Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI4102
2005-09-28 08:48:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND TEAM'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS EFIN IZ IR SY TC 
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Diana T Fritz 08/28/2006 03:54:27 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 04102

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: PAO AMB DAO DCM USLO RSO MEPI P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: A/DCM:HOLSIN-WINDECKER ECON:OJOHN ULSO:RSIMM

VZCZCADI235
OO RUEHC RUEHEG RUEHRH RUEHKU RUEHDO RUEHAM
RUEHDE RHEHNSC RUEATRS RHMFISS RUEKJCS
DE RUEHAD #4102/01 2710848
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280848Z SEP 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1759
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0623
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1492
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1038
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1187
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0590
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5438
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASH DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 004102 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/I, AND NEA/ARPI, NEA/I
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE
CENTCOM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT
CJCS FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS EFIN IZ IR SY TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND TEAM'S
VISIT TO UAE

REF: A. ABU DHABI 3161

B. ABU DHABI 4045

C. ABU DHABI 4074

D. STATE 152459

E. ABU DHABI 1680

F. ABU DHABI 3244

G. ABU DHABI 3272

H. ABU DHABI 3700

I. ABU DHABI 3266

J. STATE 177476

K. STATE 176666

L. ABU DHABI 4025

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 004102

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/I, AND NEA/ARPI, NEA/I
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE
CENTCOM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT
CJCS FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL JONES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS EFIN IZ IR SY TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND TEAM'S
VISIT TO UAE

REF: A. ABU DHABI 3161

B. ABU DHABI 4045

C. ABU DHABI 4074

D. STATE 152459

E. ABU DHABI 1680

F. ABU DHABI 3244

G. ABU DHABI 3272

H. ABU DHABI 3700

I. ABU DHABI 3266

J. STATE 177476

K. STATE 176666

L. ABU DHABI 4025

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: The United Arab Emirates has been a key Arab
partner and has supported our objectives in Iraq, condemned
terror attacks, allowed Coalition forces access to UAE air
force bases and ports, and hosted German training for the
Iraqi military and police. UAE aid to Iraq, both pledged and
delivered, has been significant. The UAEG has publicly
committed to forgive the majority of Iraq's debt although
debt relief commitments have yet to be implemented. Your
visit will be an opportunity to thank UAE leaders for their
ongoing support, lay out the USG strategy for achieving
success in Iraq, enlist UAEG views about future courses of
action, and encourage the UAE to publicly support Iraq's
political process and accelerate disbursements of pledged
assistance. End Summary.

Political Support
--------------


2. (U) The UAE leadership has strongly condemned terror
attacks in Iraq )- including the dissemination of
UAEG-drafted sermons in the mosques condemning the killing of
civilians in Iraq and the assassinations of the Egyptian
Ambassador (ref A). The UAEG has also regularly voiced
support for the Iraqi people. In September at UNGA, UAE
Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed urged the
international community to "support the Iraqi government in
its efforts to build a stabilized and united Iraq." The UAE
leadership had also publicly supported the January 30 Iraqi

national assembly elections, and allowed the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) to operate an Out-of-Country
Voter (OCV) program for Iraqi citizens resident in the Gulf
to enable them to vote.


3. (C) To date, however, the UAEG has not made a public
statement in support of the constitutional referendum or
upcoming elections, although privately Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) has told us he believed Sunni
Iraqis should participate more in the political process. He
told Ambassador and a visiting delegation September 20 that
the U.S. should try to "get the maximum percentage of Sunnis
to support it" (ref B). (Comment: We continue to make the
point that it shouldn,t be up to the U.S. alone to achieve
greater Sunni participation; key Arab partners, including the
UAE, should be taking a more active role in getting Sunnis to
participate. End Comment.) MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al
Noaimi told Ambassador September 24 that the UAE's leadership
has tried to allay Iraqi Sunni fears about federalism by
explaining its benefits, using the UAE as an example of a
federal system that has not disintegrated (ref C). The UAE
has also advised Iraqis that their new constitution could be
provisional without putting the country in jeopardy. "The
constitution is a live document that can be developed," Al
Noaimi said.


