WHITE HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR FRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000721

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PATRICK HEFFERNAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015
TAGS: IR IZ PTER SA TC
SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR FRAN
TOWNSEND'S MEETING WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE

Classified By: (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: White House Homeland Security Advisor Fran
Townsend met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
Al Nahyan (MbZ) February 7 to discuss counter terrorism
trends in the Gulf region, U.S.-UAE CT cooperation, and the
threat of Muslim extremism. Townsend and MbZ agreed on the
need to enhance CT communication among GCC members. Both
expressed concern about the potential for another terror
attack on the scale of 9/11. While the UAE has undertaken to
secure its borders and stem Islamic extremism by reforming
its educational curriculum, MbZ emphasized that more needs to
be done. He welcomed CT cooperation from the United States.
Hizbollah continues to pose a grave threat, Townsend
stressed. MbZ agreed that there was room for diplomatic
approaches to Iran and Syria, Hizbollah,s principal
supporters. MbZ expressed sorrow over the loss of American
life in Iraq, but counseled against a premature withdrawal of
forces. End Summary.


2. (U) On February 7, White House Homeland Security Advisor
Fran Townsend met with MbZ over dinner. Others attending the
meeting were Interior Minister Sheikh Saif bin Zayed (MbZ,s
half-brother); senior representatives of the Directorate for
Military Intelligence, UAE Special Forces, and State Security
Directorate; MbZ aide Yousef Al Otaiba; Ambassador; Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Tony

SIPDIS
Wayne; NSC and S/CT staffers; and Embassy representatives.

CT Cooperation and Threat Assessment
--------------


3. (C) Townsend provided a readout of her participation at
the February 5-8 International Counterterrorism Conference in
Riyadh. She said that the lack of communication between GCC
states on CT matters poses a major obstacle. It seemed it
was often easier for a GCC state to pass CT information to a
fellow GCC state via the United States than to do so
directly, she noted. MbZ said Arab League Secretary General
Amr Moussa,s proposal to locate an international counter
terrorism center in Egypt or Saudi Arabia would &kill8 the
idea because Egypt would dominate the process and stifle the
dialogue. MbZ noted he would favor placing a CT center in a
smaller Middle Eastern country, similar to NATO,s decision
to locate its headquarters in Brussels. Townsend indicated
that Bahrain was offering to host the center and MBZ agreed
that would be positive.


4. (C) MbZ and Townsend agreed that U.S.-UAE CT cooperation
was on a sound footing. &Helping you is helping us,8 MbZ
said. &We must stop terrorists or the UAE will be
destroyed.8 In this context, Townsend raised with Interior
Minister Saif the importance of cooperation on the Saeed
export control investigation. She stressed the value of U.S.
access to additional data which the UAE has accumulated on
other cases. MbZ said future challenges loom, and the fight
will be very different in five years. He predicted that a
bigger 9/11 incident was on the horizon and raised the
possibility that Iran could send a terrorist with WMD as a
way to respond to pressure on Tehran. &We need to act now
against a potential biological or nuclear terror attack.8
Townsend concurred with MbZ,s assessment. MbZ also voiced
his belief that extremist groups already had access to WMD.

The Hizbollah Threat and Iran
--------------


5. (C) Townsend expressed the view that Hizbollah remained a
grave threat and, although the Hizbollah has not conducted
attacks against U.S. targets recently, prior to 9-11 they had
been responsible for more American deaths than al-Qaida and
they likely would conduct more in the future. Hezbollah and
Iran were destabilizing forces in the region. MbZ concurred
with Townsend,s assessment of the threat presented by
Hizbollah, and noted that about five years ago UAE
authorities had identified and neutralized a Hizbollah
presence in the UAE. Townsend stated that Iran must stop
sponsoring terrorism, and that the international community
must stand up and declare that it will not tolerate Iran,s
nuclear proliferation nor its sponsorship of terrorism. She
affirmed that the U.S. is committed to a diplomatic solution
vis--vis Iran, but GCC leaders must speak out publicly and
not apply only diplomatic pressure on Iran while relying
solely on the U.S. to provide public pressure.

