donor's election support group on October
17, Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) chair,
Professor Maurice M. Iwu, laid out his strategy to organize a
high tech enabled election that would cost $66 Billion Naira,
"and be the freest in Nigerian history and a model for
Africa." Although the meeting was co-chaired by USAID and
UNDP, the highlight was Iwu's presentation, which closely
followed the strategy laid out in a sparsely detailed 12-page
pamphlet. He made reference to his electronic voting dream
package, which would include an electronic voting system,
electronic voter's register, electronic voter's
identification complete with biometrics, electronic balloting
and transmission of results. He also ambitiously presented
plans for computerized management functions of INEC and plans
to implement a Geographic Information System, (GIS) to
delineate constituency boundaries. "Give me the tools and I
will deliver the goods," he said.


3. (U) Donors present, however, were skeptical. The
representatives from the EU inquired about the technology,
timeline, and costs. Few details were forthcoming, but Iwu
did indicate that the electronic voting system would not be
possible under current law. If the laws were not quickly
amended INEC would go to plan B, which is to use the current
technology. For voter registration, Iwu said it would be
possible to push forward with electronic voter registration
even within the current legal framework, although he slipped
in a request for donor support to clear up an unspecified
debt with the software provider from the 2003 debacle.


4. (U) Iwu implied that INEC was very interested in
controlling the electoral environment, first by approving
which "genuine" NGO's could be observers and then by
suggesting that Nigerian security agents could play a
prominent role including being trained to be "election
observers". No one followed up on that troubling remark.


5. (U) The British, EU and Japanese delegations were
interested in getting more details on the myriad of issues
and suggested setting up a technical working group, which
would hear out the specific details of some of these schemes.
The Japanese said they might be interested in the election
technology basket as part of the DFID/EU-led donor basket
consortium. This technical/donor group will meet within two
weeks and the larger, more general group will meet again
November 8 at UNDP.

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. . . WHILE IWU MEETS PRIVATELY
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6. (C) In a meeting with DCM prior to the public session,
Iwu outlined the elements necessary to complete the election
process. They include voter's registration, logistical
planning and training of ad hoc staff, and computerization of
the process. Iwu said that the voter's register from 2003,
one of the successes lauded by the USG, was "basically
nonexistent." He complained that no work had been done to
digitize the list and that all that remained were scanned
"pdf" files of the handwritten registration lists. "We have
to start from scratch," he said. Iwu could offer no idea of
a timeline to begin registering the 70 million or so voters
and complained that INEC had yet to receive its funding for
2005 from the GON.


7. (C) Iwu then described his plan to improve INEC's
logistical preparations before 2007. He pointed to contracts
that had been awarded to construct warehouses in various
parts of the country in order to have elections materials
"prepositioned" closer to the areas where they would be
needed. He did not address the need to secure and control
the various far-flung sites, but rather pointed to the need
to reduce the distances the materials would travel.

8. (C) Iwu also offered no clear solution for the problem of
employing over half a million ad hoc staff to man the polling
booths on election day. He did acknowledge the problems in
training and paying the staff and said he was seeking
solutions. Possible scenarios, he suggested, would include
utilizing students and teachers from around the country. His
focus was clearly on the computerization of the electoral
process even though he had no answer for how to pay for the
equipment and even whether it could be installed before the
elections come due in early 2007.

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QUESTIONS OF INDEPENDENCE AND COMPETENCE
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9. (C) Iwu's upbeat assessments and promises stand in stark
contrast to several recent decisions and actions of INEC,
which have raised questions about his tenure and credibility
and, as a consequence, the credibility of the institution he
leads. Earlier this month, for example, INEC, under Iwu's
leadership, inexplicably reversed itself on the contentious
issue of elections in Anambra State. Under the previous
leadership, INEC defended the result of the 2003
gubernatorial vote against allegations that there was
widespread fraud. When the special Election Petitions
Tribunal ruled that, indeed, the elections were fair enough
to declare a winner (although not the one supported by INEC),
INEC now led by Iwu, reversed itself and appealed this
decision and argued that a new election was needed because
the previous process was deeply flawed by fraud.

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COMMENT
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11. (C) These are the latest episodes in a series of
controversial actions undertaken by Iwu's INEC directly
benefiting allies of the President's faction of the ruling
party, sidelining potential competitors or critics, or
reducing transparency in the electoral process. While Iwu's
statements are generally positive, this does not change the
fact that virtually every member of the elections board is
either related to insiders in the Obasanjo government or is
an active member of the ruling party. The pattern of actions
and decisions taken by INEC are reminiscent of the path taken
by previous incarnations of the same body: questionable
rulings on eligibility of specific parties and individuals
and rules detrimental to election transparency. If INEC is
not to travel down this well-worn path, serious changes to
its structure and composition need to take place before the
2007 skirmishes begin and the battle is engaged.
CAMPBELL