4. (C) MbZ and other leaders regularly express to us their
preference for Iyad Allawi, whom they regard as capable and
trustworthy and a moderate Shi'a who would put Iraq's
interests before Iran's. Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ) told
the Secretary on August 15 that the UAE would continue to
give strong support to Allawi, whom he and his brother, MbZ,
consider a friend and "the most credible leader for Iraq"
(ref D). Allawi has made several unannounced trips to Abu
Dhabi over the past year to meet with UAE leaders and met
with HbZ in late August in Morocco. MbZ reiterated his and
his brothers' financial and moral support for Allawi to us on
September 20. He also emphasized that Iraq needed laws to
punish corrupt officials, citing Ahmed Chalabi specifically.
He pointedly criticized the USG for "bringing in rogue people
to run Iraq."


5. (C) Despite repeated demarches urging the Emiratis to post
an Ambassador in Baghdad, the UAE has not yet upgraded its
Charge position. The UAEG has noted that it intends to wait
for the security situation to improve before sending an
Ambassador and expanding its Embassy staff.

UAE Concerns re: Iranian Interference in Iraq
--------------


6. (C) UAE leaders have told the Secretary, Ambassador and
visiting USG civilian and military officials that they view
with suspicion Iranian motives in Iraqi politics, and in the
Gulf region as a whole. The topic of Iran and its influence
in Iraq,s domestic affairs is likely to generate a vivid
exchange during your visit. HbZ had told Ambassador Dick
Jones during their meeting in Abu Dhabi April 12 that if the
Interior Minister post were to go to someone close to Iranian
intelligence, there could be assassinations of Sunnis and
liberal-minded Shi'as (ref E). During a July 20 lunch
meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, MbZ talked
about his discomfort and dismay at the ascendance of the
Shi'a majority in Iraq, as well as his belief that the Iraqi
Transitional Government was being influenced by Iran (ref F).

Syria's Role
--------------


7. (C) The UAE leadership has heard our concerns about Syria
and its failure to prevent foreign fighters from pouring into
Iraq, and the need to pressure both Syria and Iran to respect
Iraq's sovereignty and stop their territory from being used
by insurgents. MbZ told General Abizaid July 20 that the
Syrians were "making themselves vulnerable to extremists" and
that President Bashar Al Asad should "get the message very
clearly" that Syria cannot continue to help the insurgency.
In a meeting with Ambassador July 24, Information Minister
Sheikh Abdullah pledged his government's vigilance in
preventing Emirati citizens or expatriate residents from
traveling to Iraq )- directly or via Iran -- to join the
insurgency (ref G). UAE security services monitor ferry
traffic to Um Qasr (passengers and cargo) and anyone
exhibiting signs of extremist sympathies. Sheikh Abdullah
agreed with Ambassador that foreign fighters might eventually
seek to return to their home or neighboring countries
"credentialed" with terror experience gained in Iraq. He
vowed that the UAE would not allow that to occur. However,
Sheikh Abdullah's decision to travel to Damascus to meet with
President Bashar on July 31 (ref H) highlights the UAEG
decision to continue to engage with Syria rather than to
isolate the regime. Ambassador Jeffrey and team should
continue to underscore USG concerns over Syria's failure to
take genuine steps to alter its behavior toward Iraq by
stemming the flow of insurgents and denying safehaven to
former regime elements.

Military/Security Support
--------------


8. (C) MbZ has advised against a premature U.S. troop
withdrawal from Iraq. He indicated to us September 20 that
the Iraqis probably would be receptive to having certain Arab
forces on their soil, but he was critical of Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa for blocking such initiatives in

SIPDIS
the past.


