Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUJA1323
2005-07-20 16:25:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: IBB FACTOTUM SPECULATES ON A COUP,

Tags:  NI PGOV PREL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001323 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR AF CONSTANCE NEWMAN, AF MICHAEL RANNEBERGER, AF THOMAS
WOODS
FOR INR/AA FRANCES JONES, INR/AA JAMES SANDERS
FOR S/P M. JAMES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015
TAGS: NI PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: IBB FACTOTUM SPECULATES ON A COUP,
PRESIDENT OBASANJO "ACCIDENT"

REF: A. A) LAGOS 706

B. B) ABUJA 1285

Classified By: E.O. 12958 DECL: 07/20/2015; 1.4(A,D)

(S)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001323

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR AF CONSTANCE NEWMAN, AF MICHAEL RANNEBERGER, AF THOMAS
WOODS
FOR INR/AA FRANCES JONES, INR/AA JAMES SANDERS
FOR S/P M. JAMES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015
TAGS: NI PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: IBB FACTOTUM SPECULATES ON A COUP,
PRESIDENT OBASANJO "ACCIDENT"

REF: A. A) LAGOS 706

B. B) ABUJA 1285

Classified By: E.O. 12958 DECL: 07/20/2015; 1.4(A,D)

(S) 1. Summary: Ukandi Damachi (protect throughout) ,
businessman and advisor to former Chief of State and current
presidential candidate Ibrahim Babangida told me that
President Obasanjo has alienated his natural constituency of
ex-military men and risks being overthrown through a military
coup or that there might be an "accident" that removes him
from the scene before the 2007 elections. I replied that any
such action would be unacceptable to the U.S. and the
international community. He said that my recent speeches on
the rule of law and the critical importance to Nigeria's
democracy of the 2007 elections has "riled" the traditional
military/business establishment, which is also deeply worried
about the possible revocation of their U.S. visas because of
our well-founded suspicion of their individual corruption.
He also said that Supreme Court Lord Chief Justice Uwais was
intimidated successfully by the President in advance of his
decision upholding the 2003 elections. See comments
beginning para 6.

(C) 2. Damachi had breakfast with me at his request on July
15 in the JO quarters I occupy when I am in Lagos. Damachi,
a businessman whose fortune appears to be based on lucrative
dredging contracts, has been close to Ibrahim Babangida since
the latter became chief of state in 1985. He has been a
contact of U.S. ambassadors and the mission since then.

(S) 3. Obasanjo has distanced himself and alienated himself
from his natural power base, Damachi argued, by proposing
that former military rulers be excluded from political power
in Nigeria, by his failure to distribute "equitably" the
profits of office to his supporters, and by his alleged
desire to manipulate the political system so that he can stay
in office after 2007. In addition to Babangida, Damachi
identified Danjuma and Malu as leaders of this opposition to
Obasanjo. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision
upholding the 2003 elections, and Obasanjo's perceived

continued efforts through the National Reform Conference to
ensure that he can remain in office, Damachi said that it was
increasingly likely that the retired generals/businessmen
would "unleash the greyhounds", mid-level military officers
who could mount a coup.

(S) 4. I reiterated what a disaster a coup against an
elected government in Nigeria would be. Even if civil war
were avoided, the country would return to pariah status,
there would be negative implications for investment, and most
international assistance programs would stop. Damachi said
that Babangida's circle is aware of these consequences.
Therefore, there was also the possibility that Obasanjo would
suffer an "accident" or "fatal illness", perhaps similar to
the circumstances of former military dictator Abacha's
demise. I responded that Obasanjo is duly recognized as the
chief of state, and that his achievements are major: ECOWAS,
AU, a host of regional issues, now debt relief. Nigeria and
Obasanjo are partners of the U.S. Coups and "accidents" are
not acceptable options for the U.S. or the international
community.

(S) 5. Damachi said that my recent speeches on democracy,
the rule of law and the need for successful 2007 elections
have been "noticed" and have "riled" at least parts of the
military/business establishment. He also said that my
statements about reviewing for possible revocation the U.S.
visitor visas of those for whom there is a well-founded
suspicion of corruption has generated considerable anxiety
among the same group. He knew about, and referred to,
Ambassador Obiozor's "urgent" meeting with me to discuss a
specific visa case. Obiozor had wrongly linked a visa
refusal to such anti-corruption efforts. (In this particular
case, the visa applicant "forgot" to mention American citizen
children.)

