Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI4200
2005-10-04 11:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

MINSTATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MEETS AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR IZ QA TC 
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Diana T Fritz 08/28/2006 11:34:28 AM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 04200

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: ECON AMB DCM MEPI USLO DAO P/M PAO RSO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MSISON
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:MQUINN

VZCZCADI548
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #4200/01 2771113
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041113Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1866
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5455
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004200 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ QA TC
SUBJECT: MINSTATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MEETS AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004200

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ QA TC
SUBJECT: MINSTATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MEETS AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad
visited Abu Dhabi October 4 to urge Deputy Prime
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan
bin Zayed (HbZ) and the UAE to support the Iraqi political
process. HbZ agreed that the UAEG would encourage
Dubai-based Iraqi Sunni cleric Ahmed Qubaysi to issue a
positive statement. HbZ also agreed to invite former Sunni
Waqf (Endowment) leader Adnan Duleimi, and Duleimi's
successor, Ahmed Abd Al Ghaffour Al Samarrai, to the UAE to
urge them to engage positively on the constitution. HbZ
asked that the U.S. urge Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states to stand together to counter Iranian influence in Iraq
and to adopt a GCC statement of public support for the Iraqi
constitution. He suggested that television stations such as
Abu Dhabi Television and Al Arabiya could broadcast
statements of support for the Iraqi political process to the
Arab street. HbZ reiterated the UAE leadership's support for
Iraqi PM Iyad Allawi. HbZ invited Ambassador Khalilzad to
return to UAE later this month to discuss Iraq issues with
his older brother, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed,
and Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid.


2. (SBU) HbZ was accompanied by his chief of staff, Sultan Al
Romeithy, and MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi. Ambassador
Khalilzad was accompanied by Ambassador Sison and Embassy
Baghdad's Deputy Political Counselor. End Summary.


3. (C) HbZ agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad that the outcome
of the political process in Iraq would have a strategic
effect on the region and on U.S. policy in the region. HbZ
warned that a premature U.S. troop pullout would be
"disastrous."

Winning Sunni Support for the Constitutional Referendum
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad requested the UAE's help in
encouraging Sunni Arabs not to isolate themselves. Khalilzad
briefed HbZ on his efforts with Shi'a and Kurdish leaders to
obtain their agreement to modifications to the constitution
to accommodate Sunni Arab concerns. These four

accommodations concern the following areas:

-- New wording on official languages (alternative Article 4,
Part 3): "The federal and official institutions in the
Kurdistan region will use the two languages."

-- New article on Iraq's unity (proposed addition to Section
1): "Iraq is a federal country and united unit in land,
people, and sovereignty, and this Constitution is the
guarantor of its unity."

-- Iraq's identity (alternative wording to Article 3): "Iraq
is a country of multiple nationalities and religions and
sects. It is a founding and active member of the Arab league
and is committed to its covenant, and it is a part of the
Islamic world."

-- National reconciliation (addition to Article 7 or 131):
"Members of the former Ba'ath Party who were not senior
leaders and who did not commit criminal offenses shall not be
prosecuted and shall enjoy equality and protection under the
law along with all Iraqis."


5. (C) HbZ welcomed Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts and said
Sunni Arabs should accept that this is the "best
constitution." HbZ also agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad's
suggestion that the UAE invite Sunni Arab leaders, such as
the new and former Sunni Waqf (Endowment) leaders
(respectively, Ahmed Abd Al Ghaffour Al Samarrai and Adnan Al
Dulaimi) to the UAE to see if they can become "positively
engaged" on the constitution. He also agreed with Ambassador
Khalilzad that it was important to encourage Sunni Arabs to
participate in an October 10 meeting of Shi'a, Sunnis, and
Kurds to express their support for the constitution, and for
the Sunni to support the constitution, especially given the
compromises Ambassador Khalilzad had successfully obtained
from the Shi'a and Kurds to accommodate Sunni Arab concerns.
He pledged to contact Sunni leaders in Iraq to urge their
participation in the conference. He also said he would speak
to the Dubai leadership about crafting a UAE strategy on
Iraq, but he also said he saw the need for Gulf states to
develop a Gulf strategy for dealing with Iraq.


