Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI911
2005-02-27 12:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
UAE INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE: GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD
how-tonull Diana T Fritz 12/06/2006 02:48:21 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Cable Text: C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 00911 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: ECON INFO: POL P/M AMB DCM DISSEMINATION: ECON CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON DRAFTED: ECON:OJOHN CLEARED: DCM:RALBRIGHT, CGD:JDAVIS, PA:HOLSIN-WINDECKER VZCZCADI716 PP RUEHC RUEHXK RUEHDE RHEHNSC DE RUEHAD #0911 0581206 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271206Z FEB 05 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8401 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 4880 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000911
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARPI, NEA/IPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2015
TAGS: EFIN EAID ECON EINV PREL KPAL IS TC
SUBJECT: UAE INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE: GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD
TIMING?
REF: ABU DHABI 834
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000911
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARPI, NEA/IPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2015
TAGS: EFIN EAID ECON EINV PREL KPAL IS TC
SUBJECT: UAE INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE: GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD
TIMING?
REF: ABU DHABI 834
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (C) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed Bin
Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) told Ambassador that he had been
briefed on Dubai real estate developer Mohammed Al-Abbar's
visit to the Palestinian territories and proposed investments
there in advance of Al-Abbar's trip, and had no objection to
Al-Abbar's plans in principle. (reftel) He expected that the
current public furor would pass and implied that there might
be room to move forward on investments in Palestine when
things calmed down. Meanwhile, in response to the extensive
media coverage and criticism of his visit, Al-Abbar denied
that he had either met with Israeli PM Sharon or offered to
buy the settlements. End Summary.
2. (C) In a February 25, meeting with Ambassador and visiting
Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Jumper, MbZ said that
he had known about Mohammed Al-Abbar's visit to the
Palestinian territories and his investment concept, and was
not/not opposed to either the visit or the concept in
principle. He had "strongly" advised, however, that Al-Abbar
meet the Palestinian side first and allow them to publicize
it. After that, he suggested, meetings with the Israelis, to
facilitate the arrangement with the Palestinians, would have
made logical sense and could have been justified to the
public. MbZ stated that, unfortunately, Al-Abbar had "got
the order mixed-up," and the Israelis' put out the story as
if Al-Abbar was working the deal with them. MbZ predicted
that the media storm would "blow over" and that Al-Abbar
could be "redeemed" in the eyes of the UAE public.
3. (U) After the appearance of several articles and
editorials criticizing his visit to the Palestinian
territories and meetings with senior Israeli officials, the
UAE papers carried Mohammed Al-Abbar's public denial that he
had made a deal to purchase the settlements. He also denied
meeting with Israeli PM Ariel Sharon. He stated that his
visit to the Palestinian territories was to assess the needs
of the Palestinian people and to examine the situation on the
ground. Al-Abbar emphasized that, in his meetings with
Palestinians, he found a strong desire "to maintain the
assets that are built on these colonies instead of having
them demolished by Israeli forces. Together we held the view
that Palestinian people could benefit from those assets
rather than having to construct replacement assets."
4. (U) The weekend press debate was largely negative. The
"Emirates National Committee Against Normalization with the
Israeli Enemy" criticized Al-Abbar for his reported interest
in purchasing the settlements from Israel noting that the
"the purchase (of the settlements) rewards the Israeli
occupation and makes it legitimate." (Note: MFA U/S Abdullah
Rashid Al-Noaimi stressed to Ambassador, on February 27, that
the committee was a group of private citizens and had no/no
UAEG involvement. End note) An editorial in the English
language "Gulf News" noted that Al-Abbar's intentions were
good, but his timing was premature, since there was still no
peace settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
The editorial noted that "when the land is returned, Sharon
will not be the person to deal with." The Arab Nationalist
paper Al-Khaleej (considered the most popular paper in the
UAE) had an editorial, which -- while not naming Al-Abbar --
sharply criticized normalization of relations with Israel.
