UAE: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORTS ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004983

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, ED SALAZAR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC AE
SUBJECT: UAE: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORTS ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 193439


1. (U) This is the UAE Mission's unclassified submission for
the 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism. We will transmit to
the Department a classified addendum septel. The information
in this report is divided into the four broad categories
suggested in the provided style guide, and the septel
addendum will be keyed to these same subject headings.

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General Assessment
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2. (U) There were no acts of terrorism against or affecting
U.S. citizens or facilities in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
during 2005. The UAE continued to provide staunch assistance
and cooperation to the global war against terrorism.


3. (U) The UAE Government publicly condemned the terror
attacks in Amman, Sharm al-Sheikh, London, and Baghdad. In
December, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
al-Nahyan strongly denounced terrorists, saying they had no
loyalty to their countries. The Ministry of Justice, Islamic
Affairs, and Endowment drafted Friday prayer sermon guidance
and was thus able to issue timely condemnations of terrorist
acts and also emphasize the virtues of moderate Islam. The
Ministry required all 1,500 mosques that deliver sermons to
record them each Friday to ensure that imams adhere to
prescribed guidelines and to prevent extremist preaching.
All Sunni imams are employees of either the individual
emirate or of the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and
Endowment. The Ministry of Education continued to implement
reforms to limit extremist influence in the schools and to
modernize the curriculum. Teachers deemed extremists were
quietly dismissed or given non-teaching positions.


4. (U) In December, the Supreme Council, the top policy
making body in the country, decided to place all security
agencies under a newly established National Security Council.
The council's decision follows the UAE Government's adoption
in August 2004 of an antiterrorism law defining terrorist
crimes and punishments, and specifically criminalizing the
funding of terrorist organizations. The UAE also undertook
several security measures along its land border and at sea to
deter terrorists from reaching UAE soil.


5. (U) In March, the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
became operational at Port Rashid and Jebel Ali in the
Emirate of Dubai. CSI has five officers co-located with the
Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid. CSI is aimed
at screening shipping containers that pass through Dubai
ports that are destined for the United States that pose a
security threat. On average, CSI reviews approximately 250
bills of lading each week, resulting in 15-20 non-intrusive
inspections of U.S.-bound containers. These examinations are
conducted jointly with Dubai Customs officers. In addition,
Dubai Customs has requested that each and every container
that originates in Iran be designated for inspection by the
CSI team. Cooperation with Dubai Customs in this area has
been outstanding and the Dubai CSI operation is a model
representative of the program. On the consular/immigration
side, the Department of Homeland Security recently
established a Visa Security Unit in the UAE with plans for
some outreach with UAE officials.


6. (U) In suppressing terrorist financing, the UAE Central
Bank continued to enforce anti-money laundering regulations
aggressively. Tightened oversight and reporting requirements
for domestic financial markets resulted in a stronger legal
and regulatory framework to deter abuse of the UAE financial
system. The Central Bank provided training programs to
financial institutions on money laundering and terrorist
financing. In April, the Central Bank hosted the third
international hawala (informal money remittance and exchange
businesses) conference. The Central Bank investigated
financial transactions and froze accounts in response to UN
resolutions and internal investigations, as well as
registering approximately 160 hawala dealers to date. The US
Government has provided the UAE with anti-terrorism and
anti-money laundering training, as well as technical
assistance for bankers, prosecutors, judges, and police.


7. (U) On June 6, the UAE Cabinet of Ministers approved
accession to two U.N. conventions on terrorism, the 1999
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
and the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings. The federal Supreme Ruling Council is expected to
formally ratify the conventions. The UAE is currently a
party to eight of the 12 international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism and is considering acceding
to the final two: the 1988 Convention on the Safety of
Maritime Navigation and the 1988 Protocol on the Safety of
Fixed Platforms.


8. (SBU) The U.S. and UAE began negotiating terms of a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT),but progress was stalled
because of UAE insistence to conduct negotiations on an
extradition treaty simultaneously. The UAE Constitution
prevents the extradition of UAE nationals, and U.S. policy is
to not sign extradition treaties with countries that do not
extradite their own citizens. While the UAE has cooperated
with the U.S. in rendering fugitives in the past, that policy
has now changed and U.S. extradition requests were completely
unsuccessful in 2005.

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Sanctuary (Safe Haven) Assessment
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9. (U) The UAE extended no support for international
terrorism, terrorists, or terror groups, nor made any public
statements in support of a terrorist-supporting country on a
terrorism issue in 2005. There are no areas in the UAE where
terrorists are relatively free to operate.


10. (U) As we reported in the 2004 Country Reports on
Terrorism, UAE law enforcement agencies have the authority to
intercept wire, oral and electronic communications, subject
to limitations imposed by prosecution guidelines in the
courts. Law enforcement authorities can initiate
surveillance and investigation of suspected
terrorists/terrorist facilitators based on intelligence
information, and that information can be used as evidence in
court. In antiterrorism cases, the State Security Department
has investigative authority and prosecutors have
prosecutorial authority. There is no special examining
magistrate with special powers in the antiterrorism area.
Intelligence is permitted as evidence in a court. In the
event there are legal restrictions in this area, the best
work-around is deportation if the suspect is non-Emirati.
According to the 2004 anti-terrorism law, suspected
terrorists/terrorist facilitators can be held for two weeks,
with a two-week extension. Then, extensions of one month can
be added incrementally, which is tantamount to being held
indefinitely. This is true when a case is pending and during
trial. Law enforcement agencies have access to telephones
and to a lesser extent email, and if the technical capability
is there, access to the suspected terrorist is recorded.
There are no weekend passes for suspected terrorists to leave
jail, and foreign government service de-briefings are not
allowed. The detaining authority collects photographs and
fingerprints, but not DNA samples.

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Terrorist Groups
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11. (U) There are no known indigenous Emirati terrorist
organizations.

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Foreign Government Cooperation
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12. (U) The UAE continued to show firm resolve in cooperating
with the U.S. government to identify, control, and restrict
funding to, terrorists or terrorist organizations. The UAE
Government has requested and received training from the U.S.
In January, May and September, DS/ATA hosted UAE law
enforcement officers for various training programs in
counterterrorism and diplomatic security. In September,
representatives from the U.S. Federal Protective Service
provided physical security assessments of public facilities
in order to identify further training needs. In December,
four UAE police officers participated in DS/ATA training in
New York and Washington, D.C., on the antiterrorism response
to terror incidents in high-rise buildings.


13. (U) U.S.-UAE export control cooperation efforts have also
been strong. The UAE recognizes the need to stop the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related
materials. The U.S. Government has been training UAE
officials on export controls/nonproliferation with the goal
of attaining unilateral UAE adherence to MTCR and other
nonproliferation regimes. In Dubai, State Department and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials conducted a
training seminar for Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and northern Emirates
customs officials and police.
QUINN