Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUJA1129
2005-06-24 11:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

SUPREME COURT SET TO DECIDE 2003 ELECTIONS CASE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM NI ELECTIONS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241114Z Jun 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001129 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT SET TO DECIDE 2003 ELECTIONS CASE
JULY 1

REF: A. A) 04 ABUJA 2104 AND PREVIOUS


B. B) ABUJA 435

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001129

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT SET TO DECIDE 2003 ELECTIONS CASE
JULY 1

REF: A. A) 04 ABUJA 2104 AND PREVIOUS


B. B) ABUJA 435

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The two-year saga of Nigeria's 2003
elections is due to close its final legal chapter on or about
July 1 when the Supreme Court is slated to announce its
decision in the case brought by ANPP candidate Buhari against
PDP's President Obasanjo over abuse of security forces,
lapses in voting procedures and other elements of the
severely flawed elections. The public aspect of the Supreme
Court was short, but typified the delaying tactics of the
Obasanjo's and INEC's attorneys throughout the ordeal. Behind
the scenes, pressure on the judiciary and other participants
has been strong and continues in anticipation of the ruling.
Buhari, who pledged to pursue the court process without
public pressure, seems to be warming up his campaign machine
even as the pro-Obasanjo camp and other members of government
have begun showing their concern over possible outcomes. The
concerns are real, as the case presents potential disruptions
to the already fragile fabric of the Nigerian state
regardless of the decision.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (U) The two-year saga of Nigeria's 2003 elections is due
to close its final legal chapter on July 1 when the Supreme
Court is slated to announce its decision in the case brought
by ANPP candidate Muhammadu Buhari against PDP's President
Olusegun Obasanjo over abuse of security forces, lapses in
voting procedures and other elements of the severely flawed
elections. Throughout the trial, Buhari's attorney, Mike
Ahamba, presented evidence claiming that Obasanjo and Vice
President Atiku Abubakar used governmental authority to
disrupt the electoral process and directed now-sacked
Inspector General of Police Tafa Balogun to use the Nigeria
Police Force to ensure a "PDP victory" (ref A). He also
presented a series of election day tabulation sheets that
were at odds with those provided late in the trial by the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The case
saw INEC refuse to provide official elections results in

spite of several court orders.

--------------
THE SUPREME COURT SITS
--------------


3. (C) The public aspect of the Supreme Court was short but
typified the delaying tactics of the Obasanjo's and INEC's
attorneys throughout the ordeal. Both sittings of the
Supreme Court took place in a six-story courtroom amid heavy
security and a standing-room-only audience of Buhari
well-wishers. Buhari's attorney Mike Ahamba (a Christian
Igbo) asked that the documents filed be amended to correct a
number of typographic errors and then asked to have one of
the Appellate Court decisions amended based on the
handwritten notes of the Justice that wrote it. The
President's attorney Afe Babalola (a Christian Yoruba) and
INEC's attorney Joe Gadzama (a Middle Belt Christian)
attempted to delay the second sitting through several
interventions. Two separate justices, including Chief
Justice Mohammad Uwais, admonished them, stating "don't waste
our time." Gadzama again argued that "INEC cannot be
responsible for" complaints about the party affiliation of
Resident Elections Commissioners in each state; "it is up to
the President to appoint whomsoever he chooses."

--------------
PRESSURE ON THE COURT
--------------


4. (C) Behind the scenes, pressure on the judiciary and
other participants has been strong and continues in
anticipation of the ruling. According to the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court Mohammad Uwais, attempts have been made to
bribe, blackmail, intimidate and threaten him. After a break
in at his office (ref B),the pressure turned to threats and
he told PolOff that he has been cautious about his public
appearances and personal travel. Just before the latest
bribery allegations (septel),he told PolOff that he was
"committed" to seeing the process through and had never
considered walking away from the challenge. He provided a
glimpse into his thought processes with an evaluation of the
merits and faults of the to candidates. He characterized
Buhari as "honest, hardworking and sincere," and commented
that Buhari would eliminate corruption. He criticized Buhari
for having an "ineffective campaign organization." "He is too
loyal to those who have helped him in the past and is
reluctant to dismiss some who are detrimental to his
efforts," Uwais said.

5. (C) On the other hand, Uwais said that Obasanjo was
"mean, insincere and not trustworthy." "He would turn on
anyone for petty personal reasons," he said, and continued
that Obasanjo was "increasingly addicted to the office of the
Presidency." After complaining that Obasanjo was almost
"completely out of touch" with the thoughts and needs of
Nigeria, he commented that "at least Obasanjo has appointed
some advisers with credentials even if their actions and
motives are suspect." Uwais stressed that his analysis was
"personal" and that the Supreme Court was not "trying to
select Nigeria's next President," but rather deal with the
legal and political issues raised in the case. As usual,
PolOff did not ask for particulars on the case and Uwais
declined to discuss details.