9. (S) The Emirati leadership has tried in earnest to
accommodate U.S. requests for OIF military cooperation and
assistance. Al Dhafra Air Base (just outside of Abu Dhabi)
remains a key component of our relationship with the UAE and
is vital to the ability of CENTCOM and CENTAF to project
combat power in the AOR, including OIF/OEF/HOA support
operations. Al Dhafra currently hosts the 380th Air
Expeditionary Wing, with more than 1200 CENTAF personnel,
operating 16 KC-135 and 4 KC-10 air refueling tankers, as
well as 5 U-2 surveillance aircraft and a Global Hawk
remotely piloted vehicle. The Emiratis have granted
thousands of annual aircraft overflight and landing
clearances since OEF began. The UAE Air Force and Air
Defense has accommodated virtually every request for periodic
increases in forces at Al Dhafra, as mandated by our
fluctuating operations tempo. The ports of Jebel Ali and
Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy maritime interdiction
operations, resupply and sustainment, and combat support
efforts across the region, and have hosted in excess of 500
annual USN port visits for each of the past two years.


10. (C) The UAE has been working with Germany to provide
police and military training to the Iraqis in the UAE,
although police training is on hold because Iraq's Interior
Minister Baqir Solagh apparently wants it to take place on
Iraqi soil, the German Ambassador told us September 27. The
UAE and Germany have trained four groups of Iraqi civil
police (431 total) in the fundamentals of crime scene
investigation. Training took place at Al Ain Police College
in Abu Dhabi emirate. The UAE provided food, accommodations,
a small per diem, and transportation for the Iraqi police
between Iraq and the UAE. The UAE has hosted personal
protection training for 30 Iraqi police, a course to be
followed by a UAE-taught course in hostage rescue techniques
at a UAE armed forces location.


11. (C) In April-May 2005, 83 Iraqi army engineers came to
the UAE to receive basic leadership and mine awareness
training from the German Ministry of Defense. Those Iraqi
army engineers will return to the UAE in October-December
2005 to help train another 244 Iraqi army engineers. Once
the training is complete, this Iraqi engineering battalion
will serve in various Iraqi divisions. In addition to
hosting the training at the Zayed Military City army base,
the UAE armed forces are paying the Iraqis' rooms and board,
per diem, and transportation between Iraq and the UAE. In
addition, the UAE is donating some engineering equipment to
the Iraqi armed forces. Germany intends to offer training in
EOD tactics in the future.


12. (C) In addition to training, the UAE contributed over $8
million toward the transfer of M-113 armored personnel
carriers from Jordan to Iraq. The UAE donated four light
reconnaissance aircraft to Iraq and trained Iraqi pilots to
fly the planes, as well as 45 French-built Panhard APCs, with
a pledge of 180 additional M-113 APCs purchased from
Switzerland. Since May 2004, the UAE Director of Military
Intelligence has provided officers to coalition headquarters
in Baghdad to perform duties as joint operations and joint
intelligence officers.

Economic Support
--------------


13. (SBU) Humanitarian/Reconstruction Aid: Since OIF, the UAE
has provided significant humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance to the Iraqis. The UAE pledged $215 million in
Madrid for Iraqi reconstruction, and has informed us that it
has disbursed the entire pledge on projects inside Iraq.
Although it has been very difficult to get an exact breakdown
of total UAE assistance to Iraq, given the loose federal
nature of the UAE and the fact that most assistance is
provided by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi rather than the federal
government, we do have breakdown of humanitarian assistance
for the period 2003 to April 2005 showing disbursements of
$77 million (ref I). The breakdown includes:

-- $34.3 million from the UAE Military General Headquarters
for medical services, money, machines, supplies, computers
and fuel;

-- $33.6 million from the UAE Red Crescent Society for
medicine and medical services, equipping hospitals and
medical facilities, desalinization plants, electric
generators for hospitals, services and care in the UAE;

-- $3.4 million from UAE Red Crescent "Air Bridge" for 26
flights with medicine, medical needs, foodstuffs, computer,
clothes, blood;

-- $2.4 million from the Office of His Highness the President
of the UAE for emergency relief and money.