6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad agreed on the need to develop a
Gulf strategy. "Given that time is short, it can't wait," he
told HbZ. "These countries that are like-minded about
promoting moderate cross-sectarian Iraqi politics need to
start working together now." HbZ suggested bringing in Qatar
early, adding that Doha-based Arabic-language TV station Al
Jazeera had "great influence on the Arab street." He said
the Arabic-language media could "send a positive message"
about the Iraqi constitution. Ambassador Khalilzad agreed
that it would be useful for the UAE leadership to urge the
media to explain federalism and the UAE's successful
experience with federalism.

Countering Iranian Influence
--------------


7. (C) HbZ agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad that if Sunni
Arabs did not participate in the constitutional and political
processes, it would work to the advantage of hard line Shi'a
parties as well as Iran. HbZ added that the hard line Sunnis
have made it more difficult for the U.S. to cope with the
Iranian threat. He noted that he had met with former Iraqi
PM Iyad Allawi and Prince Bandar, and that all had agreed
that the next four years would be crucial for Iraq. If the
situation could not be addressed successfully, it would
strengthen Iran's hand in Iraq, he cautioned. "We need a
Gulf strategy. Otherwise, we will leave Iraq open for the
Iranians," he asserted. He criticized Saudi Prince Saud Al
Faisal for having issued his critical statement about Iran's
role in Iraq )- without coordination with other Gulf states.
Following that, Qatari Foreign Minister Hamid bin Jassim,
because of bilateral differences with the Saudis, issued a
more positive statement about Iranian influence in Iraq to
counterbalance Prince Saud's statement. "If Iran is allowed
to influence Iraq in the short-term, they will grow
stronger," HbZ said. "The Gulf states need to stand
together." HbZ urged the U.S. to approach the Gulf countries
about standing together, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia.


8. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad also said it was important to
press Syria to stop causing trouble. He and HbZ agreed that
Iran could not be allowed "to turn Iraq into what Syria did
to Lebanon." He underscored the importance of watching
developments in southern Iraq very carefully. Ambassador
Khalilzad and HbZ also agreed on the need to prevent further
Iranian political encroachments into Iraq.

Support for non-sectarian leaders
--------------


9. (C) Given the decisiveness of the next elections,
Ambassador Khalilzad said cross-sectarian moderate groups can
play an important role in affecting Iraq's future in a
positive direction. HbZ reiterated his support for Iyad
Allawi. In addition to having credibility and strength,
Allawi is a moderate Shi'a, a liberal, and possesses good
credentials among Sunni Arabs, he said. Ambassador Khalilzad
urged HbZ to encourage Allawi to spend more time in Iraq
organizing himself for the next election. While it was
important to work with Allawi, it was also important to work
with others who are non-sectarian and moderate. He advocated
engaging "patriotic Iraqis" who happened to flee to Iran
during Saddam's regime, rather than "shutting the door on
them."


10. (C) HbZ raised reports of a spat between President
Talibani and Prime Minister Jaafari. Ambassador Khalilzad
confirmed that the two were not happy with each other, but he
had pressed the Kurdish leaders to engage with Jafari to
resolve their differences to keep the government together.

Bilateral Cooperation and Coordination on Iraq
-------------- -


11. (C) HbZ undertook to take the following actions in the
near term:

-- Urge Dubai-based Sunni cleric/television commentator Ahmed
Al Qubaysi to issue a positive statement about the Iraqi
constitutional process;

-- Invite former Waqf leader Adnan Al Dulaimi, and his
successor, Ahmed Abd Al Ghaffour Al Samarrai, to the UAE to
encourage them to engage on the constitution;

-- Encourage the Arabic media to issue statements of support
for the Iraq constitution.


12. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad recommended the U.S. and UAE
have a mechanism for cooperating bilaterally on Iraq issues.
HbZ said the UAE would do "everything we can to support your
efforts," and suggested Iraq coordination take place through
Ambassador Sison in Abu Dhabi as well as through the Emirati
Charge in Baghdad. (Note: Minutes after Ambassador Khalilzad
departed Abu Dhabi, former IGC member Adnan Pachachi, who is
in Abu Dhabi this week, called Ambassador Sison to report
that he had had "a good conversation" over lunch with
President Khalifa earlier in the day and would most likely be
seeing Sheikh Khalifa again October 4. End note.)

13. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this message.
QUINN