--------------
BUHARI'S STRATEGY
--------------


6. (C) Buhari, who pledged to pursue the court process
without public pressure, seems to be warming up his campaign
machine. After a successful outing in Kaduna in April, Buhari
is trying to cement his new relations with politicians in the
Southwest. His appearance at a June 12 rally in Lagos
(septel) brought together elements of the political
structures from the North, the Southwest and the Southeast.
According to Embassy contacts, he has been reaching out to
his allies throughout the country in recent weeks and is
"looking forward to the decision, regardless of the outcome."
Buhari told PolOff that he hopes to begin a "thank-you tour"
throughout the country shortly after the ocurt decision. His
previous attempts holding political meetings have generally
been aborted by government officials for "security reasons,"
but he believes that he can organize political rallies
without excessive problems from the government agents.

--------------
GOVERNMENT ANXIETY
--------------


7. (C) Dismissive until now, some of Obasanjo's political
operatives are discussing the outcome of the case. Still,
their belief now, as it was early in the process, is that the
"court will uphold the elections in the interest of
stability." The fact that they consider the case worthy of
discussion is in stark contrast to their attitude in 2003.
The stock answer belies a nervousness not evident a year ago,
and many comment that they are concerned about the nation's
stability even without specific reference to this case. The
Vice President and his advisors are also looking into the
possibilities of the various outcomes. While most of this
camp, too, says that overturning the election is not likely,
some admit to contacting Buhari to explore future cooperation
against an Obasanjo-Babangida political challenge. Many of
these politicians also justify upholding the 2003 elections,
not for legal reasons, but because "holding a new election
would be impossible to coordinate" within the 90-day
constitutionally mandated timeframe.

--------------
COMMENTS AND SCENARIOS
--------------


8. (C) The concerns of Nigerians are real as this case
presents potential disruptions to the already fragile fabric
of the Nigerian state regardless of the decision. The two
prime outcomes of the election would be to uphold the
elections or to call for new elections within a few months.

TO OVERTURN THE ELECTION
--------------


9. (S) Overturning the elections brings up a cascading
series of questions with potentially disruptive outcomes. The
first question is whether or not Obasanjo will respect the
Court's decision. If he does, then the biggest problem will
be how the GON can prepare and run an election within the 90
days required by the Constitution. A secondary issue is
whether the elections could be an improvement over the 2003
performance or another stage-managed effort with a scripted
outcome. A scripted outcome would leave Nigeria's government
with the same credibility problems it faces today.


10. (C) The Obasanjo government has a history of ignoring
Court rulings that it finds inconvenient, from revenue issues
with Lagos state to the destruction of homes throughout
Abuja, Port Harcourt and elsewhere. Ignoring this one,
however, would rock the constitutional structure in ways the
others have not because of the magnitude of the issues
involved. The legal basis of the regime's six years of
governance would certainly be questioned by its critics. It
could also be questioned by the military.

11. (S) The military's response to this situation is
unpredictable. While it remains reticent to take over on its
own and is aware of the international repercussions, some
parts of the military appear deeply unhappy with the Obasanjo
government. While most accept that "democracy" is the
preferred form of government, at least some are discussing
whether the current Nigerian government qualifies. A Supreme
Court verdict and Obasanjo's noncompliance could force an
evaluation of military priorities, i.e., loyalty to the man
versus loyalty to the Constitution.

TO UPHOLD THE ELECTION
--------------


12. (C) Should the Supreme Court uphold the election,
several difficulties could arise. First, with the widespread
belief (and some admissions) that the elections were rigged,
Nigerians are already suspicious of the Presidency and the
Legislative branch. Further revelations and confirmation of
the flaws of the elections, even contained in minority
decisions, can only undermine Obasanjo's already weak
acceptance throughout the nation. It could also embolden his
challengers both within and without the ruling party.
Another eventuality could be the near unanimous assessment by
Nigerians that the Court decision was rigged. Nigerians have
a low opinion of state and local courts, but the Supreme
Court has insulated itself from this bad image through some
important (and popular) decisions over the past few years. A
widespread belief that the Justices colluded with Obasanjo in
reaching a decision could destroy public confidence in the
only remaining institution in Nigeria with a positive rating.
A government with that level of public antipathy would be
unable to tackle difficult reforms and policies and would
likely limp along until a change occurred. There is also the
open question of how Buhari and Obasanjo's other political
rivals will respond to a decision they are likely to find
lacking in credibility. In 2003, Buhari kept thuggery
largely in check within his own party, and his public
behavior during the court case has been exemplary. If he
loses the case, it is an open question whether his supporters
will continue to operate within the same constraints.

IMPLICATIONS
--------------


13. (S) The scenarios outlined above all present
difficulties for USG policy. If Obasanjo refuses to comply
with this court order, as opposed to others he has ignored,
the need to choose between the person and rule of law will be
less ambiguous than it has been. Intervention by the military
in this situation in defense of the Constitution presents a
similar choice.


14. (S) If the Supreme Court upholds the obviously flawed
elections, the short term outlook might look better, but
Nigeria's long term prospects are not improved. With waning
confidence in governmental institutions and constitutional
authority, instability could continue to mount with the GON
unable to resolve the challenges facing the country. While
the decision is likely to be a close split, as of June 24,
the establishment wisdom is that the court will uphold the
2003 elections. If this proves to be correct, the reactions
of General Buhari, General Ojukwu and other opponents of the
current government will be key to determining the short term
course for the Nigerian state.
CAMPBELL