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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05ABUJA1338 2005-07-22 16:30:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA CONFIRMS NIGERIA'S

Tags:   PGOV PREL KUNR NI UNSC UNGA 
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221630Z Jul 05
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001338 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KUNR NI UNSC UNGA
SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA CONFIRMS NIGERIA'S
PUSH FOR AU-G4 COMPROMISE

REF: A. USUN NEW YORK 1657


B. ABUJA 1154

C. ABUJA 1250

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).



1. (C) On the afternoon of July 22, Chinese Ambassador to
Nigeria Wang Yongqiu visited the Ambassador to discuss UNSC
reform. He told the Ambassador he had met with the Acting
Permanent Secretary of Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA), Mr. Asiru (phonetic), the previous afternoon, and that
Asiru had confirmed Nigeria's plans to push the AU into a
compromise with the G-4 on UNSC reform (Ref A). Wang said
that Asiru had told him that the Foreign Minister and the
regular MFA PermSec were already in New York, and that both
would attend the Ministerial-level meeting in London on July


25.



2. (C) Wang said that China would be canvassing the AU
countries for their responses to President Obasanjo's letter,
in his capacity as AU President, requesting their approval
for a compromise to the AU resolution calling for two
permanent UNSC seats for Africa. The deadline for individual
country responses was Sunday, July 24, he said, and asked if
the U.S. would canvas AU heads of state for their responses
as well.



3. (C) According to Wang, Asiru was "confident that most AU
countries would say yes" to Obasanjo's request for a
compromise of some sort between the G-4 and the AU. However,
Wang said that China thought most AU members would not agree
to Obasanjo's letter, but instead hold out for more
concessions from the G-4. Nonetheless, if Obasanjo was
successful in gaining AU support, the outcome of the
ministerial meeting in London would be a G4-AU compromise
resolution to be presented to the UNGA by the end of July.
Drafting of the compromise resolution would be done by the
"four plus four," Wang said: the four ministers from the
G-4, and four from the AU.



4. (C) Wang raised whether the P-5 ambassadors should
approach Obasanjo in order to express the P-5's strong
opposition to the G4-AU compromise. The Ambassador replied
that the U.S. had repeated its message opposing the G-4
resolution to the GON several times (Refs B and C), and he
and Wang agreed that the GON was already quite aware of the
P-5's objections.



5. (C) The Ambassador agreed to pass along China's
suggestion to canvas AU heads of state for their response to
Obasanjo's letter. Wang thanked the Ambassador and said, "It
is in our interest to keep these groups (the G-4 and the AU)
from coming together."



6. (C) Comment: The GON, of course, knows the U.S. position
on Security Council expansion, as well as our objections to
the G-4 draft. Perhaps for that reason, GON officials have
not been forthcoming about the operational details of their
campaign to reach a compromise between the G-4 and the AU.
They have not mentioned to us a July 25 London meeting of G-4
and AU ministers, for example. End Comment.
CAMPBELL