5. (C) Comment: MbZ's remarks indicate that he was much more
aware -- and potentially supportive -- of this project than
we had understood from Al-Abbar. The public outcry in the
UAE is related to the meeting with Sharon and to the news
(both of which Al-Abbar denied) that he was prepared to
compensate the Israelis for the Gaza settlements. The furor
has certainly delayed any movement on this project, given the
UAEG's preference to stay out of the headlines. It appears
however, that senior Abu Dhabi ruling family members are not
opposed to the concept of investing in the Palestinian
territories and an approach by Palestinian president Mahmoud
Abbas could possibly still move this project forward, as long
as it can be officially presented as an arrangement between
the Palestinians and UAE investors. End Comment.
SISON
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARPI, NEA/IPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2015
TAGS: EFIN EAID ECON EINV PREL KPAL IS TC
SUBJECT: UAE INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE: GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD
TIMING?
REF: ABU DHABI 834
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (C) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed Bin
Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) told Ambassador that he had been
briefed on Dubai real estate developer Mohammed Al-Abbar's
visit to the Palestinian territories and proposed investments
there in advance of Al-Abbar's trip, and had no objection to
Al-Abbar's plans in principle. (reftel) He expected that the
current public furor would pass and implied that there might
be room to move forward on investments in Palestine when
things calmed down. Meanwhile, in response to the extensive
media coverage and criticism of his visit, Al-Abbar denied
that he had either met with Israeli PM Sharon or offered to
buy the settlements. End Summary.
2. (C) In a February 25, meeting with Ambassador and visiting
Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Jumper, MbZ said that
he had known about Mohammed Al-Abbar's visit to the
Palestinian territories and his investment concept, and was
not/not opposed to either the visit or the concept in
principle. He had "strongly" advised, however, that Al-Abbar
meet the Palestinian side first and allow them to publicize
it. After that, he suggested, meetings with the Israelis, to
facilitate the arrangement with the Palestinians, would have
made logical sense and could have been justified to the
public. MbZ stated that, unfortunately, Al-Abbar had "got
the order mixed-up," and the Israelis' put out the story as
if Al-Abbar was working the deal with them. MbZ predicted
that the media storm would "blow over" and that Al-Abbar
could be "redeemed" in the eyes of the UAE public.
3. (U) After the appearance of several articles and
editorials criticizing his visit to the Palestinian
territories and meetings with senior Israeli officials, the
UAE papers carried Mohammed Al-Abbar's public denial that he
had made a deal to purchase the settlements. He also denied
meeting with Israeli PM Ariel Sharon. He stated that his
visit to the Palestinian territories was to assess the needs
of the Palestinian people and to examine the situation on the
ground. Al-Abbar emphasized that, in his meetings with
Palestinians, he found a strong desire "to maintain the
assets that are built on these colonies instead of having
them demolished by Israeli forces. Together we held the view
that Palestinian people could benefit from those assets
rather than having to construct replacement assets."
4. (U) The weekend press debate was largely negative. The
"Emirates National Committee Against Normalization with the
Israeli Enemy" criticized Al-Abbar for his reported interest
in purchasing the settlements from Israel noting that the
"the purchase (of the settlements) rewards the Israeli
occupation and makes it legitimate." (Note: MFA U/S Abdullah
Rashid Al-Noaimi stressed to Ambassador, on February 27, that
the committee was a group of private citizens and had no/no
UAEG involvement. End note) An editorial in the English
language "Gulf News" noted that Al-Abbar's intentions were
good, but his timing was premature, since there was still no
peace settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
The editorial noted that "when the land is returned, Sharon
will not be the person to deal with." The Arab Nationalist
paper Al-Khaleej (considered the most popular paper in the
UAE) had an editorial, which -- while not naming Al-Abbar --
sharply criticized normalization of relations with Israel.
5. (C) Comment: MbZ's remarks indicate that he was much more
aware -- and potentially supportive -- of this project than
we had understood from Al-Abbar. The public outcry in the
UAE is related to the meeting with Sharon and to the news
(both of which Al-Abbar denied) that he was prepared to
compensate the Israelis for the Gaza settlements. The furor
has certainly delayed any movement on this project, given the
UAEG's preference to stay out of the headlines. It appears
however, that senior Abu Dhabi ruling family members are not
opposed to the concept of investing in the Palestinian
territories and an approach by Palestinian president Mahmoud
Abbas could possibly still move this project forward, as long
as it can be officially presented as an arrangement between
the Palestinians and UAE investors. End Comment.
SISON