(S) 6. Turning to the July 1 Supreme Court ruling upholding
the 2003 elections, Damachi said that the presidency
successfully intimidated Chief Justice Uwais to render a
favorable decision. The intimidation of Uwais had been so
intense, Damachi continued, that the Lord Chief Justice had
tried to resign. He had remained in office at the
importuning of his northern supporters. Damachi said that
Uwais and other judges were vulnerable on grounds of
corruption -- and there had been a highly embarrassing press
campaign accusing Supreme Court justices of malfeasance
unleashed by the presidency.

(S) 7. Comment: Because we see Damachi from time to time, I
assume he was freelancing, that our meeting was at his own
instigation, not Babangida's. Nevertheless, it is
extraordinary to hear a member of Babangida's even outer
circle talking about the possibility of a military coup or an
"accident", though Damachi has come close before with the
Lagos CG (ref A). Therefore, I want to make a record of the
conversation. I was at pains about the utter unacceptability
to the U.S. and the international community of coups or
"accidents". Damachi has known Babangdia for a long time:
when Babangdia was chief of state in the late 1980's, he used
Damachi as his link to the Nigerian labor movement and also
to the U.S. embassy. But, Damachi has never served as a
minister, and has been careful to keep a low official
profile. Through all of the twists, turns, coups,
counter-coups and elections in Nigeria since the end of the
Biafra war, Damachi has never been jailed. Certainly
Damachi's comments should not be taken as definitive of
Babangida's own thinking. They may, however, reflect what is
being said around him.

(S) 8. Comment, continued: the relationship between
Obasanjo and Babangida is by no means clear. Ref. B reports
Obasanjo's alleged mistrust of National security Advisor
Aliyu Mohammed as one of Babangida's men. Nevertheless, they
have been associates and coup co-conspirators for much of
their careers and have been closely allied at various times
to advance their tactical interests. Both, for example,
appear opposed (at least for the moment) to Vice President
Atiku's presidential aspirations. And, despite Damachi's
suspicion, the President continues to state that he will
leave office in 2007. Serious enmity between the two would
seem more likely if Obasanjo did, indeed, seek to remain in
office after 2007 than it is now.

(S) 9. Comment, continued: There continues to be no
evidence that I have seen of coup plotting. It is also
unclear how much influence retired military officers such as
Danjuma or Malu retain over the military forces. it is true,
however, that we know relatively little about the
"greyhounds" or their ilk, and we do know that the military
continues to be starved of funds and characterized by inept
management. Nor, if Obasanjo dies suddenly or unexpectedly,
should it be presumed that it results from malfeasance. We
have reported in various channels that Obasanjo is older than
his official age, apparently has diabetes, pursues violent
exercise with little sleep, and blacks out from time to time.
And, in general, Nigeria's standards of aviation or road
safety are notoriously low.

(S) 10. Comment continued: Damachi's comment about possible
U.S. visa revocation is evidence that this is an important
way we can demonstrate our support for anti-corruption in
Nigeria. We are also well-served by our inability to provide
the names or numbers of those whose visas have been revoked.
It is widely assumed that far more have been revoked than is
the reality.

(S) 11. Comment, continued: I cannot comment one way or the
other on whether or how Uwais was pressured by the
presidency over the 2003 decision. However, it is nearly
universally believed that the 2003 elections were deeply
flawed, and the Court's decision has little credibility on
the street. It is easy to ascribe to intimidation the
rationale for the Court's decision.

(S) 12. Concluding comment: I see the significance of this
conversation as that talk about coups, largely absent when I
arrived in May 2004, has resurfaced. And, unless or until
Obasanjo convincingly shows he is going to step down by
supporting a successor in 2007, it is no surprise that people
around Babangida (and many others) should speculate about
possible dire scenarios. My bottom lines: I suspect
Damachi's scenarios here reflect speculation -- or wishful
thinking. But they are an indicator of the political
atmosphere in this country as we move into an electoral
season.
CAMPBELL