Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUJA1480
2005-08-11 16:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

WHAT WENT WRONG BETWEEN THE AU AND THE G-4?

Tags:  PREL PGOV AORC KUNR NI UNSC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

111612Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001480 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV AORC KUNR NI UNSC
SUBJECT: WHAT WENT WRONG BETWEEN THE AU AND THE G-4?
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR BRIEFS CHARGE'


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas P. Furey for Reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001480

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV AORC KUNR NI UNSC
SUBJECT: WHAT WENT WRONG BETWEEN THE AU AND THE G-4?
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR BRIEFS CHARGE'


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas P. Furey for Reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary: According to the Japanese Ambassador to
Nigeria, who was at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, emotional
appeals about Africans standing up for their rights against
Western "colonialists" carried the day in persuading the AU
to stick to its demand for veto rights for any new permanent
members of the UN Security Council. Tanaka also reported
that there are tensions within the G-4 as a result of an
unauthorized concession in Addis Ababa by the Brazilian
Foreign Minister, who agreed (supposedly on behalf of the
G-4) to support an additional non-permanent member for the
UNSC. The Japanese Government plans to step back and let the
dust settle, but is confident that a solution satisfactory to
the G-4 will be approved by the General Assembly before
Christmas. End Summary.


2. (C) The Japanese Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Akio Tanaka,
briefed Charge Furey and British Charge Martin Shearman
August 11 on his observations about the African Union summit
in Addis Ababa and UN Security Council reform. Ambassador
Tanaka served at the Japanese mission to the UN in the late
1990s and was sent by the Japanese Government to lobby the AU
on behalf of the G-4.


3. (C) Tanaka said the Nigerians were confident as they went
into the summit that they could persuade the AU to agree to
drop the demand that the new permanent members have veto
authority. He said his interlocutors, including the Sudanese
Ambassador, who were in the conference hall told him that
several small countries insisted that the African members
would have to have the veto. He attributed this to emotional
appeals by some representatives: since Western powers had
colonized Africa, it was now time for African countries to
stand up for their rights. When recounting this, Tanaka
shook his head in frustration and noted that "even Chad,"
which cannot vote in the General Assembly because of failure
to pay dues, took this position.


4. (C) As an aside, Tanaka noted with some bemusement that
he has lobbied with several African ambassadors in Abuja
about the veto issue and that many of them, "who did not seem
to be following the reform issue closely," reacted viscerally
against the idea that Nigeria would have veto rights in the
UN Security Council. The African ambassadors reacted with
comments such as: "Why should a country that cannot even
generate electricity on a regular basis be given veto power
in the UN?"


5. (C) There are tensions within the G-4 now, according to
Tanaka, as a result of an unauthorized maneuver by the
Brazilian Foreign Minister in Addis Ababa. The night before
the summit began, the Foreign Minister met with the South
African and Nigerian delegates and agreed on behalf of the
G-4 to a proposal to add an additional non-voting member
(which would be the 26th member under this proposal) to the
UNSC. Tanaka said he and the Germans and Indians were
surprised to learn about this the next day. He noted that
the Brazilian Foreign Minister had served previously as
ambassador to the UN and "unfortunately thinks he knows more
than the rest of us" about UN issues.


6. (C) The Japanese Government plans to take a step back
right now and let the dust settle, Tanaka said, adding,
"there is no way this can be resolved by September."
Nevertheless, he and his Japanese colleagues are confident
that enough support can be lined up for a solution
satisfactory to the G-4 to be approved by the General
Assembly before Christmas. He said Japan's sense of urgency
on this issue arose from the incident in 1998 when North
Korea launched a missile in the direction of Japan and the
belief of Japanese delegates to the UN that their presence on
the Security Council at that time helped greatly in
representing their interests.

FUREY