-- $1.3 million from Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Foundation
for Charitable and Humanitarian Work for emergency relief;
-- $2 million from various charitable sources for foodstuffs,
medicine, flights to Baghdad, an orphans' project, emergency
school education, emergency relief, and training for Iraqi
diplomats.


14. (C) Generators: The UAE has yet to deliver Siemens
generators it had pledged as part of its $215 million pledge
at the Madrid Conference. In April, HbZ told Ambassador Dick
Jones that the generators were still being warehoused in UAE
because of "complications" on the Iraqi side. Moving and
installing the generators would cost between $33 million and
$37 million, and the UAE is willing to pay half that cost,
MbZ told Ambassador September 20. (Note: From what we are
told, the UAE has not discussed this issue with the Iraqis
recently. We understand that the UAEG had originally
requested support from the Germans and possibly other donors
to pay for the shipment and installation of the generators.
End note.)


15. (C) Debt Relief: The UAE publicly committed to SPE James
Baker that it would forgive most Iraqi debt in January 2004.
UAEG officials have told us that they have not, and would
not, asked the Iraqis to repay any of the debt that is owed
them. However, HbZ told the Secretary on August 15 that the
UAE wanted to announce publicly its debt relief commitments,
but it could not do so because it was bound by the GCC to
adopt a common position on Iraqi debt. He asked the U.S. to
put pressure on the GCC to announce a common stance on Iraqi
debt reduction. HbZ also said that the UAE would continue to
support Iraq financially but criticized its neighbors )-
particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia )- for not providing
more assistance.


16. (C) Asset Freezes: Embassy believes that the UAE
continues to freeze small sums of assets from the former
Iraqi government, but we do not have details. On a related
issue, in 2003 UAE courts released $43.5 million in frozen
assets from the Al Wasl and Babel trading company. In April
2004, Embassy presented the UAE Central Bank with a
pre-notification of the U.S. intent to propose the listing of
Al Wasl and Babel to the UN 1518 Sanctions Committee. At
that time, the Central Bank Governor said that the UAE would
comply with the UN resolution and freeze the account, but
that the Dubai Attorney General would need to take the lead
in investigating the case. In July 2004 the Dubai A/G
confirmed to CG Dubai that the accounts had been frozen (at
the request of the federal government); in October 2004,
Central Bank Governor Al Suwaidi told then-Treasury Assistant
Secretary Juan Zarate the same thing.

SIPDIS

USG Outreach to Media Having Positive Impact
--------------


17. (SBU) Coalition objectives are getting fairer treatment
in the UAE-based regional media today compared to two years
ago. The Dubai-based, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya Arabic
satellite news station competing with Al Jazeera for viewers,
stirred up controversy with sensationalistic broadcasts of
coalition POWs and dead Iraqis in 2003 and early 2004. It
appears that the station's owners received our message and
some quiet advice from the UAEG, as they brought in new
management in early 2004. Following active outreach in 2005
by senior U.S. military officers from CENTCOM (Deputy
Commander Lieutenant General Smith, and Deputy Director for
Plans and Policy Brigadier General Kimmitt) and NAVCENT to
the Arab media, and in particular Al Arabiya, we have
observed a willingness to candidly discuss issues and events,
as well as more balanced and objective reporting from Al
Arabiya. For its part, Al Arabiya's new management is
willing to meet, interview and exchange views with CENTCOM
and civilian officials to get the U.S. side of the story.
CENTCOM's Arab Media Engagement Center is up and running in
the UAE as of September 2005. Post has provided many
opportunities for local Arabic language journalists to
participate in media tours and naval embarkations to
encourage more balanced reporting and awareness of U.S.
policy objectives.
SISON