AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD MEETS ABU DHABI, DUBAI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004540

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/I, AND NEA/ARPI, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SY IZ AE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD MEETS ABU DHABI, DUBAI
LEADERSHIP, AND IYAD ALLAWI

REF: A. ABU DHABI 4200


B. ABU DHABI 4261

Classified By: DCM Martin R. Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: During an October 18-20 visit to the UAE,
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met leaders of Abu
Dhabi and Dubai emirates, as well as former Iraqi Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi. Ambassador Khalilzad reviewed the
just-held constitutional referendum and the approaching
December 15 parliamentary elections, and thanked Abu Dhabi's
leadership for its quiet efforts to urge greater Sunni Arab
participation in Iraq's political process. A significant
portion of each meeting centered on USG and UAEG concerns
over Iranian interference in Iraq's domestic affairs, and
Syria's failure to stop insurgents from crossing into Iraq
from Syria. Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
proposed a joint Abu Dhabi-Dubai "operation" to urge Sunni
Arab involvement in the political process. All interlocutors
favored a greater role for Dubai-based Iraqi Sunni cleric
Ahmed Al Kubaysi. End Summary.

Constitutional Referendum
--------------


2. (C) At a meeting October 18 with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and Deputy Prime
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan
bin Zayed (HbZ),Ambassador Khalilzad reviewed the October 15
constitutional referendum, noting that approximately 10
million Iraqis had voted. He briefly described the
constitutional amendments announced on October 12, including
the review clause that will allow the next Council of
Representatives a one-time opportunity to amend the
constitution. He thanked MbZ and HbZ for their help in
persuading greater Sunni Arab participation in the political
process.

Next Political Milestone: December 15 Elections
-------------- --


3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad underscored the need for Iraqis
to participate in the December 15 parliamentary elections,
and that it would be particularly helpful to see greater
involvement by moderate, cross-sectarian political
personalities and parties.


4. (C) MbZ inquired whether the U.S. had had any success
tracing financing for Zarqawi and the Baathists from "this
part of the world." He said the UAEG believes there is money
coming from "the Wahhabi part of the world," namely Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. In a smaller meeting immediately
following this discussion, MbZ, without being specific,
mentioned his concern that funds from some entities in the
UAE were getting into the wrong hands.

Iranian Influence
--------------


5. (C) MbZ asked about the extent of Iranian influence in
Iraq, particularly on the security forces. Ambassador
Khalilzad said the Iranians were gaining "considerable
influence" in Iraq. Sunni insurgents were inadvertently
helping Iranian penetration into Iraq. U.S. forces are
"entangled" in western Iraq fighting the insurgency, which
has "opened the door" for the Iranians in the south. In
Baghdad, certain institutions, including the police, have
been "penetrated" by Badr Brigades and other forces that are
Iranian, he said. Iranian influence can be felt "across the
board," Khalilzad said.

MbZ: Syria's Bashar No Different Than Old Guard
-------------- --


6. (C) The Al Nahyans expressed little sympathy for Syrian
President Bashar. Ambassador Khalilzad said the Syrians are
seeking to get Bashar and Iraqis together for a "photo
opportunity," and some Iraqis were contemplating going to
Syria. MbZ said the Iraqis should not go to Syria until they
get something positive from the Syrians in return.
Ambassador Khalilzad said that was his tactic as well. MbZ
inquired about the situation in Syria in light of Interior
Minister Kanaan's suicide. "How messy it is going to be?"
Ambassador Khalilzad said President Bashar was going to come
under more pressure. MbZ said the Syrian president was
"living in another world. I don,t think Bashar is a person
you can trust." Bashar may be in his 30s, but he has the
same mentality as the old guard, MbZ said. "Syria is a
country that needs a major change." Ambassador Khalilzad
agreed with MbZ.

Sufis to the Rescue?
--------------

7. (S) In a smaller meeting with only Khalilzad and Charge,
MbZ and HbZ asked whether other countries ) especially
Jordan and Turkey -) were being helpful to the U.S. in Iraq.
MbZ also offered his theory that the promotion of Sufism (as
a benign, more spiritual form of Islam) would serve as an
antidote to Muslim fundamentalism and extremist violence in
the region. MbZ said he would supply the names of Sufis who
might advance such a strategy.