Iraq in the Aftermath of the Election
--------------


6. (C) MbZ opined that it would have been better for Iraq,s
Sunnis to have involved themselves in the recent election and
cooperated with the U.S. rather than be ruled by the Shi,a.
Iraq,s Sunnis showed they were &stubborn and stupid,8 he
said. In the meantime, Iran &stood by calmly8 to take
advantage of the situation. MbZ labeled the Iranians as
&sneaky.8 MbZ asked how the USG evaluated Syria. Syria
could do more to cooperate with the U.S., Townsend said. She
agreed that the U.S. might have an opportunity to persuade
the Syrians to change course. MbZ said the U.S. needed to
send a signal to Syria &that Syria,s generals would
understand.8 MBZ counseled that the U.S. should not put
Syria and Iran in the same category and that the U.S. should
work to bring Syria to cooperate on CT, thereby forcing them
away from an alliance with Iran.


7. (S) On the question of how Coalition forces treat captured
insurgents in Iraq, MbZ said there was obviously a difference
in approach in the West from that of the Arab world,
signaling that he would sacrifice international law and human
rights considerations in the interest of security. If it
were it up to him, these insurgents would be treated in such
a way as to deter others from taking part in the insurgency.


8. (C) MbZ expressed sorrow for the losses the U.S. had
suffered in Iraq. &There are no words to explain our thanks
to them and their families.8 That said, MbZ was convinced
that U.S. troops should not withdraw from the region, &or
all hell will break loose.8 He wished the UAE,s neighbors
understood this. &This is deadly serious business.8 (In a
sidebar conversation, Ambassador asked MbZ about PM Iyad
Allawi,s February 3-6 visit to the UAE. The trip had been
kept out of the media,s eye for security reasons, MbZ said.
MbZ told Ambassador he had warned Allawi that it was likely
to be a &bloody8 next four for five months. The UAE wished
to see Allawi as Prime Minister once again, MbZ confided, but
&nobody8 was supporting him. Allawi had done much to build
up the new Iraqi army, police, and security services, MbZ
said, but needed help.)

Gulf security
--------------


9. (S) Townsend and MbZ reviewed trends in terrorism and
security in the Gulf region, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and
Kuwait in particular. Turning to his Special Operations
group commander, MbZ noted that the UAE had some 250 men in
Afghanistan alongside Coalition forces. Why was this, he
asked rhetorically? It was because two of the nineteen 9/11
hijackers were Emirati nationals. Fighting Al Qaida on the
ground was something the UAE had no choice but to do.
However, &another8 Gulf country (Saudi Arabia) counted 15
of its nationals among the 9/11 hijackers, but &had had a
different reaction.8 MbZ noted that the Saudis would have
to win the war of extremism upon their own soil for the UAE,
the Gulf, and the world to be free from terror. Townsend
noted that the Saudis have acknowledged that they have a
long-term problem and have thus entered into a new phase in
the fight against terrorism. MbZ then asserted that Bahrain
and Kuwait were in denial about the depth of their respective
terrorism problems. Mbz said the "Arabs" have to play a
bigger role in countering extremism and terrorism but
lamented the near term likelihood of common action.

Border Controls
--------------


10. (C) Townsend described post-September 11 efforts to
improve U.S. border controls and to achieve a better balance
between security and immigration, and she acknowledged that
the current situation has often discouraged many people from
coming to the U.S. MbZ described the UAE,s own border
control challenges. He admitted it is still easy to smuggle
explosives into the UAE by land or sea. He said he would be
more comfortable with the security situation once enhanced
border security measures had been put in place by end 2005.

Stemming Extremism
--------------


11. (C) In addition to tougher border control measures, MbZ
talked at length about his government,s efforts to stem
Muslim extremism, particularly via reforms the schools. To
effectively combat extremism, MbZ said, the educational
curriculum must not only address the basics of reading,
writing and arithmetic, but also improve students, and
teachers, knowledge of Islam. Misinterpretation of the
Koran is one reason why some extremists regard anyone who
does not adhere to their narrow worldview as non-Muslim. To
illustrate his point, MbZ described how UAE Special Forces on
patrol in Afghanistan heard villagers (influenced by the
Taliban) asserting that the Emirati soldiers were
&non-Muslims8 because their version of Islam and their
practices differed from their own.
Atmospherics
--------------


12. (C) The dinner, which was outdoors at a casual Abu Dhabi
seafood restaurant, was informal and laid-back, with other
patrons seated nearby and minimal security. The conversation
was free-flowing, and it was apparent that MBZ felt very
comfortable and at-ease with Townsend and her delegation.
While MBZ has relinquished his UAE Armed Forces Chief of
Staff duties in favor of his new Crown Prince role, he
continues to have an active hand in the UAE counterterror
structure. He remains a key UAE CT interlocutor on both
civilian and military matters.


13. (U) This cable has been cleared by Homeland Security
Advisor Townsend and Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs Wayne.


14. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

SISON