NATIONAL POLITICAL REFORM CONFERENCE ENDS. NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001339

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV EPET PHUM KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NATIONAL POLITICAL REFORM CONFERENCE ENDS. NOW
WHAT?

REF: LAGOS 1073

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Unable to reach consensus on key issues of
resource control, presidential term limits, and whether
former military leaders should be precluded from contesting
future elections, the National Political Reform Conference
(NPRC) ended deliberations July 12. Conference chairmen plan
to present to President Obasanjo the majority and minority
positions for his consideration. Most observers expect the
President to forward the Conference's recommendations to the
National Assembly. What the National Assembly will do with
the findings is unclear, particularly since the Assembly
opposed the convening of the conference in the first place,
believing it an usurpation of its prerogatives. Had NPRC
delegates backed what many believe to have been the
President's "real agenda"--banning of military leaders and a
single six-year term for the presidency, of which he would be
the first beneficiary--we might have been able to expect
Obasanjo to lobby the National Assembly to adopt the
conference's conclusions. However, since the verdict was
mixed on these issues, the NPRC final report may end up
relegated to a bottom shelf. For now, South-South delegates
remain cautiously optimistic that the National Assembly will
approve some measure of increase in the percentage of oil
revenues that are channeled back to their communities. End
Summary.

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NPRC Sputters, Stalls, Then Dies
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2. (U) Per reftel, NPRC Chairman Justice Niki Tobi was forced
to recess the confab on June 14 when delegates from three of
the six geographical zones represented walked out. The
conference leadership postponed reconvening the confab three
times in an effort to give closed-door negotiations the
opportunity to bear fruit. However, these negotiations
ultimately proved unsuccessful and on July 12 the leadership
announced the end of deliberations. We still anticipate a
plenary closing session in the near future; though it is
unclear whether all delegates will attend.


3. (U) To recap, delegates differed on how much the federal
allocation to the oil producing states should be increased.
The maximalist South-South position was for an increase to 50
percent from the prevailing rate of 13 percent. The
minimalist position was an increase to 25 percent with
provisions for graduated increases later. The confab,
however, adopted an "elder's committee" recommendation to
increase the derivation to 17 percent, with no future
dispensations. There is considerable controversy as to
whether this was indeed the consensus reached by the elders
committee. NPRC chairman Tobi subsequently told the press
that he was "misinformed" when he called for adoption of the
17 percent proposal.


4. (SBU) The proposal to ban former military leaders from
contesting public office also proved controversial. On May
9, the committee studying this issue, put forth its
recommendation that leaders who came to power through coups
d'etat should be ineligible to stand for public office. A
few days later, the committee's chairman, Joseph Wayas, was
attacked by unknown gunmen, but escaped unharmed. Wayas'
office was also vandalized. This recommendation would
eliminate presidential contenders Babangida and Buhari. The
majority of delegates backed this position. However, a
significant minority argued that "democratic norms" mitigated
against banning individuals.


5. (U) Lastly, delegates were unable to agree on
presidential term limits and the rotation of power among the
six geographical zones. In the end, the status quo of
four-year tenures for a maximum of two terms was preserved.
However, like the resource control issue, it is unclear
whether that represents the true consensus position,
particularly since at the time it was adopted, one
geographical zone had already walked out the conference.

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Now What?
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6. (SBU) Most observers anticipate that the conference's
chairmen will present both majority and minority positions to
President Obasanjo for his consideration. The president has
intimated in the press that he will forward the conference's
recommendations to the National Assembly. What the National
Assembly will do with the findings remains unclear at this
point. A few senators have, however, pointedly recalled that
the Assembly strongly opposed the convening the confab and
had therefore refused to appropriate funds for it, compelling
the President to finance it from "private sources."

7. (SBU) The South-South remains cautiously optimistic that
in the end the resource allocation will be increased from the
prevailing 13 percent to a figure ranging between 17-20
percent. Delegates from this zone predict that President
Obasanjo will endorse 20 percent as a compromise position,
appeasing at least somewhat, both the North and the South.
They are less sanguine about the National Assembly's
approval, but believe they have a reasonable chance of
success.

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Comment
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8. (C) Faced with agitation since he came to power in 1999
to organize a Sovereign National Conference (SNC),Obasanjo
likely intended for the confab to divert this pressure and to
derail the SNC that was being planned by the civil society
group PRONACO (Pro-National Conference). (Note: PRONACO is
still moving forward to convene a SNC in October. End Note).
The NPRC was also intended to assuage calls from different
ethnic groups for greater political participation and fiscal
federalism. Lastly, presidential critics insist that it was
also the vehicle by which Obasanjo hoped to exclude his
rivals and secure an extension of term or new mandate. The
president has denied these allegations.


9. (C) In many ways, conference delegates proved the
president's critics wrong. Despite the virulent protests at
the conference's inception concerning delegates'
"hand-selection" and the president's proscribed "no-go"
zones, confab members exhibited considerable independence.
They refused to endorse what they believed to be Obasanjo's
"real agenda," and instead seriously debated issues of import
to the future governing of the body politic.


10. (C) The convening of the confab served as a release
valve when the President was under significant pressure to
hold an SNC and address core issues of resource control,
power-sharing, and adequate political participation by all
ethnic groups. However, rather than mending these rifts, the
conference only trained a harsh light upon them. The good
news of debt relief and the Supreme Court's decision in the
president's favor mitigated the immediate impact of the
NPRC's collapse. However, the issues discussed at the confab
will not disappear. As the euphoria of the past few weeks
recedes, we can expect them to return front and center.
CAMPBELL