Meeting with Dubai Crown Prince
--------------


8. (C) At a meeting October 19 with Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR),Ambassador Khalilzad discussed the
need to "win over the population from the insurgency," and
urged MbR to use his influence with his Sunni contacts.
Iraqis idealize the UAE and its success in producing
prosperity, he added. Ambassador Khalilzad said the UAE
could help Iraq economically by encouraging investment there,
but also by helping Iraqis build their institutional
capacity, such as in the banking sector. MbR affirmed the
UAE's support for U.S. objectives in Iraq. One way to
succeed, MbR said, is to ensure that Iraqis reap more of the
economic benefits in the post-war period.


9. (C) MbR proposed that Dubai, together with Abu Dhabi,
create a joint "unit" or "operation room" that would identify
people and organizations in Iraq that the USG could work with
to encourage Sunnis to participate. MbR also said that he
still believes that Ahmed Al Kubaysi, a Dubai-based Iraqi
cleric, could be urged to play a positive role in encouraging
Sunni participation. "He does not want to be prime minister.
He wants to help bring people together," MbR said.
Khalilzad agreed that it would be good for the UAE to
encourage not only Al Kubaysi, but Al Kubaysi's other
contacts as well. MbR said that Dubai had "a lot of
contacts" in Iraq, and that he would "talk with my brothers
in Abu Dhabi (referring to the Al Nahyan ruling family)"
about how the UAE can help move Iraq's political process
forward. (Note: MbR delegated Dubai State Security Chief
Mohammed Qemzi to follow up on the "operations room." End
note.) An organized cross-sectarian alliance of Iraqis
headed by Allawi would isolate and weaken Al Qaida, MbR said.
He also applauded the constitutional amendment addressing
the legal protection of Baath Party members. Some Iraqis
were forced to be Baathists, he said, and should not be held
liable. Rank and file Baathists should be allowed to
participate in the political process, ideally with a new name
for their movement.


10. (C) MbR also sought U.S. views on Iran, including its
interest in acquiring nuclear power. He said it would be
good to persuade Iran that they don't need nuclear weapons,
and that dealing with Iran needed to be done peacefully, not
militarily, since Iran would "make a great deal of trouble
for us" if the U.S. went to war with it.

A Role for Ahmed Al Kubaysi?
--------------


11. (S) Al Kubaysi's name came up again the night of October
19 when Ambassador Khalilzad and Charge met with MbZ, HbZ,
and Iyad Allawi in HbZ's palace. When asked whether Al
Kubaysi could play a positive role, HbZ responded that what
was required was to guide him. Allawi said that Al Kubaysi
could be "very useful" in getting the insurgents on board.
He added that Al Kubaysi is respected by the ulema and is
influential. Major General Atiq Juma Ali bin Darwish,
director of Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's
Office for Military Coordination and a frequent UAE emissary
to Baghdad, said Al Kubaysi's call in 2003 for American
forces to leave Iraq had been misunderstood because of an
exaggeration by interpreters at the time. Al Kubaysi did not
say that he wanted American forces to leave Iraq immediately,
but only after finishing the job in Iraq, Atiq said. HbZ
said that the UAE was not promoting Al Kubaysi out of any
love for Al Kubaysi, but out of love for Iraq. Atiq added
that Al Kubaysi is accepted by the vast majority of Shi'a in
Iraq and can be used as a bridge. Allawi agreed with the
assessment. Allawi suggested that Al Kubaysi go to Baghdad
to sit, talk, and influence. HbZ said he would support frank
talks with Al Kubaysi, adding that "moderate Sunnis and Shi'a
must be supported in Iraq or the country will be handed over
to Iran. America will be replaced by Iran."

Bringing Sunnis, Baathists, on Board
--------------


12. (S) Allawi advised the U.S. to talk to President Talabani
and Prime Minister Jaafari about helping with the budgets of
mosques and salaries of imams. The U.S. could also help pay
for mosques that were destroyed and use its influence to
raise the quota for Sunni pilgrims, Allawi said. Atiq
observed that the de-Baathification process had produced
negative consequences and that it was important to try to fix
the situation. The way to handle it was not to go after the
Baathis themselves (who are scared),but to treat them as
normal citizens. He would advise the Iraqi government not to
prosecute or punish Baathis who did not have blood on their
hands but who joined the party only to survive and put food
on the table. It was important, he said, to bring back most
of those who were disbanded from the police and army. Atiq
added, "We need a strong leader in Iraq, not someone who is
sleeping." HbZ agreed that Iraq's history made that point
clear.

13. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this message.
SISON