Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUJA1703
2005-09-13 09:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: UK PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE ON A

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM OPRC NI THIRDTERM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

130945Z Sep 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001703 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM OPRC NI THIRDTERM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UK PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE ON A
PRESIDENTIAL THIRD TERM

REF: LAGOS 1363

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001703

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM OPRC NI THIRDTERM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UK PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE ON A
PRESIDENTIAL THIRD TERM

REF: LAGOS 1363

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (U) Action Request Para 11.


2. (S) SUMMARY: Despite repeated public denials and
constitutionally mandated term limits, President Obasanjo's
alleged aspiration to a third term has become a lightening
rod among the political elites. The British High Commission
proposes a common, public position affirming the
international community's opposition to unconstitutional
change in Nigeria. Timing such a statement requires careful
consideration. Made now, the President will likely see it as
a gratuitous slap in the face despite his feeling that he has
done much to carry our water in Africa and many in political
class will see it as an erosion of U.S. support. Instead, we
recommend the Department go on record in support of
constitutionality and the rule of law during this
pre-election period and recommend that we continue to
reiterate our support for the rule of law in public.
Privately with the President, we should stress restoration of
civilian government and the transfer of power between
different civilian administrations as central to his legacy.
End Summary.


3. (C) Septel reports the growing rift between President
Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku, at base over the
President's alleged aspirations to a third term. The
President's relations with Ibrahim Babangida, former military
ruler and leading presidential candidate, are also
deteriorating over the same issue. Recent newspaper coverage
highlighted a possible split in the ruling PDP between the
followers of the President and the Vice President. While
such a split could acquire a North/South, Muslim/Christian
complexion, it has not so far. Meanwhile, the President
continues to deny in public any intentions to do anything
that contravenes the constitution which, in its current form,
prohibits a third term. However, he continues to manipulate
the PDP machinery contrary to party rules in a way that
appears to keep open that option. The result is
near-universal skepticism about the President's intentions,
even within his own circle. This Mission's current view is

that Obasanjo is personally undecided about a third term, and
he is searching for a candidate who would preserve his reform
legacy should the third term option founder. Whatever his
personal motivation, people around him are urging him to keep
his options open should no other "satisfactory" presidential
candidate appear.


4. (C) Conventional wisdom is that with the end of the
Political Reform Conference, it is too late to amend the
constitution to extend his current term of office. However,
Nigeria's constitution is only seven years old, and the
Supreme Court demonstrated in the Buhari case that it is
prepared to do the government's bidding, at least in certain
circumstances. Therefore, a legal, or more likely,
quasi-legal amendment or interpretation of the constitution
that could allow an accelerated amendment process might be
possible.


5. (S) This mission's view, apparently shared by the
British High Commission, is that an overt effort by President
Obasanjo to extend his time in office, whether constitutional
or not, will be destabilizing domestically and thereby impact
negatively on Nigeria's ability to play its current active,
generally positive role on the international stage. However,
thus far, the most obvious alternatives to Obasanjo are few:
Leading candidates, Buhari and Babangida are both ex-military
rulers of Nigeria, the former a byword for authoritarianism
and "discipline," the latter for corruption. Former military
governor of Lagos Gen. Marwa at present lacks the stature,
though recently there was a press boomlet in his favor. In
conversations with his former personal lawyer (reftel)
Obasanjo ruled out Babangida and Atiku because of their
personal corruption and speculated that the small stable of
pro-Obasanjo state governors might yield a candidate. While
most of them have such aspirations, no governor thus far has
acquired national standing. Meanwhile, the Nigerian press is
having a field day with the FBI investigation of Atiku; the
front page of the Sunday Guardian was dominated by a picture
of Atiku's Potomac house


6. (C) The predominately Muslim, Hausa-Fulani dominated
North believes itself to be marginalized, impoverished and is
deeply hostile to Obasanjo, a Christian Yoruba. Despite
widespread resentment, it has remained passive, up to now, in
part in anticipation that its turn will come in 2007. The
predominately Christian South and the East clamor for the
Presidency, but would settle for the Vice Presidency in 2007.
Both regions thus oppose extending Obasanjo's tenure, the
former because it would mean continued marginalization, the
latter because Obasanjo, as a Yoruba Christian, should have a
Muslim Vice President from the North or the Middle Belt,
blocking Southern and Eastern vice-presidential aspirations.
Like the North, though for different reasons, those regions
are already thoroughly disaffected from the Obasanjo
government, and there are strange manifestations of the old
Biafra separatist itch, e.g., the new circulation of the
Biafra pound, despite Federal efforts to stop it. In the
aftermath of the deeply flawed 2003 elections, there is
concern that if he decides to stay in office, Obasanjo will
manipulate successfully the electoral process to ensure that
outcome, no matter who opposes him on the ballot. Bottom
line -- if Obasanjo manipulates the political system to stay,
in the current, highly fragile Nigerian polity, there is risk
of widespread unrest the center will be unable to contain.


7. (S) This is the context for the British High
Commission's proposed "if asked" press guidance. According
to the High Commissioner, the FCO has it under consideration,
and, he said, the British Embassy in Washington may have
already shared it with the Department. His idea is that this
guidance, in some form, would be used by the UK, US, French,
German, and Canadian Missions here. Though the British draft
makes no mention of Obasanjo, any Nigerian will see it as a
statement that it would be unacceptable to the donor
community for Obasanjo to prolong his power in an
unconstitutional or extra-constitutional way.


8. (S) Begin text of British Draft If-Asked Press Guidance

-- Any unconstitutional change would be condemned by the
international community.

-- Constitutional change is a matter for the Nigerian people,
but Nigeria's friends would need to be convinced of the
reason to change the rules only 7 years into the life of
Nigeria's third shot at democracy. Nigerians should
carefully note the difference in the international reactions
to elections in Uganda and Tanzania.

-- Nigeria's friends want to see reform take strong root in
Nigeria backed by the checks and balances provided by
democracy. Constitutional transfer of power from one
government to another is an integral part of the democratic
process.


9. (S) Mission Comment on the British text: We see the
first and third ticks as conveying the essential message. We
do not see the utility of making a comparison with Uganda and
Tanzania. We are also uncomfortable with the idea that
somehow Nigerians must justify to the outside world a
constitutional change -- so long as it is done legally. So,
we would drop the second tick.


10. (S) COMMENT, continued: The High Commissioner believes
now would be a good time to issue such a statement because
President Obasanjo has repeatedly said that he does not
intend to remain in office after 2007. We are not so
sanguine. The political classes in Nigeria will give such a
statement an Obasanjo focus and take it as an erosion of U.S.
and Western support for the President. The President may
take it as gratuitous, if not a slap in the face, given his
reiteration of his previous statements that he will leave
office in 2007. Nevertheless, given the President's current
maneuvering within the PDP, inconsistent with his stated
determination to leave office in 2007, during his upcoming
travel to the U.S., it might be wise for senior U.S.
interlocutors to reiterate privately that any constitutional
change should be made in accordance with the rule of law and
the provisions of the Nigerian constitution, and, in public,
to emphasize that Obasanjo's legacy includes the restoration
and handing over of civilian government in Nigeria. End
Comment.


11. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Mission recommends the Department
go on record in support of constitutionality and the rule of
law during this pre-election period and recommends that we
continue to reiterate our support for the rule of law in
public. Mission also recommends that we should emphasize
restoration of civilian government and the transfer of power
between different civilian administrations as central to his
legacy privately to President Obasanjo.
CAMPBELL