UAE: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM - ADDENDUM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 005021

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, ED SALAZAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PTER ASEC AE
SUBJECT: UAE: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM - ADDENDUM

REF: A. ABU DHABI 4983


B. STATE 193439

Classified By: CDA MARTIN QUINN, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (U) This is the UAE Mission's classified addendum to the
2005 Annual Terrorism Report transmitted to the Department on
December 12 (ref A). Subject headings are keyed to the
headings in the unclassified report, and information
contained in each paragraph is strictly supplemental to the
corresponding subject heading in the unclassified report.

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GENERAL ASSESSMENT
--------------


2. (S/NF) During the year, the UAE demonstrated continued
efforts to enhance the protection of its land, air, and sea
borders, as well as its oil infrastructure and the U.S.
diplomatic missions in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Military
cooperation for the Global War on Terrorism was exceptional.
Judicial cooperation could be improved, as could some aspects
of cooperation on money laundering and financial
investigations.


3. (S/NF) The UAE has taken measures to improve security at
oil installations, but acknowledges that significant critical
infrastructure vulnerabilities remain and extend beyond oil
infrastructure to power and water grids. Attacks on the
UAE's power and desalination plants, which produce nearly all
the UAE's potable water, could have a far greater and more
immediate impact on living conditions in the UAE.


4. (S/NF) Abu Dhabi and Dubai police have been very
responsive to needs and requests from the Embassy and
Consulate. For example, the police swiftly increased
security at USG facilities in response to several alleged
threats. While cooperation between UAE and U.S. law
enforcement agencies is good, the UAEG has not cooperated in
extradition matters because of the lack of a treaty between
the UAE and the U.S. government. SSD response to day-to-day
routine inquiries has been generally positive. However,
there are exceptions, for example, the Abu Dhabi SSD has not
routinely granted the U.S. Government access to individuals
in custody in whom we have a mutual interest. (Note:
Cooperation with State Security in Dubai Emirate has been
better historically. End note.)

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SANCTUARY (SAFE HAVEN) ASSESSMENT
--------------


5. (S/NF) We have discussed with the UAE at the highest
levels the need for greater controls to be placed on the flow
of goods moving through the UAE's many ports, especially in
Dubai. The UAE's ports have been used to transship WMD
technology and related material to states with burgeoning WMD
programs. In early 2005, the UAE used its new anti-terrorism
law for the first time to convict UK national Osman Saeed for
trafficking in components of WMD. Saeed, who had been
detained in 2004, owned a business in the UAE that was
transshipping U.S. Munitions List components to Pakistan.
The UAE seized several components that can be used for
missile guidance systems and worked with the Department of
Homeland Security/ICE on making a case in the U.S. The UAE
sentenced Saeed to six months in jail and a fine of 60,000
Dirhams ($16,200). On April 12, the Ministry of Justice
advised that they had made an official finding that Saeed
would not be rendered to the U.S. Over the objections of the
Ministry of Interior, Saeed was deported to Pakistan where he
has dual citizenship.


6. (S/NF) The UAE continued construction of a 525-mile long
barrier along its land border with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and Oman to keep out individuals deemed a security
risk, as well as smugglers and economic migrants. It also
proceeded with plans to acquire new patrol boats,
reconnaissance aircraft, and coastal radar to improve its
ability to control smuggling and human trafficking.

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TERRORIST GROUPS
--------------


7. (S/NF) Elements of various transnational terrorist
organizations are believed to be in the UAE. Terrorist
elements are also believed to transit the UAE, and to engage
in support activities such as fundraising and fund transfer.
Emiratis have told U.S. officials about their concern for the
"Muslim Brotherhood" operating in the UAE. We have no
evidence to suggest this is a reference to any official
Muslim Brotherhood presence. Rather, Embassy has observed
UAE officials use the term "Muslim Brotherhood" as a generic
reference to Islamic extremists.
--------------
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION
--------------


8. (S/NF) The UAE provided exceptional military cooperation
for the Global War on Terrorism, including continued support
for the deployment of sensitive U.S. reconnaissance assets
(U-2s and Global Hawk UAVs) at Al Dhafra Air Base.
The UAE also continued to allow vital access to its ports for
U.S. and coalition warships, and continues to be the only
venue in the Gulf where U.S. aircraft carriers can tie up
pierside. Jebel Ali Port continued its superb logistics
support for U.S. and coalition naval combatants in the Gulf,
while the northern emirate of Fujairah also maintained its
status as a logistics hub for USNAVCENT supply ships.


9. (S/NF) The UAE continues to directly support Operation
Enduring Freedom with a deployment, begun in August 2003, of
an approximately 200-man Special Operations Task Force
currently operating out of Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. UAE
military assistance also included transfers and offers for
transfer of military-related equipment to the governments of
Afghanistan and Iraq, including trucks, armored personnel
carriers, helicopters, light reconnaissance aircraft, and
small patrol boats. The UAE, in conjunction with Germany,
also facilitated the training of over 300 Iraqi soldiers in
the UAE. The personnel trained will form the first Iraqi
military engineering battalion and ultimately staff the core
of additional future engineering battalions in Iraq.


10. (S/NF) The UAE continued to provide intelligence sharing
in Abu Dhabi and Dubai on terrorist organizations and
activities. The UAE's Directorate of Military Intelligence
provided intelligence information about Iranian support for
Iraqi insurgents. State Security, the UAE's law
enforcement-intelligence amalgam, coordinated with SIMO on
intelligence leads and with the FBI in counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and criminal investigation leads. The
Security Services continue to monitor the local mosques and
scrutinize the work of Islamic charities. The SSD and Abu
Dhabi Police Department have both inquired about receiving
counterterrorism investigation training from the FBI.


11. (S/NF) The Central Bank has, at our request, frozen
indefinitely a number of accounts related to suspected
terrorists and proliferators. The Central Bank took these
actions, even though it was not able to provide to the public
prosecutor evidence justifying the freeze, as is required by
the UAE's anti-money laundering and counter terrorism laws.
The Central Bank has come under fire from its own judicial
authorities to release the funds. The relationship between
the UAE Central Bank and the USG on terror finance cases has
historically been informal and effective. This year,
officials at the Central Bank indicated that it will no
longer act on informal U.S. requests, and that the U.S.
should take asset freeze requests through the formal MFA and
Ministry of Justice channels. Central Bank officials have
also indicated that they will no longer consider asset-freeze
requests that do not provide proof that UAE financial
institutions or account holders have broken UAE law,
regardless of conduct in other jurisdictions. Additionally,
the Central Bank recently advised a USG official that records
provided under the current Egmont agreement are not to be
shared with the requesting U.S. law enforcement agency.
While this position may be due to a lack of knowledge by the
Central Bank regarding FINCEN's role in criminal
investigations, it will severely hamper the only avenue
traditional law enforcement has been able to use to obtain
financial information on criminal investigations. Although
the Central Bank continues to be a critical partner in the
global counterterror finance efforts, the effectiveness and
timeliness of our cooperation could be hampered if the
Central Bank imposes bureaucratic hurdles such as those
described above.


12. (U) Embassy POCs for the report are Pol Chief Joel
Maybury (MayburyJF@state.sgov.gov) and Political Officer Ben
Thomson (ThomsonBA@state.sgov.gov).

QUINN